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Abstract 
 
“Addressing America: Washington‟s Farewell and the Making of  
National Culture, Politics, and Diplomacy, 1796-1852” 
Jeffrey J. Malanson 
 
Dissertation Advisor: David Quigley 
 
 
 This dissertation argues that George Washington‟s Farewell Address 
established the foundational principles of U.S. foreign policy and was the central 
text through which citizens of the Early Republic came to understand the 
connections between the nation‟s domestic and foreign ambitions.  In the eyes of 
most Americans, the Declaration of Independence affirmed their ideals and the 
Constitution established their government, but it was Washington‟s principles that 
would ensure the nation‟s maturation into a world power.  The Address became 
deeply embedded in the popular consciousness through annual readings on 
Washington‟s birthday, frequent discussion of its principles in the press, and as an 
integral component of the civic education of the nation‟s youth.  Ordinary 
Americans far removed from the nation‟s capital and from complicated debates 
over particular foreign policies and their implications could still express an 
informed opinion on the wisdom of those policies based on their understanding of 
the Farewell.   
 “Addressing America” goes beyond this popular story to illuminate how 
the Farewell shaped the fundamental disagreement over the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy from 1796 to 1852.  When Washington issued his valedictory he 
intended it as a flexible and pragmatic statement of the general principles that 
  
should guide the construction of foreign policies aimed at protecting American 
interests.  An essential part of Washington‟s wisdom was the recognition that the 
nation‟s interests would change over time, and thus so too would its foreign 
policies.  Five years later, incoming President Thomas Jefferson summarized his 
approach to foreign policy in his inaugural address of 1801 by promising “peace, 
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with 
none.”  This phrase was universally seen as an allusion to the Farewell Address 
and it immediately entered the popular lexicon as a way of pithily describing the 
nation‟s core foreign policy principles.  Over time “entangling alliances with 
none” became associated directly with Washington.  More than just a case of 
misattribution, the linking of this phrase to the Farewell permanently altered the 
meaning of the Address for most Americans; instead of a flexible statement of 
general principles, it became a rigid prescription for a permanent foreign policy of 
virtual isolation from the rest of the world.  In the fifty years after Jefferson‟s 
inaugural, the overarching narrative of American foreign policy is the conflict 
between these competing interpretations of the Farewell Address and how these 
differences in principle produced a varied understanding of both U.S. foreign 
policy and America‟s place in the world.  This dissertation is the first work of 
historical scholarship to conduct a sustained examination of the ways that 
Washington‟s Farewell Address was understood over time by early Americans 
and how it fundamentally shaped their view of the United States and its place in 
the world.
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Introduction 
 
 For more than fifty years after its first publication in September 1796, 
George Washington‟s Farewell Address persisted for most Americans as the 
central document that shaped their understanding of the relationship the United 
States should have with the rest of the world and the principles that should guide 
its foreign policy.  Washington could not have known when he sat down to 
prepare this Valedictory that it would have this type of significant and lasting 
impact, but he surely would have been gratified to learn that Americans still so 
highly valued the principles and maxims he had felt were essential to the nation‟s 
future growth and prosperity.  This dissertation is interested in how the Farewell 
Address and its principles were used and understood by American policymakers 
and the American public from 1796 to 1852, and how these evolving views 
shaped the direction and conception of U.S. foreign policy and the larger project 
of the early American republic.  Throughout this period the Address acted as both 
a principled foundation and rhetorical justification in debates about U.S. foreign 
policy between presidents, secretaries of state, diplomats, and members of 
Congress.  Outside of this “official” sphere, it also carried a tremendous cultural 
importance, as it was seen as being not just the Father of his Country‟s vital 
Legacy to the American people but also the prescription for the achievement of 
the future glory he had predicted.  Ordinary Americans far removed from the 
nation‟s capital and from complicated debates over foreign policies and their 
implications could still express an informed opinion on the wisdom of those 
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policies based on their understanding of the Farewell.  Most importantly, the 
Farewell was the central lens through which most Americans viewed and 
understood the ongoing project that was the United States and its growth and 
development as a power on the world stage. 
 When George Washington wrote about foreign policy in his Farewell 
Address he was really discussing an approach to foreign policy and the principles 
that should underlie it.  As will be seen in this dissertation‟s first chapter, he 
devoted multiple manuscript pages to expressing these ideas, but his multitude of 
points and warnings can be boiled down to a single core idea: that the object of 
foreign policy should be the attainment and protection of America‟s best interests.  
Washington believed that an honest assessment of those interests, unclouded by 
foreign attachments or antipathies, by partisanship, or by anything else not 
concerned solely with strengthening the Union, would produce a wise foreign 
policy.  In 1796 this meant the expansion of U.S. commerce, but an otherwise 
strict neutrality in all foreign matters.  At the same time, he stressed that these 
interests would necessarily change over time as the nation grew and matured and 
as external circumstances changed.  As a result, the Farewell Address was 
intended not as a declaration of any specific foreign policy, but rather as a flexible 
statement of the principles that should permanently guide American diplomacy. 
 Thomas Jefferson advanced an alternative view of the Farewell Address in 
his March 1801 inaugural address when he promised the American people that his 
administration would pursue “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all 
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nations, entangling alliances with none.”1  Between its emphasis on commercial 
expansion and its prohibition against any other external entanglements, 
Americans immediately interpreted this phrasing as an allusion to Washington 
and the Farewell.  Within a decade, many Americans would come to see 
“entangling alliances with none” as not just an allusion to Washington, but as a 
direct quote from the Farewell Address itself.  This was a highly significant 
development that has been grossly underappreciated by historians, as this phrase 
was responsible for producing an entirely different understanding of 
Washington‟s principles than what he originally intended.  Instead of putting 
forward core principles to guide the creation of a flexible foreign policy, 
“entangling alliances with none” yielded a rigid prescription for a permanent, and 
largely isolationist, approach to the wider world.  While this influenced the way 
many politicians and policymakers shaped U.S. diplomacy, it also had a 
tremendous and widespread impact on popular conceptions of the relationship the 
United States should have with the rest of the world.  Americans continued to 
support aggressive commercial expansion, but the isolationist tendency of 
“entangling alliances with none” led many to increasingly view the United States 
as necessarily standing apart from the rest of the world, and to see the nation‟s 
greatness as intimately connected with its independence of all political 
entanglements.  All the while, there remained a small but vehement group who 
remained dedicated to Washington‟s original principles.  As a result, the larger 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1801, in James D. Richardson, ed., A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, 11 vols. (New York: 
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908),  1:323. 
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story of U.S. foreign policy, at least through the 1840s and the conclusion of the 
Mexican War, is the story of these competing interpretations of the Farewell 
Address, and how these differences in principle produced a varied understanding 
of both U.S. foreign policy and America‟s place in the world.  After 1848, the 
conflict shifted away from the interpretation of the Address and towards the 
question of whether it still expressed the principles that should guide U.S. foreign 
policy.  To put it another way, after the war with Mexico some Americans felt 
that the Farewell Address, as defined by the dominant “entangling alliances with 
none,” represented a too rigid prescription for American foreign policy. 
 The overarching focus of “Addressing America,” then, is an exploration of 
these conflicts.  This dissertation is not a history of U.S. foreign policy, but 
instead is the narrative of an idea, of the evolution of George Washington‟s 
Farewell Address in the American political and popular mind.  This narrative is 
illuminated by its connection with key foreign policy decisions and debates, but is 
more concerned with how they shaped and were shaped by these divergent 
understandings of American principles.  The significance of this study is twofold.  
First, it allows for a much deeper understanding of the development of U.S. 
foreign policy over an extended period of time, and places that policy in the 
context of the evolving conceptions of American principles and ideals, while also 
highlighting the formative connection between popular views and diplomatic 
action.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, it refocuses modern attention on 
the paramount importance placed on the Farewell Address by nineteenth century 
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Americans.  People throughout the nation derived their understanding of the 
development of the United States, its relationship with other countries, and 
ultimately of its responsibilities on the global stage from the Farewell Address.  
Despite its centrality, Washington‟s Farewell remains largely absent from modern 
historiography. 
 This is a substantially different approach to the history of the early 
republic, and to the Farewell Address in particular, than what is often seen in 
historical scholarship.  Most historians who have touched upon the Farewell at all 
focus almost entirely on its diplomatic or political import and ignore its popular 
impact.
2
  “Addressing America” builds substantially on this scholarship – not to 
                                                 
2
 Any discussion of the Farewell Address must begin with Felix Gilbert‟s seminal work on the 
development of early American foreign policy, To the Farewell Address, and his contention that 
the Address, with Alexander Hamilton as its chief architect, was simultaneously the application of 
existing European ideas about foreign policy as well as something new.  Two other leading views 
that speak to the general interpretations that have been advanced by many who have only briefly 
touched on the Farewell are articles by Samuel Flagg Bemis and Alexander DeConde.  Bemis‟s 
“Washington‟s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence,” emphasized the long-term 
view of American foreign policy and the nation taken by Washington when he constructed the 
Farewell.  DeConde, in “Washington‟s Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796,” 
countered such works that praised the Address by condemning it as little more than a piece of 
political propaganda aimed at influencing the outcome of the presidential election of 1796.  
Historians have also taken many other approaches to the discussion of foreign policy in the 
Farewell Address.  Joseph Fry noted the intrinsic connection between commerce and foreign 
policy in his article “Washington‟s Farewell Address and American Commerce,” while Patrick 
Garrity argued that the Address was actually aimed at the creation of a “distinctive American, and 
republican, character,” in his essay, “Warnings of a Parting Friend.”  Felix Gilbert, To the 
Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1961); Samuel Flagg Bemis, “Washington‟s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of 
Independence,” American Historical Review 39 (Jan. 1934): 250-68; Alexander DeConde, 
“Washington‟s Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796,” Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review 43 (Mar. 1957): 641-58; Joseph A. Fry, “Washington‟s Farewell Address and 
American Commerce,” West Virginia History 37, no. 4 (1976): 281-90; and Patrick J. Garrity, 
“Warnings of a Parting Friend,” National Review 45 (Fall 1996): 14-26. 
 For a sampling of other important works focusing on the Farewell Address, see Albert K. 
Weinberg, “Washington‟s „Great Rule‟ in its Historical Evolution,” in Historiography and 
Urbanization: Essays in American History in Honor of W. Stull Holt, ed. Eric F. Goldman 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941); Arthur A. Markowitz, “Washington‟s Farewell and 
the Historians: A Critical Review,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 94 (Apr. 
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mention a series of truly excellent recent works on early American politics and 
political culture – but also moves in important new directions.3  This dissertation 
is the first work of historical scholarship to conduct a sustained examination of 
the ways that Washington‟s Farewell Address was understood over time by early 
Americans and how it fundamentally shaped their view of the United States and 
its place in the world.   
  “Addressing America” begins with the construction of the Farewell 
Address.  While the traditional narrative places a great deal of emphasis on 
developments in Washington‟s second term in comprehending the foreign policy 
portion of the Farewell, fuller consideration of his first term and his post-
Revolution/pre-presidential years allows for a more robust understanding of the 
evolution of Washington‟s foreign policy thought as well as a more accurate 
understanding of his true meanings.  In this vein, an examination of the 
administration‟s response to the Nootka Sound Controversy of 1790 is especially 
                                                                                                                                     
1970): 173-91; Horace Binney, An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington‟s Farewell Address 
(Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, Publishers, 1859); Victor Hugo Paltsits, Washington‟s Farewell 
Address: In Facsimile, with Transliterations of All the Drafts of Washington, Madison, & 
Hamilton, Together with Their Correspondence and Other Supporting Documents (New York: 
New York Public Library, 1935); Matthew Spalding and Patrick J. Garrity, A Sacred Union of 
Citizens: George Washington‟s Farewell Address and the American Character (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); and François Furstenberg, In the Name of the Father: Washington‟s 
Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 2006). 
3
 These works include, Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher, eds., 
Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Jeffrey L. Pasley, “The Tyranny of 
Printers”: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 2001); David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of 
American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); 
James E. Lewis, Jr., The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States 
and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998); and Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and 
Narratives of U.S. Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). 
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instructive.  Though it was widely praised at the time it was published, the 
Farewell did not become engrained in the American consciousness as a sacred 
document containing principles of perpetual utility until after Washington‟s 
unexpected death in December 1799.  The period of national mourning that 
followed, and the widespread invocation of the Address by Americans as their 
departed Father‟s vital legacy, elevated it to the status of the nation‟s founding 
documents.  Chapter 2, “Washington‟s Farewell in the American Mind, 1796-
1817,” explores this process as well as the immediate impact of Thomas 
Jefferson‟s “entangling alliances with none” on evolving conceptions of the 
Farewell Address.  This chapter also examines the spread of Washington 
Benevolent Societies in the North during the presidencies of Jefferson and James 
Madison and the role these primarily Federalist organizations played, especially 
during the War of 1812, in celebrating Washington‟s birthday as an annual 
holiday and in making the explicit connection between adherence to the Farewell 
Address and America‟s continued peace and security.  These Societies largely 
faded away after the war, but the traditions and discourse they popularized had an 
enduring impact. 
 Chapter 3, “John Quincy Adams and the Legacy of the Farewell Address,” 
focuses on the presidential administration of James Monroe and specifically on 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams‟s conduct of U.S. foreign policy.  Next to 
Washington himself, Adams is arguably the single most important individual in 
any extended discussion of the legacy of the Farewell Address, as he was the 
  
8 
 
leading proponent of a view of the Address uninfluenced by “entangling alliances 
with none.”  From the 1790s on, Adams was a staunch advocate of 
Washingtonian principles, which guided him throughout his career as a politician 
and diplomat.  This chapter explores the evolution of Adams‟s foreign policy 
thought for the insight it gives into the application of Washington‟s principles in 
the years after the War of 1812, as well as for how it highlights the growing 
significance of the differing interpretations of the Farewell Address.  
Understanding Adams and his view of the Farewell is also critical to 
understanding the creation in 1823 of what history has come to call the Monroe 
Doctrine.  The Doctrine was intended by Adams as an expansion of the Farewell 
Address to meet the new challenges posed by the recent independence of Latin 
America.  It aimed to expand Washington‟s sphere of separation from European 
influence and interference to include all of the free American nations, and warned 
Europe of this new expectation.  Adams was not looking to fundamentally alter 
U.S. principles or to abandon the nation‟s longstanding neutrality, but rather to 
acknowledge that it was in the best interests of the United States to pursue a 
minimally closer relationship with the newly free republics extending to its 
borders than it previously had with Europe. 
 Initially hailed as a strong defense of American interests and principles, 
some critics soon began to question the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine, fearing 
that it threatened American neutrality, and ultimately that it violated 
Washington‟s Farewell Address.  For the first time the competing interpretations 
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of the Farewell had come into direct conflict with each other in shaping the 
understanding of the principles America would base its Latin American policy on.  
“America‟s Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy and the Panama Congress 
of 1826,” the dissertation‟s fourth chapter, examines the moment this conflict 
entered the political and popular spheres in the national debate over then President 
John Quincy Adams‟s proposal to send U.S. delegates to the Congress of Panama.  
This congress was intended as a meeting of the independent nations of the 
Americas at which Adams hoped to see U.S. principles – specifically those of the 
Farewell Address – adopted internationally.  At stake in the Congressional debate 
over participation were the interpretations and legacies of both Washington‟s 
Farewell and the Monroe Doctrine.  While the Panama mission was approved by 
Congress after five months of rigorous debate, the manner in which the debate 
was carried out, the way it was covered in the press, and the arguments leveled by 
both sides resulted in the larger American memory of the proceedings being the 
failure of the mission.  This legacy of failure carried with it the rejection of the 
Monroe Doctrine and the confirmation of the “entangling alliances with none” 
conception of the Farewell Address. 
 Chapter 5, “The Revaluing of American Principles, 1826-1850,” considers 
the quarter-century after the Panama debate as a period of transition for American 
society and for U.S. principles of foreign policy.  The Panama debate was the first 
salvo in a renewed partisanship that gave rise to America‟s second party system 
and an era of mass participatory politics.  This upswing in political participation 
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helped to turn the 1832 centennial anniversary of George Washington‟s birth into 
one of the grandest national celebrations to take place in the country‟s history to 
that point.  As the sectional crisis began to deepen in the 1830s and 1840s, the 
Farewell Address only grew in importance as an expression of Unionist 
sentiments.  In addition to investigating these popular transitions, this chapter also 
examines the evolving diplomatic uses of the Farewell Address and the Monroe 
Doctrine, primarily brought about by America‟s attempts to annex Texas.  The 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine as John Quincy Adams had envisioned them 
reemerged in the early 1840s, but they were soon manipulated by Presidents John 
Tyler and James K. Polk to justify annexation and as part of a pretense for war 
with Mexico.  Not only did these actions engraft entirely alien meanings upon the 
Doctrine, but victory over Mexico permanently changed the debate over the 
fundamental principles of foreign policy.  After 1848, this debate moved away 
from the competing interpretations of the Farewell Address and towards the 
question of whether it was still a useful guide for American action, as an 
increasingly vocal minority began advocating a more activist and interventionist 
foreign policy. 
 These competing views of America‟s proper role in the world were put on 
national display from December 1851 to July 1852 with the tour of Hungarian 
revolutionary leader Louis Kossuth throughout the United States, which is 
detailed in the dissertation‟s final chapter, “„Washington or Kossuth‟?: The 
Farewell Address in the American Mind after Fifty Years.”  Kossuth came to the 
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United States to secure economic, political, and potential military support for 
Hungary‟s future revolution against Austrian rule, primarily in the form of a 
pledge by the United States government that it would intervene in Hungary to 
prevent any other powers from intervening – intervention to defend the principle 
of non-intervention.  In order for Kossuth to convince the American government 
and people of the legitimacy of this principle, he had to argue against continued 
adherence to Washington‟s Farewell Address.  In the wake of the Mexican War, 
some Americans felt that the United States now had a responsibility to defend 
republican principles abroad and thus endorsed Kossuth‟s call.  For a larger 
majority, the attack on the Farewell Address only served to reinvigorate interest in 
and allegiance to its maxims for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.  Even for 
those who saw a grander mission for the United States in the wider world, it was 
as an example of the strength of republican principles and not as the vindicator of 
those principles.  The great importance of Kossuth‟s tour is not just that it 
produced the most significant reevaluation of the Address to take place in the 
nation‟s history, but that this reevaluation was carried out by both politicians and 
a broader spectrum of Americans from throughout the nation. 
 The significance of “Addressing America” rests with the two interrelated 
histories it tells about the political and popular understandings of the Farewell 
Address – the official diplomacy and public celebrations carried out in its name.  
Handed down by the Father of his Country, its principles shaped American 
foreign policy, but were also shaped by their cultural life in the early nineteenth 
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century.  Only through this dual investigation can the fundamental importance of 
George Washington‟s Farewell Address to the citizenry of the early American 
republic – to say nothing of the impact it had on the development of that republic 
– be truly appreciated.  First, though, it is necessary to go back to the beginning 
and Washington‟s efforts to construct a Valedictory Address that would strike an 
enduring chord with the nation. 
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One: Constructing the Farewell Address 
 
 On 19 September 1796, word quickly spread throughout Philadelphia of 
what many had been suspecting for months: George Washington would not seek, 
nor would he accept, a third term as President of the United States.  His closest 
friends and advisors knew that he had longed for retirement almost since the day 
he took the oath of office in 1789, and that he had attempted to step down at the 
end of his first term before agreeing to stand for reelection.  Republicans and 
Federalists alike had been plotting for months over whom they would support and 
where they could secure victory should Washington bow out.  While the fact of 
his retirement did not surprise anyone, the form in which he chose to announce it 
did.  Rather than issuing a simple statement to Congress or to the states declaring 
his intentions, Washington produced a lengthy tract addressed directly to the 
people of the United States.
1
  More than just announce his retirement, he used this 
valedictory, or Farewell Address, to hand down “the disinterested warnings of a 
parting friend,” and to give to the people “some sentiments; which are the result 
of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all 
                                                 
1
 The Address was published in David C. Claypoole‟s American Daily Advertiser under the simple 
heading, “Friends, and Fellow-Citizens.”  Washington‟s valedictory was not referred to by its 
more famous title until it was published as “Washington‟s Farewell Address” by the Courier of 
New Hampshire several weeks later.  It should be emphasized from the outset that even though it 
is commonly referred to as an address, evoking images of Washington standing before an eager 
audience as he read it to them, it was never delivered as such and was actually prepared with 
newspaper publication in mind.  Victor Hugo Paltsits, Washington‟s Farewell Address, In 
facsimile, with transliterations of all the drafts of Washington, Madison, & Hamilton, together 
with their correspondence and other supporting documents (New York: The New York Public 
Library, 1935), 55, 67. 
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important to the permanency of your felicity as a People.”2  This chapter 
investigates the Farewell Address itself, its content and its creation, but is more 
concerned with the evolution of George Washington‟s thought on U.S. foreign 
policy and the principles that should guide it.  Understanding his conception of 
these principles is essential to understanding the meaning of and his hopes for the 
Farewell Address. 
 While much of the Address was devoted to promoting the importance of 
the Union and its preservation, the most impactful advice handed down by 
Washington focused on America‟s relationship with the outside world and the 
principles that should shape it.  What was clear throughout this discussion of 
foreign policy was that he did not just see it as the duty of the government, but 
instead as the responsibility of the entire populace, as a national project.  
Washington urged Americans to “Observe good faith and justice towds. all 
Nations.  Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . .  It will be worthy of a free, 
enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great Nation, to give to making the 
magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted 
justice and benevolence.”  There were two important ideas here that would 
reappear throughout this portion of the Farewell.  Taking the second idea first, it 
was the assertion that the United States and its people represented a “too novel 
example” in the history of the world as long as it carried itself appropriately on 
                                                 
2
 The full text of the Farewell Address can be found in multiple sources, including Paltsits, 
Washington‟s Farewell Address, 139-59, but this dissertation will refer to the version in George 
Washington, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-
1799, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1931-44), 35:214-38.  Quotes from page 218. 
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that stage.  More important was his description of the United States as “at no 
distant period, a great Nation.”  This recognition that the United States had not yet 
achieved greatness was at the heart of the recommendations to follow.
3
 
 Washington cautioned that “nothing is more essential than that permanent, 
inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachments for 
others should be excluded; and that in place of them just and amicable feelings 
towards all should be cultivated.”  He believed that “The Nation, which indulges 
towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a 
slave.  It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient 
to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.”  Antipathies caused people and 
nations to take up arms when wise policy would dictate peace, and passionate 
attachments encouraged “the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases 
where no real common interest exists,” leading to behavior that wise policy would 
likewise overturn.  The most important refrain of the Address was this need to 
recognize and act upon America‟s true interests.  Washington was especially 
concerned with the appearance of favoritism in the conduct of foreign policy, as 
the “attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful Nation, dooms 
the former to be the satellite of the latter.”  In this case, the United States was both 
a small and a weak nation.  Attachments and antipathies plagued more than just 
national policy, as with the individual, “Excessive partiality for one foreign nation 
and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger 
only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the 
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other.  Real Patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favourite, are liable to 
become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and 
confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.”  As a result, the “jealousy 
of a free people ought to be constantly awake” to the “insidious wiles of foreign 
influence.”4 
 Washington next laid out his “Great rule of conduct for us, in regard to 
foreign Nations,” the basic principle of which was “in extending our commercial 
relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.”  It was 
essential that Americans remember that “Europe has a set of primary interests, 
which to us have none, or a very remote relation.  Hence she much be engaged in 
frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our 
concerns.”  As a result, “it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by 
artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary 
combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities.”  Washington 
believed that one of America‟s greatest blessings was that “Our detached and 
distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.  If we remain 
one People, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may 
defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude 
as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously 
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making 
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we 
may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by our justice shall Counsel.”  
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This was the heart of Washington‟s message, the need to not only understand 
what America‟s true interests were, but also to fully grasp what they were not, and 
what was at stake in the process – short-term survival and long-term greatness.5 
 Washington questioned why Americans would “forego the advantages of 
so peculiar a situation?  Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?  Why, 
by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace 
and prosperity in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humour or 
Caprice?”  He concluded that it was “our true policy to steer clear of permanent 
Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.”  As long as the United States 
took care “always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectably 
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.”  Once again, the idea of American interest is interwoven 
throughout this section of the Farewell Address.  This was interest broadly 
defined as well, as Washington was concerned not just with the immediate 
implications of American actions but the far-reaching ramifications as well.  In 
1796 the United States could not force any of the great powers of Europe to 
respect its rights as a neutral nation through intimidation or force, but a wise 
foreign policy would help to ensure that in the not-too-distant future that would 
change.  Washington expanded on this idea towards the close of the Address in 
disclosing that, “With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain 
time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress 
without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency, which is 
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necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.”  
Washington firmly believed that with time – time free from foreign interference, 
time dedicated to the development of an American character and the 
strengthening of the American union – the United States would become a great 
power, equal, if not superior, to any in Europe.
6
 
 In the years after its publication the Farewell Address was interpreted 
many different ways and took on vastly divergent meanings, but an examination 
of Washington‟s entire discussion of foreign policy makes clear that, despite its 
length and its multitude of points, it can be distilled down to a few core principles.  
First and foremost, and as had been repeated several times already, it was the 
responsibility of policymakers and all Americans to render an honest assessment 
of what the best interests of the United States were before constructing or 
enacting foreign policies.  In 1796, while the United States was still a small and 
weak nation, those interests were commercial expansion and political separation 
from Europe, as well as the avoidance of permanent alliances.  As the nation grew 
and prospered, as its people and institutions solidified and matured, and as the 
international context changed, those interests – and the specific policies that 
would best protect them – would necessarily change as well.  The recognition of 
change over time was the second core principle of the Address, and, as will be 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, was the one largely forgotten by 
subsequent generations.  Washington was not prescribing a permanent foreign 
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policy, but rather permanent principles to guide the construction of new foreign 
policies to meet new global challenges.  Beyond suggesting that in the future the 
United States would more easily be able to force other nations to respect its 
principles, Washington did not predict what those future interests or policies 
might be as he understood that as the nation‟s relationship with the rest of the 
world changed so to would its foreign policy.  He clearly believed that the 
avoidance of permanent alliances and the maintenance of neutrality in foreign 
political concerns and conflicts would be enduring ideals, but they were pursued 
to protect those interests.  With this understanding of the Farewell Address in 
mind, two questions emerge.  First, how did Washington come to have this 
conception of American principles and why did he feel it was necessary to lay it 
out in his Farewell Address?  Second, what impact, if any, did they have?  The 
first of these questions will be answered in this chapter; the second comprises the 
investigation to be carried out in the rest of this dissertation. 
 
Washington’s Second Term 
 Washington had originally planned on retiring from the presidency at the 
close of his first term.  In the spring of 1792 he turned to James Madison, whom 
he often sought out when he needed assistance drafting important public 
messages, and set him to work on a “Valadictory [sic] address from me to the 
public” that would express “in plain & modest terms” his reasons for stepping 
down.  It would also include a plea for national union and support of the federal 
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government.
7
  According to Madison, Washington confided to him that this 
additional component of the message was necessary because “a spirit of party in 
the Government was becoming a fresh source of difficulty, and he was afraid was 
dividing some (alluding to the Secretary of State [Thomas Jefferson] & Secry. of 
the Treasury [Alexander Hamilton]) more particularly connected with him in the 
administration.”8  Despite Washington‟s very specific concerns, Madison‟s draft 
of an address avoided any overt discussions of partisanship, simply declaring, 
“We may all be considered as the children of one common country.  We have all 
been embarked in one common cause.  We have all our share in common 
sufferings and common successes.”  If the “common Government” established by 
the Constitution was “supported by wise councils, by virtuous conduct, and by 
mutual and friendly allowances, [it] must approach as near to perfection as any 
human work can aspire, and nearer than any which the annals of mankind have 
recorded.”9  Washington approved of the tone of Madison‟s message, but 
ultimately consented to stand for reelection at the urging of his confidantes and 
advisors.  The question then became why Washington desired such a sharp shift in 
focus and a dramatic expansion of his valedictory by 1796?  Why move from a 
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brief and general address to an extended and quite detailed discussion of 
principles?  Why talk about the nation‟s foreign policy at all?  The answer boils 
down to the lived experience of the United States and of Washington himself in 
the intervening years. 
 Almost as soon as Washington agreed to stand for reelection, intelligence 
began to reach the United States of the outbreak of war between France and 
Austria; by March 1793, a general war in Europe seemed imminent.  While 
Washington desired that “such an event will not take place,” he also hoped that 
his fellow citizens would “have too just a sense of our own interest to originate 
any cause that may involve us in it,” and he “ardently” wished that the nation 
would “not be forced into it by the conduct of other Nations.”10  He firmly 
believed that it would be “unwise . . . in the extreme to involve ourselves in the 
contests of European Nations, where our weight could be but Small – tho‟ the loss 
to ourselves would be certain.”11  By early April word had reached the nation‟s 
capital at Philadelphia that France had declared war on Great Britain and 
Holland.
12
  War between Great Britain and France was especially difficult for the 
United States given that the nation had formally allied itself with France in 1778 
in the midst of its own revolution and that Britain was by far its most important 
commercial partner.
13
  Upon receiving the news Washington wrote to Secretary of 
                                                 
10
 George Washington to David Humphreys, 23 March 1793, in Papers: Presidential Series, 
12:362-63. 
11
 George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 25 March 1793, in Ibid., 380. 
12
 Tobias Lear to George Washington, 8 April 1793, in Ibid., 434-37. 
13
 See “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” and “Treaty of Alliance,” both dated 6 February 1778, in 
Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, 8 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-48), 2:3-34, 35-44. 
  
22 
 
State Thomas Jefferson that “it behoves the Government of this Country to use 
every means in it‟s [sic] power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us 
with either of those powers, by endeavouring to maintain a strict neutrality.”14  
Less than two weeks later Washington issued his famed Proclamation of 
Neutrality in the hopes of keeping his nation at peace with both European powers 
and uninvolved in their wars as anything more than a neutral trading partner.
15
  It 
should be emphasized that as far as Washington was concerned, the maintenance 
of American neutrality was the responsibility of all American citizens. 
 The Proclamation was an attempt to declare a national approach to the 
war, but in its wake the administration became engulfed with Franco-mania.  As 
has been well-documented, many Americans in this period felt that not only was 
France following in their own nation‟s revolutionary footsteps, but that the United 
States owed its loyalty and aid to France as a result of the 1778 alliance.  While 
these views manifested themselves in a multitude of ways, the most problematic 
in the summer of 1793 was privateering.  Supporters of France would arm their 
merchant vessels and prey upon British shipping in American waters, leading to a 
seemingly endless stream of letters flowing into the president from governors and 
revenue officers seeking guidance on how to deal with the privateers and their 
prizes (captured British vessels).
16
  The actions of these private citizens placed 
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America‟s national neutrality on a precarious footing, as even though the 
privateers were not state sponsored or government sanctioned, Great Britain could 
justifiably complain that its vessels, sailing in supposedly neutral waters, were 
subject to attack. 
 The difficulties with privateering for the U.S. government went beyond 
the actions of American citizens as well.  The treaty of alliance with France left 
open the question of what rights French privateers might have actually had to 
operate out of American ports.  More problematic was that France‟s minister to 
the United States, Edmond Charles Genet, was actively enlisting American 
citizens as privateers in the cause of France.  Genet first arrived in the United 
States to a cheering crowd in Charleston, South Carolina two weeks before 
Washington issued the Proclamation of Neutrality, and immediately 
commissioned four vessels as privateers of the French nation.  After manning 
them with largely American crews and setting them to sea, he set up courts under 
the control of the local French consul in Charleston to condemn the British prizes 
they brought back.  Ten days after he arrived in Charleston, Genet set out on a 
twenty-eight day trek north to Philadelphia, courting the public as he went, and 
caring little for the view the U.S. government was taking of his actions.
17
  Later in 
the summer, after it had been made clear to Genet that the outfitting of French 
privateers in American ports to prey on British shipping was prohibited, he 
pushed forward to begin equipping the Petite Democrate, a British ship originally 
                                                 
17
 Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 
1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 335-36. 
  
24 
 
named the Little Sarah that had been captured by a French privateer, to set out on 
a privateering mission of its own.
18
  When Genet was ordered to stop, he 
threatened to “„appeal from the President to the People,‟” claiming popular 
authority for the work he was doing.
19
  This was an affront to the authority and 
the legitimacy of the federal government, and to President Washington in 
particular, but Genet felt that he could engage in such behavior as a result of the 
enthusiastic crowds that received him throughout his travels.  By August 
Washington and the cabinet agreed that they could no longer abide Genet‟s 
insolence and that he would need to be recalled by the French government.
20
  
While Genet‟s actions and the larger privateering issue did no permanent damage 
to U.S. relations with Britain or France, it acted as a stark demonstration to 
Washington of both the practical dangers of foreign influence being exercised 
domestically and the impact private citizens, with their attachments, antipathies, 
and actions, could have on America‟s foreign relations. 
 In part spurred by an encouraging Genet, the Proclamation of Neutrality 
also caused the party development that Washington had lamented in 1792 to spiral 
out of control during the summer of 1793.  Most disturbing to the president was 
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the Republican press, which generally favored the cause of France, and 
continually portrayed the program of neutrality as an attempt to subvert the 
Franco-American treaties in aid to Great Britain.  One writer, labeling himself 
“Veritas,” wrote several letters to Washington in May and June, which were also 
published in the National Gazette of Philadelphia, condemning him for “officially 
opposing the national will,” which he claimed supported France.  Veritas 
predicted that “An attempt of this kind, at present, would be scouted with 
deserved contempt, and bring ruin on its author.”21  Another writer, calling 
himself, “A CITIZEN,” informed Washington that “The affections of thousands 
of your fellow-citizens are withdrawn from you, and suspicions are entertained, 
that you have, indignantly, cast behind you those endearing principles of 
republicanism, which are so congenial to the minds of your countrymen, and to a 
strict observance of which, you are, in a great measure, indebted for all your 
fame.”22  Washington‟s attempts to keep the nation at peace in a war it had no 
direct interests at stake in were being depicted by those in favor of France as 
being not only pro-British but also anti-America.  While this was an extreme view 
of the president in 1793, it was the increasingly common view that Republicans 
held of the Federalist program.  Federalists similarly distrusted Republican 
motives in their seemingly unwavering devotion to France.  While Washington 
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felt the personal attacks were unwarranted and misguided, he was greatly 
concerned about the populace turning against itself over a war he hoped the nation 
would have no direct involvement in. 
 Partisan vitriol worsened in 1795 with the conclusion of the Jay Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain.  Washington sent John Jay to Great 
Britain to settle the nations‟ differences stemming from recent violations of 
American neutral shipping by British vessels and British shipping by “French” 
privateers sailing in American waters, the impressment of American sailors to 
serve on British ships, and a series of long-standing complaints dating from the 
treaty of peace signed between the two nations at the end of the American 
Revolution.
23
  By the summer of 1794, tensions between the United States and 
Great Britain had reached such a height that an open rupture seemed likely if 
something was not done to avert it.  While the Francophiles might have welcomed 
such a conflict, Washington understood that war was clearly not in America‟s best 
interest given how woefully unprepared the country was to fight.  War would also 
create a significant upheaval for American commerce and would likely widen the 
already substantial rift in public opinion.  At the same time, Washington would 
not let Britain violate American rights with impunity just to avoid war.  Jay 
succeeded in negotiating a treaty that secured peace, but little else; even 
Washington admitted that its terms were far from ideal, as it failed to resolve 
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many of the issues that had led to the increased tension on the American side in 
the first place.
24
   
 As Jay completed his negotiations, he too recognized the potential 
shortcomings of the treaty, but warned Alexander Hamilton, “If this Treaty fails, I 
dispair of another.”25  For those concerned with keeping the United States at 
peace, it was this treaty or it was nothing.  Republicans saw the signing of this 
one-sided treaty as the consummation of a de facto alliance with Great Britain and 
the refutation of American obligations to France, and they regularly depicted it as 
such in the press.  Once again, as Washington saw it, an unbiased assessment of 
practical realities had been abandoned in favor of partisan views, leaving him to 
complain of a press that had rendered “the most tortured interpretation” of the 
treaty and whose writings were “pregnant of the most abominable mis-
representations.”26  The treaty passed the Senate with the minimum number of 
votes possible, and encountered a great deal of resistance in the House of 
Representatives.  Constitutionally speaking, the House had no direct role to play 
in the treaty-making process, but it was responsible for originating the 
appropriations necessary to carry the treaty into effect.  Republican congressmen 
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sought to leverage this power to defeat the treaty, and with some initial success.  
Ultimately, though, Washington‟s endorsement of the treaty swayed public 
opinion to exert pressure on members of the House to give up their opposition and 
pass the appropriations.  Writing in the aftermath of the of the crisis Washington 
reflected that the Republican members of the House had been motivated by “the 
partialities in favor of one nation, and of the prejudices against . . . Another.”  
This sentiment, expressed just days before Washington commenced the project of 
drafting his Farewell Address, clearly shaped its message.
27
 
 More deeply troubling to Washington than the affect these partialities and 
prejudices were having on the actions of the larger Republican party was the 
impact they had on the conduct of his personal friend and trusted advisor, 
Edmund Randolph.  Randolph had served as an aide-de-camp to Washington 
during the Revolutionary War and had been a pivotal member of the Virginia 
delegation to the Constitutional Convention in 1787.  When Washington was 
assembling his cabinet he tapped Randolph to be the nation‟s first Attorney 
General, and when Jefferson resigned as Secretary of State at the end of 1793 
Randolph was the president‟s choice to replace him.  Washington had complete 
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confidence in Randolph, confidence that proved to be misplaced.  In July 1795 
evidence surfaced in the form of an intercepted dispatch from Joseph Fauchet, the 
French minister to the United States, that while Washington had been in 
Pennsylvania the previous October attending to the Whiskey Rebellion, Randolph 
was disclosing information to Fauchet about the administration‟s dealings with 
the rebels.  It was also alleged that during their conversations, Randolph solicited 
a bribe from Fauchet in exchange for exerting influence over how the 
administration would handle the rebellion from that point forward.
28
   
 While historians have generally concluded that no such bribe was actually 
demanded, the overall direction and tone of Randolph‟s dealings with Fauchet 
were highly inappropriate, given that as Secretary of State he was laying before a 
foreign minister confidential insights into the nation‟s domestic discord, 
especially given that it was a minister from the very nation who had been sowing 
the seeds of discord just two years earlier.  Historians Stanley Elkins and Erik 
McKitrick have argued that Fauchet‟s dispatch “breathed malevolence and 
contempt for the United States government on the part of the resident French 
minister, and the confidences of Edmund Randolph had had a great deal to do 
with the way he had arrived at those sentiments.  At the very least, there was 
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something here profoundly disreputable to the government‟s good faith and 
character.”29  A week after receiving the dispatch, Washington, in front of the 
entire cabinet, confronted Randolph and demanded an explanation.  Randolph 
defended his actions as having been entirely above board, but ran from the 
president‟s house, embarrassed by what had transpired.  He submitted his 
resignation later that day.
30
  A burgeoning party spirit and attachments to Britain 
and France had torn apart Washington‟s first cabinet, permanently splitting 
Jefferson and Hamilton, and distancing him from James Madison as well.  Now 
the attachment to France had caused a trusted friend , and the last original 
member of his cabinet, to actively undermine the American government. 
 
From Confederation to Constitution: The Evolution of Washington’s Foreign 
Policy Thought 
 
 While the events of Washington‟s second term, detailed only briefly here, 
were clearly influential in shaping his discussion of foreign policy in the Farewell 
Address and the import he attached to that discussion, they only served to solidify 
the foreign policy ideas and ideals that had been evolving in Washington‟s mind 
since the end of the American Revolution.  Lessons from the Confederation 
period and his first presidential term helped give specific shape to the foreign 
policy principles tested during his second term and expounded upon in the 
                                                 
29
 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 425-26. 
30
 John Lamberton Harper, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 160-61. 
  
31 
 
Farewell.
31
  Key to understanding the development of these principles in 
Washington‟s mind is his conception of the American government itself.  
Washington‟s views of government were largely shaped by his experience at the 
head of the Continental Army during the Revolution.  This vantage point allowed 
him to see firsthand the weakness of the Confederation government in its inability 
to provide the army with adequate men, supplies, and monetary support.
32
  By the 
end of 1778, Washington expressed his fear that the United States was “on the 
brink of ruin” and he implored a fellow Virginian to “exert yourself in 
endeavouring to rescue your Country, by, . . . sending your ablest and best Men to 
Congress; these characters must not slumber, nor sleep at home, in such times of 
pressing danger; they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of places of 
honor or profit in their own Country, while the common interests of America are 
mouldering and sinking into irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin, in 
which theirs also must ultimately be involved.”33  Virginia‟s best and brightest 
were needed in Congress if this nascent nation was to survive.  Two years later 
Washington lamented “that unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone; 
unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great 
purposes of War, or assume them as a matter of right . . . our cause is lost. . . .  I 
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see one head gradually changing into thirteen.”34  By Washington‟s side 
throughout much of this time was aide-de-camp Alexander Hamilton, who shared 
the general‟s tremendous concern for the weakness of the central government.  In 
1780 he offered a critique of the “defects of our present system, and the changes 
necessary to save us from ruin.”  According to Hamilton, the “fundamental defect 
[of the present system] is a want of power in Congress,” a “want of sufficient 
means at [Congress‟s] disposal to answer the public exigencies and of vigor to 
draw forth their means.”  The system also suffered from “an excess of the spirit of 
liberty which has made the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in 
their own hands.”  The danger was that the “uncontrollable sovereignty in each 
state . . . will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union 
feeble and precarious.”35 
 In 1781-82 Hamilton brought his argument for a stronger central 
government directly to the people in a series of anonymous articles published in 
The New York Packet, and the American Advertiser known as The 
Continentalist.
36
  He forcibly and publicly expressed the deep fears held by 
himself and Washington for the future of the nation if the union and its 
government were not placed on a more stable footing.  With the approach of 
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peace with Great Britain in 1783, Washington wrote to Hamilton that the end of 
war marked an opportunity to affect the changes necessary to “make us a great, a 
respectable, and happy People,” and that such changes needed to be made by 
“other means than State politics, and unreasonable jealousies and prejudices.”37   
 It took four years for the rest of the nation to come around to 
Washington‟s view, but in May 1787 the Constitutional Convention got underway 
in Philadelphia with Washington presiding.  During the early days of debate, 
Washington wrote to Thomas Jefferson, then stationed in Paris, “That something 
is necessary, all will agree; for the situation of the General Governmt (if it can be 
called a governmt) is shaken to its foundation – and liable to be overset by every 
blast.  In a word, it is at an end, and unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy & 
confusion will inevitably ensue.”38  These United States were at a dire crossroads.  
Hamilton, also a delegate at the Convention, was one of the most ardent 
proponents of a strong national government.
39
  In early July, when he was called 
back to New York to attend to personal business, Hamilton wrote to Washington, 
who was still presiding over the Convention, outlining his belief that this was “the 
critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of this country on a solid 
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foundation.”  He feared “that we shall let slip the golden opportunity of rescuing 
the American empire from disunion anarchy and misery.  No motley or feeble 
measure can answer the end or will finally receive the public support.”40  
Washington was pessimistic about the prospect of success, replying to Hamilton 
that an examination of the progress of the Convention since he had departed 
would reveal “little ground on which the hope of a good establishment can be 
formed.  In a word, I almost dispair [sic] of seeing a favourable issue to the 
proceedings of the Convention, and do therefore repent having had any agency in 
this business.”  Washington was especially critical of the men “who oppose a 
strong & energetic government” as being “narrow minded politicians . . . under 
the influence of local views.”41  Washington and Hamilton both believed that they 
could very well be witnessing the final days of the United States of America. 
 The Convention finished its work, producing the Constitution and 
establishing a stronger federal government than either Washington or Hamilton 
had expected.  Even when placed on a stronger footing, though, Washington knew 
that future success would depend on the will of men and their ability to maintain 
national views.  In the winter of 1787-88, as war between Great Britain and 
France appeared to be imminent, and as the ratification of the Constitution 
remained uncertain, Washington expressed his wish that “we shall have wisdom 
enough not to take a part in their quarrels.”42   Expanding on these sentiments, he 
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declared that in the event of a European war, “we shall feel more than ever the 
want of an efficient general Government to regulate our Commercial concerns, to 
give us a National respectability, and to connect the political views and interests 
of the several States under one head in such a manner as will effectually prevent 
them from forming separate, improper, or indeed any connection, with the 
European powers which can involve them in their political disputes.”43  
Nevertheless, he feared that “we shall certainly get involved, unless there is 
energy enough in Government to restrain our People within proper bounds.”44 
 While it soon became clear that peace would prevail in Europe, if only for 
the time being, it did not wholly ease Washington‟s concerns.  Writing in August 
1788, he declared his “hope that [the] United States of America will be able to 
keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics & Wars,” as a period of 
peace, along with “the adoption of a good national government,” would allow the 
United States to “become respectable in the eyes of the world so that none of the 
maritime Powers, especially none of those who hold possessions in the new world 
or the West Indies shall presume to treat them with insult or contempt.”  With 
regards to Europe, “It should be the policy of [the] United America to administer 
to their wants, without being engaged in their quarrels.  And it is not in the ability 
of the proudest and most potent people on earth to prevent us from becoming a 
great, a respectable & a commercial nation, if we shall continue united & faithful 
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to ourselves.”45  Before he had even been elected to the presidency, then, 
Washington had a clear sense of the principles that would guide his foreign policy 
and that would shape the Farewell Address eight years later.  The United States 
needed to engage commercially with Europe without becoming otherwise 
involved; if the country could walk that tightrope it would achieve greatness over 
time.  When Washington assumed the presidency early the next year, he was 
thankful that the Constitution had been ratified and a stronger government erected 
that could better coordinate domestic concerns and foreign relations, but he still 
appreciated that ultimate success or failure of the American experiment lied as 
much with the people as with their new government. 
 
Washington’s First Term and the Nootka Sound Controversy 
 The first concrete foreign policy challenge faced by President Washington 
and his administration, the Nootka Sound Controversy, is also the most instructive 
for understanding his conception of America‟s principles and of the challenges 
the United States faced as a weak nation in a world of strong powers.  In the 
spring of 1789 as the United States was setting up its government in New York, 
across the continent Spain and Great Britain were looking to expand their 
commercial empires. At this point the United States only occupied a small portion 
of North America, as Britain controlled Canada and Spain maintained as colonies 
the Floridas and the remainder of the continent west of the Mississippi River.  By 
and large there was minimal dispute between these two great empires over their 
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North American claims, until it came to the northwest coast, where both powers 
aimed to establish ports to facilitate the fur trade with local Indians.  Both 
countries set their sights on Vancouver Island, just off of the coast of modern day 
British Columbia, and specifically on Nootka Sound.
46
 
 In mid-May 1788, John Meares, a retired British naval officer, landed at 
Nootka Sound as a preparatory step to a more permanent British settlement of the 
island.  He lived there for roughly six weeks at the start and end of the summer, as 
bookends to a series of trading voyages, before departing for the winter.  The 
following May a Spanish ship arrived at the Sound and found no evidence of prior 
occupation by anyone other than the natives, and claimed it for Spain.  Two 
months later two British ships sailed to Nootka Sound to initiate trade with the 
local Indians, believing it to be British territory by virtue of Meares‟s occupation 
of the island the previous summer.  Both ships were captured and sent as prizes to 
Mexico, as the Spanish commander at Nootka interpreted their presence as a 
violation of Spain‟s territorial rights.  Given the great distance between Nootka 
Sound and the imperial centers of Great Britain and Spain, it was not until the 
following February that negotiations began between the two countries to equitably 
settle the matter.  These negotiations quickly faltered as each side took a hard 
stance, leading the British to being preparations for a military solution. 
 On the surface the United States had no role to play in this European 
controversy, but two factors threatened to involve the Americans deeply.  The 
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first was the British military preparations, which included a “hot Press” wherein 
several thousand sailors were impressed into service in the British navy.
47
  From 
March to September 1790 several hundred American sailors were caught up in the 
impressments and were forced into service for Britain.  Impressment was a critical 
issue for American sailors and for the United States government and would 
increasingly become a point of conflict between the two governments over the 
next quarter-century.  In this case, though, the more critical factor determining 
American involvement was the potential theaters in which an Anglo-Spanish war 
could be carried out and the impact this would have on the United States.  It 
quickly became apparent to Washington and his cabinet that should hostilities 
erupt between Spain and Britain, the United States, surrounded by their colonies, 
could be forced to take sides.  This belief was further encouraged when George 
Beckwith, a British envoy in the United States, suggested to Alexander Hamilton 
that “should a war take place . . . the U. States would find it to be their interest to 
                                                 
47
 For a fuller discussion of the Nootka Sound Controversy, see William R. Manning, “The Nootka 
Sound Controversy,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1904 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905): 281-478; Derek Pethick, First 
Approaches to the Northwest Coast (Vancouver: J. J. Douglas Ltd., 1976); Barry M. Gough, 
Distant Dominion: Britain and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1579-1809 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), chapters 6-9; Frank T. Reuter, Trials and Triumphs: 
George Washington‟s Foreign Policy (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1983), 81-
85; and Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, 29 May 1790 and Alexander Hamilton to 
Washington, [8 July 1790], in  Washington, Papers: Presidential Series, 5:438, n. 1 and 6:26-29, 
source note.  Julian Boyd, editor of the Jefferson Papers, also compiled an extensive analysis of 
Alexander Hamilton‟s relationship with a representative of the British government, George 
Beckwith (whom Boyd described as being a secret agent), and discussed how the Nootka Sound 
Controversy played into Hamilton‟s larger efforts to “bend American foreign policy toward a 
closer connection with Great Britain.”  See “The War Crisis of 1790,” Editorial Note and 
accompanying documents in Jefferson, Papers, 17:35-108, 108-60.  Boyd subsequently expanded 
his treatment of the incident in Julian P. Boyd, Number 7: Alexander Hamilton‟s Secret Attempts 
to Control American Foreign Policy, with Supporting Documents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1964).  Above quote from Ibid., ix.  
  
39 
 
take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain.”48  Britain was certainly the 
stronger power at this point and a more important commercial partner than was 
Spain, but the United States could not afford a rupture with the Spanish, who 
controlled access to the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans, which 
were of tremendous importance to U.S. trade.  Of course the greater danger for 
the United States was that Britain would displace Spain on the North American 
continent.  As the U.S. minister to Great Britain, Gouverneur Morris, put it, 
should Spain submit to British naval power, “she may as well give up her 
american Dominions.”49 
 Faced with the possibility of alliances, warfare, and territorial transfer, 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson framed a British victory over Spain in quite 
stark terms.  He warned of “The dangers to us, should Great Britain possess 
herself” of the Floridas and Louisiana.  Britain would “possess a territory equal to 
half ours, beyond the Missisipi [sic]” and would “seduce that half of ours which is 
on this side the Missisipi [sic].”  Gaining such a significant foothold on America‟s 
borders would enable Britain to “take from the remaining part of our States the 
markets they now have for their produce by furnishing those markets cheaper, 
with the same articles.”  Britain would thus “encircle us compleatly [sic], by these 
possessions on our land-board, & her fleets on our sea-board,” and “instead of 
two neighbors balancing each other, we shall have one, with more than the 
strength of both.”  If Britain supplanted Spain, the continued existence of the 
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United States as an independent nation would be placed in doubt.  Understanding 
what was at stake in this Anglo-Spanish conflict, the question for Jefferson then 
became, “Would the prevention of this be worth a war?”50  For Washington and 
his cabinet the answer was complicated.  If they could be assured that if they 
joined the side of Spain that Great Britain would be defeated, then obviously war 
would be a reasonable course; however, America‟s inconsequential military and 
naval power would not tip the scales in Spain‟s favor.  The sober reality for the 
United States was that unless France – bankrupt and engaged in its own 
revolution – would throw its weight behind Spain, there was little chance of 
stopping Great Britain.   
 Washington‟s administration needed to find an alternative solution.  One 
such solution was to work with Spain to see Louisiana and the Floridas made 
independent, for, as Jefferson asked, “might [Spain] not prefer their Independence 
to their Subjection to Grt Britain?”  One possibility that Jefferson rejected was 
Beckwith‟s suggestion of an alliance with Great Britain.  As no guaranteed 
positive outcome would result from the United States involving itself in the 
conflict, Jefferson concluded that “in the event of a war between Gr. Brit. & Spain 
we are disposed to be strictly neutral.”  Should war occur, “we should view with 
extreme uneasiness any attempts of either power to seize the possessions of the 
other on our frontier, as we consider our own safety interested in a due balance 
between our neighbors.”  Jefferson‟s assessment of the Nootka Sound 
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Controversy and its possible impacts on the United States reinforced for President 
Washington just how precarious America‟s situation was and how far beyond the 
new government‟s control was the determination of its fate.51 
 Jefferson had clarified for Washington the real dangers posed by Anglo-
Spanish hostilities but had left him unsure of how to move forward.  Several days 
later the president requested any available information on the geographies, 
populations, and military capabilities of Mexico and Brazil, colonial possessions 
of Spain and Portugal, respectively.  What precisely the president planned to do 
with this information is unknown, although several historians have speculated that 
he was entertaining the idea of a potential U.S. intervention in those colonies.  No 
further evidence of discussion on the matter has been found, making it impossible 
to assess how seriously this option was considered or what Washington expected 
could be achieved by such an intervention, but even the preliminary consideration 
of such a step reveals how far afield the president‟s search for possible solutions 
went.
52
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 By early August, Washington and Jefferson had decided to use what they 
still believed to be an imminent war to their diplomatic advantage.  From the 
moment the United States gained its independence, free navigation of the 
Mississippi River, and the right of deposit at New Orleans had been objects of 
repeated negotiations with Spain.  Given the great military and naval advantage 
Britain would have over Spain in any war, Washington and Jefferson intended to 
leverage an offer of American friendship to extract concessions from Spain on 
these points.
53
  In support of his plan, Washington went so far as to write to the 
Marquis de Lafayette, a prominent leader in France and a close personal friend of 
Washington‟s dating back to the Frenchman‟s service in support of the United 
States during the American Revolution.  If anyone would assist Washington in 
this project it was the French, who deplored the prospect of British advancement 
on the North American continent just as much as the Americans and the Spanish 
did.  In his letter to Lafayette, Washington observed that the United States was 
“patiently advancing in our task of civil government, unentangled in the crooked 
politics of Europe, wanting scarcely any thing but the free navigation of the 
Mississippi.”  In the event of war between Britain and Spain, the United States 
would “observe a strict neutrality,” though he expected that their “friendship” 
would be “courted” by both sides.  Specifically with regards to Spain, Washington 
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asked “Why will not Spain be wise and liberal at once?  It would be easy to 
annihilate all causes of quarrels between that Nation and the United States at this 
time.  At a future period that may be far from being a fact.”  The not-so-subtle 
suggestion was that both nations had something to gain by an immediate 
negotiation.  Washington closed his letter by predicting that “Should a war take 
place between Great Britain and Spain, I conceive from a great variety of 
concurring circumstances there is the highest probability that the Floridas will 
soon be in the possession of the former.”  Whether aiming to plant the seed that 
Spain could declare the Floridas independent, or simply trying to add greater 
weight to his letter, Washington was painting a bleak picture for the Spanish in 
North America in the event of war with Britain while also alluding to some steps 
that could improve their situation.
54
  He was clearly hoping that Lafayette could 
use his influence to encourage Spain to negotiate with the United States. 
 While the Lafayette letter is a fascinating example of a weak nation (the 
United States) trying to wield the power of a strong nation (Great Britain) to bring 
a third party (Spain) to the negotiating table, it would take months to receive a 
response from Europe.  More than this, a positive response would not diminish 
the dangers posed to the United States by an Anglo-Spanish War – and there was 
no assurance of a positive response – and it did not reduce the perceived 
likelihood that war could break out on the nation‟s borders at any time.  By late 
August, Washington had become convinced, as he expressed it to Vice President 
John Adams, “that New Orleans and the Spanish Posts above it on the Mississippi 
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will be among the first attempts of the [British], and that the reduction of them 
will be undertaken by a combined operation from Detroit.”  Writing to Adams, 
Jefferson, Hamilton, Secretary of War Henry Knox, and Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court John Jay, Washington asked for advice on how he 
should respond to the British minister, Lord Dorchester, “in case he should apply 
for permission to march Troops through the Territory of the said States from 
Detroit to the Mississippi,” and “What notice ought to be taken of the measure if 
it should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probably proceeding of 
the two?”55  Washington‟s concern was twofold.  First, as a neutral nation, what 
were the implications of the United States allowing or disallowing British troops 
to move through its territory?  Second, how should the United States respond if its 
territorial sovereignty was not respected and the British marched through against 
America‟s wishes or without previously asking for permission?  The premise 
underlying both questions was that the U.S. did not want to see the British troop 
movement in the first place.  The answers Washington received to his queries all 
hinged upon the idea that the United States had to recognize what its true interests 
were, but that it had to balance those with the current inability of the nation to 
defend itself militarily in support of those interests if either Britain or Spain 
should violate them.  How the United States should respond to this particular 
situation stood at the root of his advisors‟ responses. 
 Jay believed that the only way the United States could refuse the British 
would be if they “should declare and make it an invariable Maxim in their Policy 
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never to permit the Troops of any Nation to pass thro‟ their country.”  He pointed 
out that “Such a Measure might be wise in case the U.S. were in Capacity to act 
accordingly; but that not being as yet the case, it would perhaps in the present 
Moment be unreasonable.”  If the United States did refuse and the British 
marched anyways, they likely faced “one of two inevitable Inconveniences;” 
namely “that of opposing their Progress by Force of Arms and thereby risque 
being involved in the War; or of submitting to the Disgrace and Humiliation of 
permitting them to proceed with Impunity.”  As either result was undesirable, Jay 
favored allowing the troop movement.
56
  Jefferson saw the same difficult choice 
as Jay, namely that if they refused the movement and the British marched 
anyways, the United States would either need to “enter immediately into the war, 
or pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the world: and one insult pocketed 
soon produces another.”  If Washington had to give an answer, he believed that he 
should allow it; however, he preferred a “middle course” in which they should 
“avoid giving any answer.”  In his estimation, the British “will proceed 
notwithstanding.  but to do this under our silence, will admit of palliation, and 
produce apologies, from military necessity; & will leave us free to pass it over 
without dishonor, or to make it a handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have 
use for it as such.”  By neither approving nor condemning a troop movement, they 
avoided possible insult should the British disregard their wishes and it left the 
United States free to act at future points as their interests dictated.
57
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 Adams disagreed with the conclusions reached by Jay and Jefferson.  He 
believed that in order to maintain American neutrality, and more importantly the 
appearance of neutrality, it was necessary for the administration to refuse the 
British troop movement.  He argued that to grant the British “permission to march 
troops through the territory of the United States . . . would not only have an 
appearance offensive to the Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a 
real Injury to Spain.”  Even if they also granted Spain the right to move its troops 
through U.S. territory, the initial step would be perceived as a facilitation of 
British aggression, thus the only truly equitable response was to deny any British 
request.  Adams acknowledged that should Great Britain proceed anyways, the 
United States would then be faced with a decision for war, but rather than fight or 
sheepishly accept the insult, he saw the real alternative to war being negotiation.  
He asserted that “Nations are not obliged to declare War for every Injury or even 
Hostility.  A tacit Acquiescence under such an Outrage, would be misinterpreted 
on all hands; by Spain as inimical to her and by Brittain [sic], as the effect of 
Weakness, Disunion and Pusillanimity.  Negotiation then is the only other 
Alternative.”  Adams admitted that negotiation was itself “attended with peculiar 
difficulties,” and was not likely to produce a positive effect, but it kept the United 
States out of war, avoided “a tacit Acquiescence,” and allowed them to stand 
firmly by their avowed neutrality in the eyes of the rest of the world.
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 Knox also determined that the passage should be refused, but that the 
refusal should not be backed by force, as “The true interests of the United States 
dictate a state of neutrality in the affair between Spain and England.”  Neutrality 
was more important to America‟s long-term interests than was the British insult.  
Along these lines, Knox feared that American neutrality would also be threatened 
by existing treaty obligations to France, as he believed it to be “highly improbable 
that Spain would enter the War unless she expected to be supported by France.”  
In that event, “every effort on the part of France will be employed to associate 
America in the War.  And it is a question of great moment whether the United 
States could strictly comply with the treaty of friendship and Commerce entered 
into with France . . . and observe an exact Neutrality.”59  Almost three years 
before the Proclamation of Neutrality, Washington and his advisors were already 
beginning to see the unintended consequences and great dangers posed by 
enduring foreign alliances.  Hamilton also raised the potential complications 
raised by treaty commitments, but leaned towards the view that there was no solid 
foundation to believe that France would actually involve itself in the war.  He 
concluded that the United States was in no position to oppose the passage, and 
would derive greater benefit from granting permission to a British request, as he 
argued that if the troops were going to proceed regardless of the American 
response, the British might be more inclined to acknowledge American rights of 
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navigation on the Mississippi if the United States did not hamper the war effort.
60
  
Of all the responses Washington received, Hamilton‟s was the most driven by a 
pragmatic reaction to realistic outcomes rather than a concern for larger principles 
or ideals. 
 For Washington and his administration, this flurry of letters on how to 
respond to a possible British troop movement and the ramifications of that 
response for American principles and policy proved to be the end point of 
documented discussions as the seemingly imminent war never arrived.  As 
Hamilton had expected, France could not commit to entering a war against 
Britain, leaving Spain, in the face of Britain‟s naval and military supremacy, to 
pursue a negotiated solution.  Historians of Washington‟s presidency have tended 
to give only minimal consideration to the Nootka Sound Controversy in assessing 
his foreign policy principles and mindset since there was no war and thus no 
formal diplomatic response.  While this fact makes it virtually impossible to know 
which course Washington would have pursued – especially given that he did not 
respond in writing to any of these last letters he received stemming from Nootka – 
the cabinet‟s discussion of theoretical plans of action is in many ways more useful 
for understanding Washington than had a war actually broken out.  The Nootka 
Sound Controversy confirmed Washington in his belief in the importance of U.S. 
neutrality in foreign war and politics and it acted as a stark reminder of how 
precarious the U.S. situation was given that it was surrounded by European 
colonies and could thus be easily embroiled in a war it had no interests in the 
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causes of but everything at stake in the outcome.  The Nootka letters also likely 
clarified two additional thoughts for Washington.  First, it illuminated the great 
dangers posed by permanent alliances with other powers.  Knox‟s warning of the 
difficult decisions the United States would face should France enter the war make 
it that much easier to understand why the president was proactive in announcing 
American neutrality when war erupted throughout Europe three years later.  
Second, and more importantly, the entire Nootka Sound Controversy instructed 
Washington that the conduct of American diplomacy was really about managing 
America‟s weakness and pursuing policies that would minimize the nation‟s 
exposure while best fostering its long-term growth and security.  Attempting to 
leverage American friendship to extract concessions from Spain was a perfect 
example of this.  The disagreement over how to best respond to a British request 
to march troops through U.S. territory when the government could do nothing to 
prevent it also emerged from differing viewpoints on this idea.  Later in his 
administration, the Jay Treaty was the embodiment of it.  The Nootka Sound 
Controversy produced no concrete foreign policy precedents, but it did help to 
shape Washington‟s understanding of America‟s foreign policy principles – 
principles that helped to guide him through the crises of his second term and 
served as the foundation of his Farewell Address to the American people. 
 
The Farewell 
 With the peaceful resolution of the Nootka Sound Controversy in Europe, 
the remainder of Washington‟s first term passed in relative peace from a foreign 
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policy perspective.  When he approached James Madison to help with the drafting 
of a valedictory in 1792, foreign policy was not on his mind.  Madison convinced 
Washington that the address should be written directly to the people, as a 
reflection on the American experience to that point.  With Nootka having been 
debated out of public view and two years in the past, and with the 
internationalization of the French Revolution and the popular upheavals it brought 
still a year away, there was no immediate context or need for a discussion of 
foreign policy principles, thus the draft Madison prepared contained no mention 
of them.  By 1796, with all of the changes and stresses the nation had experienced 
during his second term, Washington clearly understood that the project of 
constructing a new valedictory address was a much different undertaking than it 
had been four years earlier.  This was further cemented in Washington‟s mind, as 
preparations for composing it commenced in the immediate aftermath of the 
House debate over the Jay Treaty appropriations.  Washington had grown distant 
from Madison since 1792, so when he began preparations for a new valedictory 
he turned to a man who understood his approach to American government, union, 
and foreign policy better than anyone else, Alexander Hamilton.   
 Hamilton‟s impact on the form, scope, and specific content of the Farewell 
Address has been hotly debated by historians.  Felix Gilbert argued that while 
Hamilton used Washington‟s ideas in framing his version of the Address, “he 
placed them in a different setting and gave them a new meaning.”61  Alexander 
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DeConde took this a step further in pointing to the “prominent” hand of 
Alexander Hamilton in the construction of what he described as a “political 
manifesto, a campaign document.”62  Samuel Flagg Bemis disagreed with these 
views, and instead argued that “the ideas and thought of the Farewell Address are 
intrinsically the President‟s own.  Where he ceased to agree with Hamilton, 
Washington could not be led.”63  Victor Hugo Paltsits came to the same 
conclusions as Bemis, emphasizing the process Washington went through in 
constructing the final draft as he “drew upon each source and altered or 
introduced words at will, even words that were in no anterior draft.  In the last 
analysis he was his own editor; and the Farewell Address, in the final form for 
publication, was all in his own handwriting.  It was then in content and form what 
he had chosen to make it by processes of adoption and adaptation in fulfilment 
[sic] of what he desired.  By this procedure every idea became his own without 
equivocation.”64     
 Hamilton‟s biographers have tended to emphasize the cooperative nature 
of the venture.  Broadus Mitchell saw the Address as “the joint product of 
Washington and Hamilton.  Hamilton‟s was the lesser rôle, but important if only 
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because he furnished the form of words which conferred additional merit on the 
thoughts. . . .  In the Farewell Address they worked together over both principles 
and expression.”65  Ron Chernow argued that “It is difficult to disentangle the 
contributions of Washington and Hamilton because their ideas overlapped on 
many issues,” and because “their two voices blended admirably together.”  He 
described the results as “a literary miracle.  If Hamilton was the major wordsmith, 
Washington was the tutelary spirit and final arbiter of what went in.  The poignant 
opening section in which Washington thanked the American people could never 
have been written by Hamilton alone.  Conversely, the soaring central section, 
with its sophisticated perspective on policy matters, showed Hamilton‟s 
unmistakable stamp.”66  Gilbert Lycan, taking a closer look at the foreign policy 
section of the Address, concluded that “Hamilton contributed notably to the 
composition of the Farewell Address.  He is responsible not only for its beautiful 
style but also for many of its best-known principles.  His role in its creation, 
though second to that of Washington, is one of his greatest legacies to his 
nation.”67 
 Foregoing a detailed discussion of each draft of the Address, what 
emerges from a close examination of them is that Hamilton‟s involvement made it 
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possible for Washington to figure out what he wanted to say and how to best 
articulate it, but the beliefs themselves, the principles put forward, were all truly 
Washington‟s.68  A few key passages from the president‟s first draft of May 1796 
illustrate this point.  He expressed his wish “That we may avoid connecting 
ourselves with the Politics of any Nation, farther than shall be found necessary to 
regulate our own trade.”  He hoped “That every citizen would take pride in the 
name of an American, and act as if he felt the importance of the character by 
considering that we ourselves are now a distinct Nation the dignity of which will 
be absorbed if not annihilated, if we enlist ourselves (further than our obligations 
may require) under the banners of any other Nation whatsoever.  And moreover, 
that we would guard against the Intriegues [sic] of any and every foreign Nation 
who shall endeavor to intermingle (however covertly and indirectly) in the 
internal concerns of our country.”  He admonished “That whatsoever and so long 
as we profess to be Neutral, let our public conduct whatever our private affections 
may be, accord therewith; without suffering partialities on one hand, or prejudices 
on the other to controul our Actions.”  Finally, Washington asserted that “without 
the gift of prophecy, it may safely be pronounced, that if this country can remain 
in peace for 20 years longer: and I devoutly pray that it may do so to the end of 
time; such in all probability will be its population, riches, and resources, when 
combined with its peculiarly happy and remote Situation from the other quarters 
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of the globe, as to bid defiance, in a just cause, to any earthly power 
whatsoever.”69  Looking back at the passages quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, it is clear that Hamilton gave to the Farewell Address a distinctive 
thoroughness, structure, and style, but the major ideas were all present in 
Washington‟s first draft. 
 With a clearer understanding of why Washington chose to discuss his 
principles of foreign policy in the Farewell Address, the question still remains as 
to what he was trying to accomplish by invoking these principles?  In the short 
term, the Address was written with successor concerns in mind.  The two worst 
kept secrets in the nation‟s capital in the summer of 1796 were that Washington 
intended to retire and that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were contending to 
replace him.
70
  Given that a basic premise of the Address was that passionate 
attachments for certain foreign nations bred unwise policies, Washington clearly 
had to fear for the outcome of the pending election and the implications the next 
president‟s politics would have on America‟s relationship with Great Britain and 
France.  Despite these successor concerns, DeConde‟s labeling of the Address as 
little more than a campaign document was an inaccurate assessment of it for two 
critical reasons.  First, while it hoped to impact Americans‟ approach to the 
coming election, the Address was written so as to not be grounded in the 
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immediate politics of the time.  It expressed contemporary concerns and alluded 
to recent experience, but there was a conscious decision made to not specifically 
reference Great Britain and France or the actions of particular people or parties.  
In transmitting his first draft to Hamilton, Washington stated that “My object has 
been, and must continue to be, to avoid personalities; allusions to particular 
measures, which may appear pointed; and to expressions which could not fail to 
draw upon me attacks which I should wish to avoid, and might not find agreeable 
to repel.”71  He recognized that the Address could have a political impact, but he 
distinctly did not want it to be a political document.   
 Second, even if pointing to Hamilton‟s unabashed partisanship in his other 
endeavors, it is not possible to place his intentions ahead of Washington‟s when 
interpreting the Farewell Address.  Washington had specifically instructed 
Hamilton that even if he “should think it best to throw the whole [draft] into a 
different form,” it should still be “predicated on the Sentiments contained in the 
enclosed Paper.”72  Hamilton did this, and in constructing his draft of the Address, 
felt it to be his “object to render this act importantly and lastingly useful, and 
avoiding all just cause of present exception, to embrace such reflections and 
sentiments as will wear well, progress in approbation with time, & redound to 
future reputation.”73  Just like Washington, he did not want the Address to be 
rooted in the politics of 1796.  Even the language in the Address that can be 
interpreted as being more overtly political when attributed to Hamilton must be 
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read in light of how Washington would likely have understood it.  When 
Hamilton made reference to the “tools & dupes” of the favorite nation (France), 
he was likely thinking of leading members of the Republican party, such as 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
74
  When Washington kept the reference in 
the final draft, Edmund Randolph more likely came to mind as someone who had 
actively worked against his government for the sake of that favorite nation.
75
 
 Washington was optimistic that the Address would influence people‟s 
behavior beyond the presidential election.  He described the “Sentiments” 
expressed in Hamilton‟s draft to be “extremely just, and such as ought to be 
inculcated.”  In the Address itself he offered the “counsels of an old and 
affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting 
impression, I could wish; that they will controul the usual current of the passions, 
or prevent our Nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the 
Destiny of Nations.”  He continued by declaring his hope that these counsels 
“may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may 
now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the 
mischiefs of foreign Intriegue [sic], to guard against the Impostures of pretended 
patriotism; this hope will be a full recompence for the solicitude for your welfare, 
by which they have been dictated.”76  For the good of the country, Washington 
wanted the Address to have an impact.  In the short term, the influenced behavior 
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should be a diminution of partisanship and the election of a successor who would 
dedicate himself to the principles of Washington‟s administration, not to mention 
a cooling of the rhetoric surrounding America‟s relationship with France and 
Britain.   
 In the longer term, Washington‟s objective was more nuanced.  There 
were fundamental ideas that should be taken from the Address – the importance 
of a strong union and government, the constant need to put aside antipathies and 
affections in order to properly recognize America‟s true interest and to let that 
guide American action – but more than anything it was supposed to be a reminder 
that the country was still young and developing and needed time to mature.  The 
best interest of the United States was seeing the attainment of that time.  In 
Washington‟s first draft he had expressed the hope that “this country can remain 
in peace for 20 years longer . . . .”77  This was an idea that was not new to 
Hamilton when he took up the task of reworking Washington‟s draft.  The 
previous summer, in writing a defense of the Jay Treaty, he had declared, “If we 
can avoid War for ten or twelve years more we shall then have acquired a 
maturity, which will make it no more than a common calamity and will authorize 
us in our national discussions to take a higher & more imposing tone.”78  In the 
published version of the Farewell Address, specific timeframes were removed in 
favor of the more abstract declaration that “the period is not far off, when we may 
defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude 
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as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously 
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making 
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we 
may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by our justice shall Counsel.”79  
Washington‟s final version of the Address expanded on this point in a paragraph 
that had not appeared in any previous iteration.  “With me,” it said, “a 
predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain time to our country to settle 
and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption, to that 
degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly 
speaking, the command of its own fortunes.”80  If the United States was going to 
rise to equal the powers of Europe, it needed time to develop. 
 Time itself was not enough, though, as it needed to be time well spent.  
Time free from foreign influence and partisan instability, time free from 
international conflict.  Even at peace, it needed to be time spent developing the 
means for self-defense, as he frequently reiterated the idea throughout his writings 
that “If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it.”81  It was also time 
when the citizens of America needed to look beyond their local attachments and 
partisan views and begin to come together once again as Americans.  James 
Madison‟s original draft of a valedictory contained language referring to 
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Americans as “the children of one common country.”82  Four years later similar 
sentiments were expressed in the final draft.  Along these lines, the one portion of 
the Address Washington and Hamilton disagreed on was a section dealing with 
the creation of a national military academy.  For Hamilton it was too specific a 
policy recommendation to merit inclusion in the president‟s valedictory, but to 
Washington the military academy was more than just a school to teach the next 
generation of America‟s fighting men, it represented the central institution for 
cementing the Union in the minds of the next generation of America‟s national 
leaders.  Washington demanded of Hamilton, “What, but the mixing of people 
from different parts of the United States during the [Revolutionary] War rubbed 
off these impressions?  A century in the ordinary intercourse, would not have 
accomplished what the Seven years association in Arms did: but that ceasing, 
prejudices are beginning to revive again, and never will be eradicated so 
effectually by any other means as the intimate intercourse of characters in early 
life, who, in all probability, will be at the head of the councils of this country in a 
more advanced stage of it.”83  As far as Washington was concerned, the interests 
of the United States were best served by maintaining peaceful relations with 
Europe and by cementing the bonds of Union at home.  The achievement of these 
two goals would secure to the nation the time it needed to ensure its survival and 
prosperity. 
 
Towards Retirement 
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 When George Washington left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon on the 
morning of 19 September 1796, leaving the scene before the public would get 
hold of his valedictory, he believed that he had laid out a coherent set of foreign 
policy principles to guide the nation in the short term, and some basic but 
fundamental maxims that would lead the United States to future greatness.  He 
hoped his Address would have a positive impact on Americans because he feared 
for the survival of the nation if affairs progressed as they had for the past four 
years.  In the remaining years of Washington‟s life, both his hopes and his fears 
would be realized. 
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Two: Washington‟s Farewell in the American Mind, 1796-1817 
 As Thomas Jefferson rose to deliver his inaugural address on 4 March 
1801, he faced new and different challenges than had his predecessors in the 
presidency.  George Washington had confronted the daunting task of presiding 
over the new government created by the Constitution, putting his reputation on 
the line to give it added authority and legitimacy.  As John Adams took office, not 
only was he leading in the wake of Washington, but storm clouds were fast 
approaching both domestically and internationally as mass partisanship was 
coming to define American politics and as relations with France were quickly 
deteriorating.  When Jefferson took the reins, though, the government had been 
established, the quasi-war that had developed with France was on the verge of 
resolution, and his Republican party had become the majority party and had 
soundly defeated the Federalists throughout much of the country.  For him, then, 
at least at the beginning of his presidency, his challenge was not to navigate the 
country between war and peace, but rather how to mold the government and the 
nation into his own Republican image.  To put it another way, as Federalist Roger 
Griswold of Connecticut fretted a few months into Jefferson‟s presidency, 
“„Under this administration nothing is to remain as it was, . . . every minutia is to 
be changed.  When Mr. Adams was President, the door of the president‟s House 
opened to the East.  Mr. Jefferson has closed that door and opened a new door to 
the West.‟”1   
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 Jefferson was eager to get to work putting the nation back on the right path 
it had diverted from under Federalist leadership.  As he stood before Congress on 
that 4
th
 of March, he sought to lay out the “essential principles of our Government 
. . . which ought to shape its Administration.”    He saw the United States as “A 
rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the 
rich productions of their industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel 
power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal 
eye.”  As Washington had discussed on many occasions, and as would become a 
familiar trope in years to come, the nation had a great destiny, but it was only 
attainable if the people remained committed to the project of a republican union.  
He reminded Americans that although partisanship had marked recent years, 
“every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle.  We have called by 
different names brethren of the same principle.  We are all Republicans, we are all 
Federalists.”  On the subject of American foreign policy, he promised “Equal and 
exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; 
peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with 
none.”  In discussing these principles, he declared that they formed “the bright 
constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of 
revolution and reformation.  The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes 
have been devoted to their attainment.  They should be the creed of our political 
faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of 
those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, 
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let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, 
liberty, and safety.”2 
   To those who heard Jefferson deliver his inaugural, it was an 
underwhelming performance.  As historian Forrest McDonald put it, the inaugural 
“was delivered in a voice so unprepossessing that few could even hear it, much 
less be inspired by it.”3  Where the address shone, though, was in print as it 
circulated throughout the nation in newspapers, broadsides, and pamphlets.  
“Entangling alliances with none” had a special impact, as it immediately became 
the phrase popularly used to describe the fundamental principles of American 
foreign policy.  When it first appeared it was seen as a nod to George 
Washington‟s Farewell Address, and as a pithy restatement of its complex 
maxims for foreign policy.  As the rest of this chapter and dissertation will reveal, 
though, this phrase and its ultimate association with Washington‟s valedictory 
dramatically changed the Farewell in the American mind and oversimplified its 
original meanings, over time turning its pragmatic axioms for the conduct of 
American foreign relations into a rigid and permanent declaration of virtual 
isolation.  This process took many years, and its ramifications would not be fully 
realized until the mid-1820s and after, but its impact on popular understandings of 
the Farewell could be seen less than ten years after it was first written. 
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 This chapter will investigate the evolving conceptions of Washington‟s 
Farewell Address in the American mind in the two decades after its publication.  
From initial reactions to the role it played in commemorating Washington after 
his death in December 1799, the Address quickly came to shape the Americans‟ 
minds, both with regard to principles of foreign policy and how they conceived of 
America‟s past, present, and future.  “Entangling alliances with none” becomes 
vitally important because of the influence it had on such conceptions.  This 
chapter will also examine how the Address was interpreted by Washington‟s 
successors in office and how their understandings shaped some of the major 
foreign policies pursued by their administrations.  The purpose is not to give a 
comprehensive history of foreign policy decision making in the Adams, Jefferson, 
and Madison administrations, but rather to consider how Washington‟s principles 
influenced foreign policy construction on a broader level after his retirement and 
death.  In the end, this chapter will provide an overarching examination of the 
evolution of Washington‟s Farewell Address in the American popular and 
political mind in the period from 1796 through the end of James Madison‟s 
presidency. 
 
Reactions to the Farewell Address 
 By the summer of 1796 Washington‟s impending retirement was the 
nation‟s proverbial worst kept secret.  This did not stop a rabid press from 
relaying the news and the text of his valedictory address after its initial 
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publication in Claypoole‟s American Daily Advertiser on 19 September.4  
Philadelphia newspapers began reprinting it in their later editions that same day, 
with the text making its way throughout the nation over the ensuing days, weeks, 
and months.
5
  As Victor Hugo Paltsits pointed out in his landmark 1935 study of 
the physical history of the Farewell, there was surprisingly little commentary on it 
in many newspapers when it was first reprinted.  For many Republican papers, the 
silence was the result of them quickly turning their attention away from 
Washington and towards the approaching presidential election.
6
  Commentaries 
did emerge, though, and for some they were heavily influenced by partisanship.  
Those who had come to paint Washington as a Federalist, or as having fallen into 
Hamilton‟s clutches, tended to see the Farewell as being a campaign document, 
aimed at generating support for John Adams at Thomas Jefferson‟s expense.  
William Duane, for example, wrote a scathing public letter to Washington 
accusing the outgoing president of trying to present his partisan views in the guise 
of disinterested warnings, declaring that “you have discharged the loathings of a 
sick mind; you have collected the aggravating recollections of wounded pride, and 
warmed to the inveteracy of hatred, discharged the whole burthen of your blazing 
spirit at the object of your personal dislike, under the form of advice to your 
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beloved country!”  Duane was especially worked up over the Jay Treaty and how 
it brought the United States closer to Great Britain while Washington sought to 
push the United States away from France.  He argued that “Whatever may have 
stimulated you to the execution of such a treaty, it is evident the advice you have 
offered to your fellow citizens, with regard to foreign connexions, conveys a tacit 
condemnation of that measure, while it displays an attempt to defend your 
conduct, though deviating from the policy you recommend.”7  Many Republicans 
contended, just as Duane had, that Washington‟s warnings about foreign 
connections struck a hypocritical tone given his treatment of Britain and France.  
Republican views of Washington‟s conduct toward Europe clouded their 
interpretations of his Farewell Address and led them to see it as electioneering. 
 Despite the views of some Republican partisans, it is important not to 
overstate the weight given to these opinions in the broader popular consciousness.  
The vast majority of Americans, regardless of partisan leanings, still had respect 
for and complete faith in Washington and greeted his valedictory with the sad 
acknowledgement that he was leaving public life.  New York‟s Daily Advertiser, 
for example, remarked that “there is nothing we can say, that will fully express 
the estimation in which his illustrious and important services are held by the 
citizens of this much favoured country; or that will equally express their regret at 
                                                 
7
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being deprived of the continuance of his paternal watchfulness and care.”8  More 
important than such expressions of sorrow, though, was the immediate 
recognition by many of the importance of what Washington had said in his 
Farewell.  One orator in Salem, Massachusetts, speaking at a local celebration of 
Washington‟s birthday in 1797, commented, “But even when retired to private 
life, will our WASHINGTON continue to bless his country, if his affectionate 
valedictory address is duly regarded.  While it manifests the sincerest patriotism, 
it abounds with the wisest and best political maxims.”9  Oliver Wolcott, Sr., 
whose son was the Secretary of the Treasury at the close of Washington‟s 
administration, described the Farewell‟s advice as “the best which could possibly 
be given.”10 
 Despite a widespread hearty endorsement of the Address and its maxims, 
much of the positive commentary was very general in nature, and it is not a large 
leap in logic to suggest that such approbation, at least in the immediate short term, 
stemmed as much from the fact that it had come from Washington‟s pen as from 
its actual principles.  One of the enduring facets of the popular approval of the 
Address was the tension between belief in the wisdom of the principles it 
enunciated and faith in the wisdom of Washington and thus unquestioned support 
of his valedictory.  This tension manifested itself most notably when questions 
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about the authorship of the Address were discussed publicly in the 1820s.  
Questions about the nature of American support for the Address aside, a 
demonstration of the immediate significance attached to it can be seen in how 
widely available the text became in the months after its initial publication, as 
printers not only put it in their newspapers but also started selling it in pamphlet 
form.  Paltsits, focusing only on the year 1796, compiled a list of over 140 
newspapers in which the Address was reprinted, and identified at least forty-six 
separate pamphlet publications.
11
  Washington had not left office yet, and his 
Farewell was being put forward as an important contribution to the nation‟s 
history and future. 
 The formal announcement of Washington‟s retirement also meant the 
beginning of the first contested presidential election.  Adhering to contemporary 
political norms, neither of the major candidates, John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson, actively campaigned on their own behalf, leaving the “dirty work” to 
surrogates, newspaper editors, and local party functionaries.  The vagaries of the 
Electoral College make it nearly impossible to assess what impact, if any, the 
Farewell Address had on the contest, but in the end, Adams won the presidency, 
and Jefferson succeeded Adams as vice president.
12
  When Adams took office he 
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committed himself to carrying out Washington‟s policies.  In his inaugural 
address he warned against “the pestilence of foreign influence” and expressed his 
“inflexible determination to maintain peace and inviolable faith with all nations, 
and that system of neutrality and impartiality among the belligerent powers of 
Europe.”13  In his first address to Congress, he announced his desire to “preserve 
peace and friendship with all nations” and reiterated the maxim that “we ought 
not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves 
always distinct and Separate from it if we can.”14  To further preserve the link to 
Washington, Adams retained his cabinet, not fully realizing that Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering, Secretary of War James McHenry, and Secretary of the 
Treasury Oliver Wolcott, Jr. had dedicated themselves to Adams‟s nemesis, 
Alexander Hamilton. 
 One of the great ironies of Adams‟s presidency was that while he honestly 
strove to be non-partisan, he presided over some of the bitterest party struggles 
                                                                                                                                     
electors would vote, given how removed the average citizen was from the actual election of the 
president, it is difficult to trace the influence of the Farewell Address on the outcome of the 
election. 
 The Electoral College system was further complicated by the fact that before passage of 
the Twelfth Amendment in 1804, there was no way for electors to distinguish between a vote for 
president and a vote for vice president; each elector cast two votes and both were treated as votes 
for president.  In 1796 this meant that even though both Adams and Jefferson were candidates for 
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Jefferson and Aaron Burr, the Republican candidates for president and vice president, 
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the nation would witness until the Jacksonian period.  Republicans saw Adams as 
the nation‟s pre-eminent monarchist and as being motivated by Federalist and 
pro-British sympathies.  At the same time, the Arch-Federalists allied with 
Hamilton distrusted him as not being fully committed to their specific agenda.  
For Adams, the decision-making process, especially as it related to the central 
crisis of his presidency, the quasi-war with France, was always focused on what 
was best for the country, regardless of which group of politicians he would please 
or anger.  The rampant distrust partisans had for their perceived opponents meant 
that Adams‟s decisions usually upset both groups in the long run.  In the wake of 
the XYZ affair, Adams‟s decision to form an army under the command of 
Washington was greeted with acclaim by the Arch-Federalists who saw such 
preparations as a precursor to war with France, but was interpreted by the 
Republicans as yet another example of Adams choosing Britain over France.  
When Adams chose to send another peace delegation to France in 1799, he was 
heavily criticized by the Federalists for not putting the country‟s new army to use, 
but his motives were still distrusted by the Republicans.  In reality, Adams never 
wanted war, but understood, as Washington had counseled, that in circumstances 
such as these, “An efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.”15  When 
he saw another opportunity to secure that peace without recourse to declared war, 
he seized it, demonstrating the primacy of national over partisan interests in his 
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thinking.
16
  In many ways, the course of Adams‟s entire presidency acted as a 
strong confirmation of the wisdom of Washington‟s warnings about the dangers 
of foreign attachments, as American judgments were consistently clouded by 
allegiance to or antipathy for Britain or France, rather than being purely guided by 
American interest.
17
 
 
Washington’s Death and the Growing Significance of the Farewell Address 
 Given that war was ultimately avoided and a treaty with France was 
signed (though not until Jefferson had taken office), the single most important 
event for the country during Adams‟s presidency did not take place in the nation‟s 
capital, but instead at Mount Vernon, where on 14 December 1799, George 
Washington died.  Upon his retirement from the presidency, Washington threw 
himself back into the life of a private citizen, daily overseeing the work being 
carried out on his several plantations.  The major exception was when he 
consented to take charge of the American army being formed in the event of war 
with France.  Washington embraced this new challenge, but it often seemed like 
he was enjoying reliving past military glories more than he was actually 
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concerned for the outbreak of war.
18
  Throughout his retirement he also continued 
to reiterate the principles he had espoused in the Farewell Address.  He urged that 
“No policy, in my opinion, can be more clearly demonstrated than that we should 
do justice to all but have no political connexion with any of the European Powers, 
beyond those which result from, and serve to regulate our Commerce with them,” 
and that the country needed to “maintain a strict Neutrality, to keep the United 
States out of the vortex of European Politics, and to preserve them in Peace.”19  
Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette in December 1798, he declared his politics to 
be “plain & simple.  I think every Nation has a right to establish that form of 
government under which It conceives It shall live most happy, provided it infracts 
no Right, or is not dangerous to others.  And that, no governments ought to 
interfere with the internal concerns of another, except for the security of what is 
due to themselves.”20  Even in retirement, he was still dedicated to the principles 
of his Farewell Address. 
 By December 1799, Washington was no longer active on the public stage, 
but he was still prominent in Americans‟ lives.  By this time, there were already 
eight different biographies that had been written about him, and he was still 
regularly the subject of toasts and orations throughout the country, especially 
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during annual celebrations of his birthday and American independence.
21
  A 
tourist from Great Britain noted in 1796 that “Not one town of any importance 
was there in the whole union, where some meeting did not take place in honor” of 
Washington‟s birthday.22  His continued presence in the popular mind made news 
of his death all the more unexpected.  Washington had not suffered from a 
protracted illness, and he was only 67 when he died.  On 12 December he went on 
his normal tour of his plantations, spending several hours on horseback in the 
midst of a storm of snow and freezing rain, he fell ill, and two days later he was 
dead.
23
  The suddenness of Washington‟s death is important in that the 
widespread expressions of grief and sorrow that swept the nation were not filtered 
through a period of expectation or preparation; rather, they were the heartfelt 
outpourings of a grieving nation.  John Marshall of Virginia expressed the 
sentiments of the nation best when he stood before the House of Representatives 
and declared that “Our Washington is no more!  The Hero, the Sage, and the 
Patriot of America – the man on whom in times of danger every eye was turned 
and all hoped were placed – lives now only in his own great actions, and in the 
hearts of an affectionate and afflicted people.”24  Congress officially declared 22 
February 1800, Washington‟s birthday, to be a national day of remembrance, but 
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cities and towns, churches and civic organizations, held services throughout 
December, January, and February.
25
   
 In Boston, 9 January was set aside as a day of “solemn Tribute” to 
Washington.  Organized around a grand procession involving one-fifth of all 
Bostonians and the delivery of a eulogy at the Old South Meeting-House, all 
business in the city was suspended for the day, and men and women were 
instructed to wear black crape or ribbons from that day through Washington‟s 
birthday as a sign of mourning.
26
  Historian Gary Laderman described the 
ceremonies in Providence, Rhode Island, where “A funeral procession began on 
the morning of the seventh [of January], accompanied by the firing of sixteen 
cannons in quick succession.  After the initial military display, a cannon was 
discharged every half-hour.  Throughout the course of the procession minute guns 
were fired, and muffled bells tolled from morning until evening.  The cortege 
included various military orders, a bier supported by four pallbearers, a riderless 
white horse, members of the local government, representatives from local trade 
associations and other societies, and officials from several agencies and 
organizations.”  At the end of the procession, “the empty bier was then deposited 
underneath the Episcopal church.”  Such “simulations of real burial” were a 
central part of many funeral services held for Washington throughout the 
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country.
27
  From the perspective of this dissertation, these public services are 
significant not just for what they say about the place Washington held in 
American hearts, but for the impact they had on the place the Farewell Address 
held in the American mind.  As François Furstenberg has argued, it was the civic 
texts that emerged after Washington‟s death, and specifically the eulogies and 
funeral orations pronounced during these services, that “made the Farewell 
Address a statement of inviolable political principles” and turned it into a “sacred 
text.”28   
 Indeed, his comment that such texts were “instructions on how to read 
Washington‟s writings” is particularly insightful, as the eulogies inculcated the 
idea that the Farewell was Washington‟s great legacy to the American people, and 
that their nation‟s future depended on adherence to it.29  Orators described the 
Farewell as being “worthy to be written in letters of gold, or, rather, to be 
inscribed on the hearts of an enlightened, free, and grateful people;” as the “polar 
star” that should guide America‟s policy makers; or as laying out America‟s “true 
policy as a nation.”30  Daniel Dana, speaking in Newburyport, Massachusetts, 
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called on his listeners to “Read his Legacy.  There is the wisdom, the counsel, the 
heart, the soul of your WASHINGTON.  There are the precious rules for making 
our nation wise and great and happy.  Treasure it in your memories.  Let it live in 
your hearts.  Let it shine in your conduct.  And from the moment that your 
children begin to lisp the honored name of their country‟s Father, endeavor to 
prepare their minds for the reception of these invaluable maxims; that they may 
be handed down to the latest posterity.”31  This idea of the importance of the 
Farewell to future generations was frequently repeated.  A speaker in Boston 
urged people to “Read, preserve the sacred deposit; and lest posterity should 
forget the truth of its maxims, engrave them on his tomb, that they may read them 
when they weep before it.”  Another hoped that it would “descend, unsullied as its 
purity, to the wonder and instruction of succeeding generations; and, should the 
mild philosophy of its maxims be ingrafted into the policy of nations, at no distant 
period will the departed hero, who now lives only in the spotless splendour of his 
own great actions, exist in the happiness and dignity of mankind.”  And another 
asked those assembled to “Teach it to your children, in the house, and by the way, 
lying down and rising up, going out and coming in.  It is an invaluable legacy.”  
One orator predicted that continued “Obedience” to Washington‟s maxims “will 
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lead us to the highest pinnacle of national glory.”32  Hundreds of these eulogies 
were printed as pamphlets and were either sold or freely distributed in 
communities throughout the United States; quite a few of them included complete 
copies of the Farewell Address as well.
33
  Collections of eulogies were also bound 
together and sold as a way to spread the thoughts and ideas they expressed beyond 
the towns they were first pronounced in.
34
  The eulogies, both as oratorical 
performances and as texts to be read and studied by private citizens, elevated the 
importance of Washington‟s maxims in the popular mind to the point that the 
Farewell was frequently held up as a sort of foundational document, alongside the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
35
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 This elevation of the Farewell Address continued even after the nation 
stopped publicly mourning Washington‟s death.  Historian Michael Kammen 
argued in Mystic Chords of Memory that Americans before the Civil War took 
very little interest in the nation‟s history, except as the occasional tool for 
illuminating present or even future concerns.  Daniel Webster, for one, was 
famous for giving orations that somewhat mythicized America‟s past to address 
present circumstances.
36
  The one genuine exception to this historical disinterest 
was George Washington, who was a central character in the celebration of 
Independence Day, and whose birthday was the only other widely accepted 
national holiday.  As with the eulogies, all of these occasions featured oratory 
dedicated to praising Washington and the fundamental importance of his Farewell 
Address to the ongoing progress of the United States.
37
  As one modern observer 
put it, “The importance of Washington oratory lies in its impact upon the 
American people. . . .  February 22 and the Fourth of July were annual occasions 
upon which he was sure to be eulogized in towns and hamlets all over the country, 
and public speakers found many other opportunities to focus attention upon 
him.”38  The lack of interest in the nation‟s history but a continued interest in 
Washington was further manifested in the realm of biography.  Where 
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Washington had a new or revised biography published virtually every year from 
before his death through the 1850s, Thomas Jefferson‟s first real biography was 
not written until 1857.
39
  Due to the work done by all of these civic texts focusing 
on Washington – eulogies, orations, biographies, etc. – the Farewell Address was 
taken out of the realm of American history and was seen as having ongoing 
significance.  It would frequently be published with the nation‟s founding 
documents, with state laws and constitutions, with local orations for civic 
holidays, and even in children‟s books for use in schools.40  It was both part of the 
nation‟s great past, and a vital element in what would surely be its glorious future. 
 
“Entangling Alliances with None” and the Jeffersonian Reconceptualization 
 Whether through oratory or in print, Americans of all ages, occupations, 
and political leanings were thus very familiar with Washington‟s Farewell 
Address in the years after his death.  This meant that when Thomas Jefferson 
promised “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling 
alliances with none” in his first inaugural address, people saw it as an allusion to 
Washington and his principles.
41
  One editorialist, for example, after extensively 
                                                 
39
 For example, Catherine Albanese determined that Mason Locke Weems‟s Life of Washington 
had gone through fifty-nine editions by 1850.  Forrest McDonald discusses the lack of a Jefferson 
biography before 1857 in his survey of Jefferson‟s presidency.  Albanese, Sons of the Fathers, 
174; and McDonald, Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 167.  
40
 In addition to the examples given in footnote 35, also see Noah Webster, Elements of Useful 
Knowledge. Volume II.  Containing a Historical and Geographical Account of the United States.  
For the Use of Schools, 3
rd 
ed. (New Haven, CT: Increase Cooke & Co., 1808); and Samuel 
Temple, The Child‟s Assistant in the Art of Reading.  Being a Collection of Pieces, Suited to the 
Capacities of Children, In the Early Stages of Education.  Designed as a Medium between the 
Spelling-book, and the American Selection of Lessons, American Preceptor, and Other Books of a 
Similar Kind, 2
nd 
ed. (Boston: Munroe and Francis, 1802). 
41
 Historian Garry Wills argued in his study of Washington that “By the time of his own 
presidency, Jefferson was teaching the Washington doctrine on neutrality so emphatically that he 
  
80 
 
quoting from the Farewell, stated that “Such is the emphatic advice of our 
departed friend: in correspondence with which the present Chief Magistrate on his 
induction into office, in enumerating what he considered the essential principles 
of our government and such as ought to shape its administration, declares as one, 
„peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances 
with none.‟”42  As previously mentioned, “entangling alliances with none” was a 
fundamentally important phrase in the history and development of the Farewell 
Address.  The phrase itself almost immediately entered the American lexicon as 
the shorthand to describe the principles underlying American foreign policy.  
Newspapers were strewn with references to it throughout the first decade of the 
nineteenth century.  Often times such references were to celebrations involving 
toasts given to “Foreign intercourse; „Commerce and honest friendship with all, 
entangling alliances with none,‟” or to “The king of Great-Britain and the chief 
consul of France; „Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – 
entangling alliances with none.‟”43  Another toast was offered to “Commerce and 
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,” and was followed by 
a poem hailing the “Full twenty years we‟ve pass‟d in peace,/And like so to 
                                                                                                                                     
gave to it the catchphrase some still mistakenly attribute to Washington himself: „no entangling 
alliances.‟”  Wills‟s assertion is interesting both because he draws a more direct connection 
between Washington and Jefferson, and because he misquotes Jefferson‟s actual phrase.  Garry 
Wills, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1984), 91.  For an extended discussion of Jefferson‟s first inaugural address, see 
Browne, Jefferson‟s Call for Nationhood. 
42
 Curtius [John Taylor], A Defence of the Measures of the Administration of Thomas Jefferson 
(Providence, RI: William Olney, 1805), 61-62. 
43
 “For the Bee.  Better Late Than Never,” The Bee (New Haven, CT), 26 August 1801; and “At a 
numerous and respectable meeting of republicans and others assembled at Stewart's Inn, Fell‟s 
Point, to celebrate the anniversary of American independence . . . ,” Democratic Republican; and 
Commercial Daily Advertiser (Baltimore), 6 July 1802. 
  
81 
 
remain;/While Europes clime by bloody wars,/May count her thousands slain.”44  
One newspaper in Boston even adopted the phrase as part of its masthead.
45
  In 
these early years “entangling alliances with none” was recognized as Jeffersonian 
in origin, but it was also generally seen as relating to Washington‟s Farewell 
Address.   
 The distinction between the Jeffersonian phrase and the Washingtonian 
principles began to blur over time, and by the end of the decade people had begun 
to directly attribute it to Washington.  This was certainly never universally the 
case – even in 1852, the end point of this study, there were people who correctly 
pointed toward its Jeffersonian origins – but as time passed, an increasing 
majority of Americans saw the phrase as belonging to Washington.  As early as 
1810, there are examples of orators laying the phrase at Washington‟s feet.  
Tristam Burges, speaking in Providence, Rhode Island during a 4 July celebration, 
discussed the establishment of the nation‟s government under Washington, and 
stated that “When the French, whose revolution, at first presented all the 
allurements of freedom . . . when they would have coiled us within the 
contaminating embrace of this revolution, the preserving angel of our country 
[Washington] said to the many headed faction, „Peace; be still;‟ „We will have 
honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.‟  And it was so.  
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France, then, respected our neutrality.”46  What is perhaps most interesting about 
this speech was that the phrase was not even attributed to the Farewell Address, 
but rather to the Proclamation of Neutrality.  Even before this time, though, there 
were many instances where the phrase was incorrectly quoted and not attributed 
to anyone, signifying that it had become less grounded in its original Jeffersonian 
context and could, as a result, be more easily reappropriated, consciously or not, 
to Washington.
47
  By 1812, printers began referring to “Washington‟s Policy” of 
“„Peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none.‟”48 
 If this were only a question of the misattribution of Jefferson‟s phrase to 
Washington‟s pen, it would only warrant minor consideration, but there proved to 
be much more at stake.  As discussed in some detail in the first chapter, the 
principles Washington laid out in the Farewell were not intended to prescribe a 
permanent foreign policy for the nation to follow, but rather were aimed at 
guiding the construction of the wisest policies possible to meet evolving 
circumstances.  Washington urged the preservation of peace so as to allow the 
nation the time necessary to mature and prosper, he warned against foreign 
influences and attachments because they could bind the nation to courses of action 
detrimental to the public good, and he stressed the fundamental importance of 
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always maintaining the freedom to act in the nation‟s best interest.  Washington 
recognized that this national interest in 1796 was different from what it would be 
ten or twenty years later.  He expected the nation to grow in territory, population, 
and might, thus while he discussed policy ideas that were essential in the short 
term, he understood that they might not be eternally so; he was more concerned 
with larger, more enduring principles.  The point here is to reiterate that the 
Farewell Address was not simple in its conception of American foreign policy; it 
could be boiled down to a few basic ideas, but wholly conceived its long term 
wisdom and utility derived from its nuanced approach.  In contrast was “peace, 
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with 
none,” the great appeal of which was that it pithily laid out America‟s basic 
foreign policy principles at the outset of Jefferson‟s presidency.  The problem was 
that while “entangling alliances with none” nicely described American interests in 
the short term, it overshadowed the real wisdom of the Farewell in the long term; 
rather than representing principles to guide thoughtful policy construction, it 
became a rigid prescription for a permanent foreign policy.  Most troubling, 
“entangling alliances with none” became more closely associated with 
Washington as its rigidity became less necessary and even less wise, and when the 
warning to act in America‟s best interests would have resulted in a broader 
foreign policy than what was ultimately pursued.
49
   
 As will be seen in the next chapter, once “entangling alliances with none” 
had been given greater legitimacy due to the added authority of its association 
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with Washington‟s Farewell Address, it became nearly impossible to convince 
Americans that there were better alternatives to the virtual isolation it produced.  
Realistically, though, as much as “entangling alliances with none” subverted 
Washington‟s original meanings, it also likely facilitated the transmission of the 
Farewell Address‟s fundamental importance across the generations.  Washington 
was of ongoing significance and his clear and succinct foreign policy principles 
were seen as having shepherded the nation to great heights.  As Francis Scott Key 
noted in 1814, “In this address we have every thing to excite our veneration and 
affection. . . .  No evil can befal [sic] us, against which, he has not guarded us – 
no temptation can come upon us, where his monitory voice has not supplied us 
with a caution.  The remotest of our descendants, to whom the political blessings 
we have received, may be allowed to be transmitted, will find these parental 
counsels sanctioned by experience, and the impartial historian will note the 
invariable connection between the happiness of the nation and the observance of 
these hallowed precepts.”50  Here he was making clear the link between the 
Farewell and the nation‟s rising glory.  Without “entangling alliances with none,” 
it is an open question if the Farewell would have carried such great weight in 
public and policy debates over the ensuing decades.  In introducing this 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization of the Farewell Address – that is, the 
reassociation of “entangling alliances with none” with Washington and the 
resulting shift in meaning of the Address – it is important to emphasize that these 
long-term ramifications were not necessarily intended by Jefferson when he 
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introduced the phrase in his inaugural address, but were rather unintended 
consequences of the initial popularity of his phrasing.  Jefferson certainly believed 
in a foreign policy defined by “entangling alliances with none,” but he was not 
necessarily consciously recalling Washington, and he could not have anticipated 
the reconceptualization of the Farewell Address is would produce. 
 
Republican Foreign Policy 
 While many contemporaries saw a uniformity of principle from 
Washington to Jefferson when it came to the nation‟s foreign policies, the latter‟s 
Republicanism clashed with the Federalist policies of the previous 
administrations; larger foreign policy principles may have been consistent, but 
how they were put into practice was a different question.  Two specific policy 
changes pursued by Jefferson deserve brief consideration in this study.  Both 
changes stemmed, at least in part, from Jefferson‟s extreme concern for economy 
in the operations of the federal government.  He believed that the government had 
grown too big, was responsible for a great deal of unnecessary spending, and that 
the people had been taxed too much to support it.  One way he sought to reduce 
spending was by dismantling much of the military and naval establishment built 
up during the quasi-war with France.  Americans had had a long-held distrust of 
standing armies, so while Jefferson‟s insistence that state militias could defend the 
country until the moment of crisis when a national army would be necessary 
proved shortsighted in the War of 1812, there was a certain logic to it based on 
the nation‟s past experience.  The navy was a different question, though, as the 
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nation‟s recent history of British and French abuses on the oceans had 
demonstrated the utility of a strong navy.  George Washington, in his final annual 
message to Congress, preached that neutrality alone “is not a sufficient guard 
against the depredations of nations at war.  To secure respect to a neutral flag 
requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or 
aggression.”51  Likewise, John Adams had repeatedly pointed to the importance of 
a strong navy and oversaw the creation of the Department of the Navy in 1798.  
Jefferson, though, believed that the importance of U.S. commerce to Europe was 
enough to regulate relations between nations, rendering a navy a waste of 
resources.  As he put it in 1801, “The interest which European nations feel, as 
well as ourselves, in the mutual patronage of commercial intercourse, is a 
sufficient stimulus on both sides to insure that patronage.”52 
 Large armies and navies were also unnecessary in Jefferson‟s view 
because the nation needed to put the maintenance of peace as its primary concern 
above all others.  While he was vice president in 1798 he had recommended that it 
would be better for the United States to “keep together as we are, hawl off from 
Europe as soon as we can & from all attachments to any portions of it, and if we 
feel their power just sufficiently to hoop us together, it will be the happiest 
situation in which we can exist.  if the game runs sometimes against us at home, 
we must have patience, till luck turns, & then we shall have an opportunity of 
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wining [sic] back the principles we have lost.  for this is a game where principles 
are the stake.”53  Shortly after his inauguration, he similarly declared that 
“determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in 
war & destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the powers of 
Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue.  they have so 
many other interests different from ours, that we must avoid being entangled in 
them.”54  A temporary sacrifice of principle in order to preserve peace was 
preferable to a costly and dangerous war. 
 A second area Jefferson believed greater economy could be achieved was 
the diplomatic establishment, or the number and extent of America‟s missions 
overseas.  This was also more than a question of money, for he believed that 
despite Federalist adherence to the Farewell Address, the United States had 
become overly involved in European affairs, specifically as a result of the 
ministers it had in foreign nations.  In giving to Elbridge Gerry “a profession of 
my political faith” in 1799, Jefferson declared that “I am for free commerce with 
all nations, political connection with none, & little or no diplomatic 
establishment: and I am not for linking ourselves, by new treaties with the 
quarrels of Europe.”55  Near the end of 1801, he expressed a “wish to let every 
treaty we have drop off without renewal.  We call in our diplomatic missions, 
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barely keeping up those to the most important nations.  There is a strong 
disposition in our countrymen to discontinue even these; and very possibly it may 
be done.”56  Jefferson was not the only one who felt this way.  Near the end of 
John Adams‟s term in office, John Fowler, a Republican congressman from 
Kentucky, complained that “For the diplomatic department, near 130,000 dollars 
are required.  When General Washington wrote his Valedictory, we had ministers 
at Paris, Hague, London, Madrid, and Lisbon, and he lamented that we had so 
many, and cautioned the future government against an increase. . . .  How has his 
successor regarded this wise and prudent council?  Why by projecting embassies 
to the most despotic powers in Europe with whom we can never have any or but 
little commercial intercourse.”57  That Washington did not actually warn against 
an increase in the diplomatic establishment is a separate question from the main 
sentiment expressed by Fowler.  Just two years later Representative Thomas 
Sumter of South Carolina wrote proudly to his constituents that the administration 
was “Desirous also, in the spirit of a true American, to detach the United States 
from a dangerous union by diplomatic ties with European powers,” and had 
worked to suppress “two appointments of Ministers, the one to the Hague and the 
other to Berlin; suffering only three to remain, viz. those to London, Paris, and 
Madrid.”58  In February 1807, James Holland of North Carolina hailed Jefferson 
for the “soundness of the course adopted” at the outset of his administration, 
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principally “a „strict impartiality to all nations, entangling alliances with none, a 
discontinuance of useless institutions and offices, and an economical expenditure 
of the public money.‟”59 
 John Adams had addressed the specific issue of the diplomatic 
establishment in his first message to Congress.  He argued that in order to 
maintain America‟s separation from Europe, “early, punctual, and continual 
information of the current chain of events and of the political projects in 
contemplation is no less necessary than if we were directly concerned in them.  It 
is necessary, in order to the discovery of the efforts made to draw us into the 
vortex, in season to make preparations against them. . . .  It is a natural policy for 
a nation that studies to be neutral to consult with other nations engaged in the 
same studies and pursuits.”60  Jefferson disagreed with Adams‟s assessment, 
though, believing that even purely diplomatic connections threatened to entangle 
the United States in European affairs and represented an unnecessary expense in 
violation of Republican economy.  As far as Jefferson was concerned, the only 
connection the United States should have with Europe was a commercial one.
61
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 Jefferson‟s attempt to eliminate even diplomatic ties to Europe raises an 
important historiographical question relating to the intent of his foreign policy.  
One of the basic questions historians have debated relating to Jefferson‟s foreign 
policy was whether or not it was isolationist.  As Louis B. Wright set up the 
question in his study of the “Founding Fathers and „Splendid Isolation,‟” “Of all 
political dogmas, the one that Americans have clung to with the greatest tenacity 
and the least success is the doctrine of isolation from international entanglements 
and responsibility. . . .  The two statesmen who have been most often quoted – 
and misquoted – in defense of political isolation are Washington and Jefferson.”62  
For example, Marie-Jeanne Rossignol argued that “Washington‟s Farewell 
Address laid the foundations of isolationism,” and that Jefferson‟s “entangling 
alliances with none” “ensured continuity between George Washington, John 
Adams, and himself.  Political isolationism had been recommended by the first 
president and had been applied by the second, . . .  it was also in Jefferson‟s 
credo.”63  Such conclusions were also reached by Lawrence Kaplan, who argued 
that “the United States sought to maintain its independence by isolating itself 
from the political life of the Old World.  The warnings of George Washington in 
his Farewell Address, the aspirations of Thomas Jefferson in his First Inaugural 
Address, and the challenge of John Quincy Adams in the Monroe Doctrine, all 
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speak to the benefits of isolationism from and the dangers of involvement with 
Europe.”64   
 Alexander DeConde, on the other hand, did not see continuity from the 
Federalists to Jefferson, instead arguing that “Leaders such as Adams realized that 
the politics of Europe‟s rulers, particularly of France and Britain, could vitally 
affect the United States.  Adams, and those close to him, therefore, were not 
isolationist in their thinking.  Isolationism, in the sense of the American 
government seeking to sever political, and even diplomatic, connections to 
Europe, became the governmental policy after Jefferson took office.”65  As has 
already been discussed, Jefferson‟s efforts clearly represented a break from 
Adams and Washington, as “entangling alliances with none,” in Jeffersonian 
practice, meant something much closer to isolation than did the Farewell Address, 
further highlighting the problem of the contemporary conflation of the two.  
Historians such as Rossignol and Kaplan placed too much emphasis on later 
interpretations of the Farewell in seeing a continuity of principle and practice 
from Washington to Adams to Jefferson.  The question still remains, though, of 
was Jefferson isolationist?  Albert K. Weinberg thought not, suggesting that “the 
counsel of Washington and Jefferson became known as the principle of avoiding 
foreign entanglements, or more briefly as the doctrine of non-entanglement. . . .  
What is really envisaged in non-entanglement is freedom of action in so far as it is 
                                                 
64
 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Jefferson (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1987), xi. 
65
 DeConde, Quasi-War, 335. 
  
92 
 
preserved through the avoidance of certain relationships with others.”66  This was 
echoed by Wright, who contended that “There is no indication in Jefferson‟s 
actions or utterances . . . that his efforts to remain insulated from the Napoleonic 
Wars betokened the hope or desire to institute a permanent foreign policy of 
complete isolation.”  He further argued that “Whenever the national interest could 
be advanced by discarding isolationist policies, Jefferson was ready to throw them 
overboard.”67   Indeed, he was correct, in that it was only through a diplomatic 
connection with France that Jefferson was able to achieve the unprecedented 
success of the Louisiana Purchase.  More importantly, America‟s ongoing 
commercial relationship with a Europe embroiled in war plagued America‟s 
diplomats and Jefferson throughout his presidency.  Theory and practice, though, 
are two different things, and these exceptions do not disprove that Jefferson‟s 
ideal foreign policy would have been as isolationist as possible. 
 At the start of his presidency, Jefferson clearly wanted to focus the 
nation‟s energy and resources on internal rather than external development; as the 
Connecticut Federalist Griswold had put it, he wanted to look west instead of east.  
The course of human events in Europe prevented him from fully dedicating 
himself to this task and a largely isolationist foreign policy.  This is important in 
that succeeding generations, at least rhetorically, increasingly moved toward the 
isolationist ideal that Jefferson could not achieve.  For Jefferson himself, it was a 
sad irony that his Republican economy and insistence on the reduction of the 
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domestic tax burden actually made the United States more rather than less 
dependent upon Europe.  Forrest McDonald pointed out that the elimination of 
internal taxes “relieved the farmers and planters of an onerous tax burden and 
arrested the proliferation of hated excisemen, but it also made national revenues 
almost totally dependent upon duties on imports – which meant dependent upon 
the uninterrupted flow of international commerce, which in turn depended upon 
the will of Napoleon Bonaparte and the ministers of King George III.”68  This 
dependence continually threatened to pull the United States into the European war 
as depredations on the high seas increased. 
 
Jefferson’s Success and Failure: The Louisiana Purchase and the Embargo 
 Unquestionably the greatest success Jefferson achieved in the realm of 
foreign policy was the Louisiana Purchase.  The fact that it came on the heels of 
the great fear of news that the territory had been transferred from Spain to France 
and the ramifications this would have for American security only multiplied the 
feeling of exuberance at the feat.
69
  Not only did the Purchase permanently 
eliminate France as a colonial power from mainland North America, but, with the 
exception of the Floridas, it also moved Spain much further away from the 
population centers of the United States.  Representative Joseph Winston of North 
Carolina informed his constituents that “The advantages of this acquisition are too 
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many to be enumerated, and too precious not to be a just cause of congratulation 
to every friend of America and free government; it secures us from the danger of 
ambitious neighbors and consequent wars – it prevents troublesome disputes, and 
saves our frontier from the troubles sometimes attempted to be fomented by the 
emissaries of foreign powers – it rescues us in a great measure from European 
connexions and jealousies, and obtains for us the respect of European nations, as 
much on account of the wisdom and vigor of our measures, as the pacific system 
by which our government is regulated.”70  The dilemmas that had plagued 
Washington during the Nootka Sound Controversy in 1790 were now largely and 
permanently removed. 
 Notwithstanding its obvious advantages, the Purchase was not entirely 
unattended by difficulties, as there were constitutional and legal questions 
involved with acquiring and incorporating foreign territories and the peoples 
living in them.  Diplomatic tensions also arose with Spain that underscored the 
practical difficulties with territorial transfers in this time period.
71
  For almost two 
decades after 1803 the United States found itself in a dispute with Spain that 
focused on the boundaries of the Louisiana territory it had bought from France.  
Louisiana had originally been ceded from France to Spain in 1763 as part of the 
settlement of the Seven Years‟ War, back to France in 1800, and on to the United 
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States in 1803.  In none of the treaties carrying out these cessions were the precise 
boundaries specified, creating obvious problems for the United States as it sought 
to occupy its newly acquired territory.  While Spain unsuccessfully contested 
France‟s right to sell Louisiana to the United States at all, at specific issue were 
Texas and a relatively small piece of territory located between the Mississippi and 
Perdido Rivers along the Gulf of Mexico known as West Florida.  West Florida 
had been transferred from France to Spain in 1763, which led the United States to 
believe that it had retroceded to France in 1800 and was thus part of the Purchase; 
however, Spain contended that this was not the case.  Jefferson repeatedly 
attempted to negotiate a settlement aimed at securing undisputed title to both 
West and East Florida, and went so far as to secretly have Congress allocate 
money to carry out a purchase, all to no avail.  In 1810, President James Madison 
issued a proclamation declaring that “possession should be taken of [West 
Florida] in the name and behalf of the United States.”72  The United States felt 
that it had just cause to believe that West Florida had been purchased from France 
in 1803 and was no longer going to wait for a negotiated acquisition of a territory 
it already owned.  The following January Madison looked on to East Florida as 
Congress passed the no-transfer resolution, which declared “That the United 
States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without 
serious inequitude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any 
foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, 
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under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; 
they, at the same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain 
subject to future negotiation.”73  While no recourse was taken under the auspices 
of the no-transfer resolution, the principle it espoused would become important a 
decade later when President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams contemplated what would be known to history as the Monroe Doctrine.  In 
the end it took the United States and Spain until 1821 to negotiate and ratify a 
final solution to the Florida controversy.
74
 
 The long-term disruption caused by the Floridas aside, the Louisiana 
Purchase was the high point of Thomas Jefferson‟s foreign policy, as the renewal 
of war in Europe shortly after its execution meant the escalating harassment of 
American shipping by both Britain and France.  Historians and contemporaries 
alike argued that what troubled Jefferson and the nation most by this treatment 
was that it revealed that these European powers did not see the United States as an 
equal on the world stage.  As historian Marie-Jeanne Rossignol put it, “Americans 
felt that the hostile attitude of the British navy and government since 1805 proved 
                                                 
73
 The no-transfer resolution was passed during a secret session of Congress in association with 
“An act to enable the President of the United States, under certain contingencies, to take 
possession of the country lying east of the river Perdido, and south of the State of Georgia and the 
Mississippi Territory, and for other purposes.”  The resolution was first proposed on 5 January 
1811, and passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 70 to 42 on 8 January.  It was 
amended by the Senate on 12 January by a vote of 23 to 6, and the amended version of the 
resolution was passed by the House by a vote of 78 to 21 on the same day.  President James 
Madison signed the associated act into law on 15 January.  3-15 January 1811, in Annals of 
Congress, 11
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 369-80, 1117-48.  In 1918 the Department of State issued a 
confidential memorandum detailing the secret passage of this act and resolution, which contained 
an appendix that included all of the pertinent debates.  See David Hunter Miller, Secret Statutes of 
the United States: A Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918). 
74
 The resolution of the Florida question will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
  
97 
 
that the former colonizing power did not accord the United States its true value.”75  
Joseph Desha, a congressman from Kentucky, believed that “Britain, revengeful 
in her temper, has never forgiven our independence, and apparently yet entertains 
the mad design of reducing the United States to colonial subjection.”76  The best 
demonstration of how Britain and France valued the United States could be seen 
in the fact that both nations were willing to prey upon and ultimately sacrifice 
American shipping in order to achieve larger goals in the Napoleonic wars.  The 
real problem for the United States and for Jefferson was that he was not in a 
position to force Europe to respect American rights.  International trade was the 
main source of revenue for the government and was the livelihood of merchants 
up and down the eastern seaboard.  Jefferson was in the impossible situation of 
needing to see that trade continue and even grow while also needing to do 
something to prevent American shipping from being harassed, cargoes from being 
lost, and sailors from being impressed into service in the British navy.  The lack 
of a navy only further limited Jefferson‟s options.  A treaty negotiated with Great 
Britain by James Monroe and William Pinkney represented an opportunity to ease 
tensions with that nation, but Jefferson rejected it out of hand in 1806 without 
even sending it to the Senate because it failed to address the issue of impressment, 
which had been the greatest ongoing sign of British disrespect for the United 
States.  Jefferson believed that there had to be a solution that would be beneficial 
to both American principles and shipping, possibly including the formation of an 
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alliance with one of the European powers against the other, but he could never 
find that solution.
77
  His best option was brought to him by Secretary of State 
James Madison in 1807 and it was the embargo.  Both men believed that the 
importance of U.S. commerce to Britain and France would cause one, if not both 
of the nations to reform their policies to see it resume.   
 The measure was hailed by Jefferson‟s supporters in Congress.  John Rea 
of Tennessee described it as “a cautious provident measure of internal police, to 
preserve the liberty of seafaring citizens, to save the property of citizens from 
capture on the ocean, to manifest neutrality, and to maintain peace.”78  Burwell 
Bassett of Virginia argued that it “makes us more secure by making our 
opponents less able to agress [sic] upon us.”79  Another Virginian, William A. 
Burwell, firmly believed that it would “produce serious effects on France and 
England” as well as beneficial effects at home, as it would “force us to 
manufacture the articles we want, and while she [England] loses for ever the most 
profitable branch of export, we shall become really independent, and furnish 
within our country every requisite for convenience and comfort.  It will no longer 
be in the power of a foreign nation to disturb our prosperity.”80  All of this 
hopeful confidence proved misplaced, though, as, in the words of historian Forrest 
McDonald, “it was all for naught: as a result of the embargo, some Nova Scotia 
fishermen and a good many West Indian slaves went hungry during much of the 
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year, and there was some unemployment in English factory towns, but the general 
effect upon the international economy was so slight that the French and British 
could regard the American policy with contemptuous amusement.”81 
 Jefferson‟s main failing throughout this period was that he forgot the 
warnings Washington‟s Farewell Address and grossly overestimated the 
importance of the United States to Europe.  The United States was still an infant 
compared to the old giants that were the European powers, but this had not 
stopped Jefferson from seeing America as being equal to, if not greater than, any 
Old World nation.  Jefferson‟s messages to Congress overflowed with language 
on the rising tide of American greatness and the wisdom of a republican 
government that valued peace, especially when compared to the “exterminating 
havoc” of Europe.82  In his Farewell Address, George Washington had likewise 
described the United States as a rising power, but intrinsic in his prediction of 
future greatness was the admission that the nation was not yet great, and that it 
was actually quite weak.  Part of his warning to always act in the nation‟s best 
interests was the constant need to honestly assess and recognize what those 
interests were, even if they clashed with American hopes and ideals.  For 
example, Washington had not seen the Jay Treaty as being a good one for the 
United States – it did not address most of the causes of conflict between the two 
nations – but the fact that it secured peace more than made up for any deficiencies 
and was actually of greater importance to the country at that point in time.  
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Jefferson was faced with a similar decision in 1806 when presented with the 
Monroe-Pinkney Treaty and chose principles over peace.  In the decade after the 
Jay Treaty and the Farewell Address the United States had grown in stature, had 
doubled in size, and was prosperous; but it was also still a weak nation with no 
real army or navy for which the assurance of peace, especially in the short term, 
might have been more valuable than the adherence to a principle the nation could 
not defend in the first place.  The embargo Jefferson pursued in 1807 was 
likewise the policy of a much stronger nation that would be better able to enforce 
it at home and give meaning and weight to it abroad.  Not only was this attempt at 
economic coercion not effective in achieving its stated object, it was also 
devastating domestically as American revenues suffered and it further alienated 
much of the northeastern population that was already distrustful of the 
Jeffersonian program. 
 
Washington and the War of 1812 
 Many of these same themes carried over into the presidency of Jefferson‟s 
successor, James Madison.  While the embargo was abandoned on the last day of 
Jefferson‟s term, Madison also pursued a foreign policy that repeatedly risked 
entanglement with Britain or France and ultimately fell back on policies of 
economic coercion better suited to a more powerful nation.
83
  A level of national 
unease or dissatisfaction began to set in mid-way through Madison‟s first term, as 
over half of the House of Representatives was turned over in the election of 1810, 
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ushering in a new generation of political leadership in that body.  Historian Robert 
Rutland argued that the new leadership to emerge in this period was significant 
because “These men had no memory of the Revolution; they had not helped to 
found the new nation, but they intended to preserve it” in the face of the current 
crisis.
84
  By the summer of 1812, though, Madison felt that war could no longer 
be avoided and he asked Congress for an official declaration, an outcome that had 
become somewhat inevitable from the moment the embargo had first been 
declared. 
 Despite the fact that their attempts at economic coercion had failed for the 
past five years, many Americans, in what has become a recurring theme in pre-
war discourse that has endured to the present day, were supremely confident that 
the war with Great Britain would be relatively quickly won.  The fact that when 
war was declared the United States had almost no substantial military or naval 
establishment in place, poorly trained and ill-equipped troops, a dearth of capable 
or experienced field commanders and tacticians, and would be pitted against the 
unmatched strength of the British army and navy seemed to matter little in 
contemporary projections of American success.  This overconfidence was present 
at the highest levels of government, as well.  Robert Rutland argued that “In 
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Madison‟s mind the war with Britain would be fought on American terms with 
more diplomacy than marching, with more talking than shooting, and ultimately – 
and this was the whole point – with the British backing down.  Madison wanted 
no British territory, no reparations, no humble surrender.  His war aims were 
limited.  All he desired was an admission by British leaders that the United States 
was not a second-cousin dependent but an honest-to-God sovereign power in the 
world family of nations.”85  As is often the case in matters of such consequence, 
though, expectation did not match reality.  By the summer of 1814, the story of 
the war featured three failed and abortive attempts to invade Canada, the loss of 
territory in Maine, a series of embarassing military defeats, and only sporadic 
examples of American success.
86
 
 The domestic impact of the war was further complicated by a sharp 
increase of interest in and public discussion of George Washington and his 
Farewell Address; developments in part spurred by the creation of Washington 
Benevolent Societies throughout the northern half of the country that dedicated 
themselves to his example and wisdom.
87
  The first organization to take 
Washington‟s name in this manner was the Washington Society of Alexandria, 
Virginia, which was formed in 1800, just a month after Washington‟s death; four 
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years later it was emulated by a group of young Federalists in Augusta, Maine.  
The first official Washington Benevolent Society was founded in 1808 in New 
York City, and within four years there were Societies in eleven states.  Historian 
David Hackett Fischer has calculated that by 1816 there were 208 documented 
Societies, but expected that “there were probably many more.”88  The timing of 
the rise of these Societies was directly related to the foreign policy failures of the 
Madison administration; while membership was open to all citizens, they were 
primarily Federalist organizations.  It was thus not surprising that these groups 
achieved the best traction in those areas hit hardest economically by the 
Republican restrictions on commerce (Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston), 
and that had historically been most devoted to the Federalist cause (New 
England).  Part of what makes these Societies so interesting is the rich literature 
they left behind as a testament to their beliefs and goals.  The Washington 
Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania, for example, was formed in the fall of 1812 
by people who had “avowed their attachment to the character and principles of 
Washington,” and who formally declared “that we are firmly attached to the 
Constitution of the United States and to that of Pennsylvania; to the principles of a 
free Republican Government, and to those which regulated the publick conduct of 
George Washington.”89  To facilitate this ongoing attachment, the Pennsylvania 
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Society provided each new member with a copy of the Society‟s constitution and 
of Washington‟s Farewell Address.90   
 While they met fairly regularly throughout the year, most Societies 
organized major public events on Washington‟s birthday, the anniversary of 
Washington‟s first inauguration as president (30 April), and Independence Day.  
The Federalist membership of the Societies often produced a partisan 
undercurrent, if not overt partisanship, in the course of these events.  This held 
especially true after the American declaration of war against Great Britain.  
Throughout the war, these annual celebrations regularly featured lengthy orations 
sometimes aimed at decrying the Republican abandonment of Washington‟s 
principles, but always focused on reminding listeners of his enduring wisdom and 
significance.  One orator speaking before the commencement of war in 1812, 
reminded his audience that “Towards foreign nations, the maxim of Washington 
was, A liberal intercourse with all; alliances, with none,” while another warned 
that “It is neither manly or profitable to condemn the course of national, or 
individual conduct, without showing that a better conduct might have been 
pursued.  We look to the counsels of WASHINGTON.”91  This speaker heavily 
criticized Jefferson, specifically for his rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, 
believing that it would have adjusted the nation‟s difficulties with Britain.  The 
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following year a speech delivered at a celebration of Washington‟s birthday called 
on those assembled to “Let us be Americans, and impress on the minds of our 
children the love of virtue and patriotism.  Teach them to pronounce the name of 
Washington: and as soon as they can read, let them study the history of the Father 
of his country.  Teach them, like him, to be guarded against foreign influence: 
and, like him, to love their country, and to be brace in its defence.”92  A plethora 
of orations like these, and many that took a much harsher view of Jefferson and 
Madison‟s conduct, were subsequently printed as pamphlets to increase the 
impact of their ideas. 
 After two years of conflict the war was shaping up to be a catastrophic 
failure for the United States, with the lowest points still to take place.  The illicit 
trade some New Englanders had been carrying on with Great Britain on a limited 
basis throughout the war increased as the region‟s support for the federal 
government decreased.
93
  The nation‟s military faced its most demoralizing and 
embarrassing moment when, in August 1814, it failed to prevent British forces 
from marching into Washington, D.C. and burning half of the city down, 
including the White House and the Capitol.  The end of the year also witnessed 
the gathering of the Hartford Convention and New England‟s consideration of 
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secession from the Union.
94
  As the darkest clouds were gathering over the nation, 
a stunning but decisive American naval victory on Lake Champlain during the 
Battle of Plattsburgh and the successful repelling of British forces from the city of 
Baltimore provided a hint of blue sky.  Both of these events contributed to a 
British desire to see the war brought to an end.  In Ghent, where peace negotiators 
had already been hard at work but were achieving little forward progress, the 
British backed off of their original harsh demands and a treaty was signed on 
Christmas Eve 1814.
95
  The war was already over when General Andrew Jackson 
led the United States to its most convincing and overwhelming military victory of 
the entire war in the Battle of New Orleans in mid-January 1815.  News of 
Jackson‟s victory arrived in Washington only days before news of the Ghent 
peace treaty did, suddenly turning America‟s depressing failure into a spectacular 
success.   
 That the Federalists published the proceedings of the Hartford Convention 
only days before America‟s final “victory” in the war was declared proved to be 
the death knell of the party.  The popularity and influence of the Washington 
Benevolent Societies quickly waned after 1815 as well.  While many of them 
persisted into the middle of the next decade, and the Society of Pennsylvania 
remained active into the 1830s, their moment had clearly passed.
96
  These 
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Societies may not have left a large mark on history, but their rise and spread was 
still significant.  The Washington Benevolent Societies were more than two 
hundred local movements of people organizing around the idea that the United 
States needed to rededicate itself to the principles of George Washington and 
specifically to his Farewell Address.  They were largely partisan organizations to 
be sure, but that did not diminish the genuineness of their attachment to these 
principles or the importance they placed on them.  If anything, the multitude of 
speeches they had printed revealed how deeply dedicated they were to seeing the 
country return to the path staked out by the Father of his Country.  Washington 
oratory through the end of the War of 1812 had been primarily Federalist in 
nature as a result of the Benevolent Societies, but this would not long remain the 
case as the nation began to confront new problems and challenges.
97
 
 Everywhere the news of peace was received enthusiastically.  Coming on 
the heels of Jackson‟s victory at New Orleans, even though the treaty had actually 
been signed three weeks before the battle took place, it served to eliminate two 
years of disastrous results and to elevate the accomplishment in the minds of most 
Americans.  Letters written by two congressmen to their constituents best 
exemplify this view.  Israel Pickens of North Carolina was gratified to be writing 
that “peace has been concluded with Great Britain, on terms highly honorable to 
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the United States. . . .  Thus gloriously has terminated this second war for our 
independence.”98  John Rhea of Tennessee heaped even more praise on the United 
States, declaring that in the short duration of the war “the American character has 
unfolded itself in a blaze of effulgent glory not excelled by any nation, and has 
raised itself to the highest rank of nations.”  He described the treaty itself as “an 
honorable treaty of peace” that “confirmed their independence never to be 
shaken.”99  For these observers, the results justified the long and costly war. 
 The terms of the treaty were not universally greeted with such acclaim.  Of 
central concern was that it did not address many of the issues that had caused the 
war in the first place, most notably impressment.  Joseph Pearson, a Federalist 
from North Carolina, for example, did not forget that “The impolitic and 
disastrous war in which we were involved, had progressed for more than two 
years, without producing any other effect, than apparently removing farther and 
farther, from attainment, the objects for which it was professedly declared and 
prosecuted.”  While he thought that the treaty was “peculiarly beneficial to the 
country, because peace had become almost indispensable to our existence as a 
nation,” he also felt an obligation to acknowledge that “To say what we have 
obtained is impossible, unless it be peace, and that we had before the war; but to 
say what we have not obtained, is easy – we have not obtained one single solitary 
object, for which the war was professedly declared and prosecuted.  On the 
contrary, those rights and those objects, held by the administration to be so 
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important and so indispensible to our national independence, are, by the doctrines 
of those very men, abandoned and forever lost to the nation.”  Impressment was 
the key issue here, as it had been one of the central points of contention between 
the two nations for over twenty years.  Republicans had taken Washington to task 
for signing the Jay Treaty when it failed to address the issue, and Jefferson had 
rejected the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty for the same reason, but the Treaty of Ghent, 
which was cheered throughout the nation, was silent on it.  Pearson marveled that 
“It is perhaps the first and only treaty that ever was made, which did not contain 
some reference, some distant allusion to the causes which produced the war, and 
the objects intended to be effected.”  Indeed, the main object of the treaty was to 
return both nations to the status quo that had existed before the war and to leave 
open to future negotiation all other concerns.  Such a treaty was possible because 
the Napoleonic wars in Europe were over and there was no longer any need to 
harass American shipping.  Pearson concluded that despite the treaty‟s silence on 
many issues, it was still “a blessing to the nation – it has saved us from impending 
destruction, and whatever may be the condemnation it seals on the administration 
and their war, the people have cause to rejoice.”100 
 In a war and era filled with ironies, perhaps the greatest one is the impact 
the War of 1812 had on the place Washington‟s Farewell Address occupied in the 
American mind.  Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had made a number of 
foreign policy decisions that flew in the face of Washington, culminating in the 
decision to forego peace in favor of war.  Republican policies led Federalists to 
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bemoan the abandonment of Washington‟s principles and to found Societies 
dedicated to seeing their return.  Despite all of this, the American “victory” in the 
war ultimately produced the stronger national union that Washington had called 
for much quicker than it might otherwise have been achieved.  As Albert Gallatin 
put it in 1816, “The war has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and 
character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessened.  The 
people have now more general objects of attachment with which their pride and 
political opinions are connected.  They are more American; they feel and act more 
as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better 
secured.”101  The end of the war also marked the return of normal commercial 
relations with Europe, and many of the Washingtonian foreign and domestic 
policies abandoned by Jefferson over a decade earlier.  Orators also continued to 
view the Farewell Address as explicating the ideal American approach to foreign 
policy.  In perhaps the best indication of where the Address stood in America‟s 
consciousness, Jerome Loring, speaking on 4 July 1815, warned that “The clouds 
of war are again thickening in Europe, portending a fearful storm. . . .  No doubt 
every art will be employed to draw us into the vortex.”  He urged his audience to 
“hear the monitory voice of Washington and beware,” and he concluded a long 
passage summarizing the Farewell Address by calling on the nation to “„cultivate 
peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none.‟”102
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Three: John Quincy Adams and the Legacy of the Farewell Address 
 
 As President James Monroe prepared to leave Washington, D.C. for his 
home in Louden County, Virginia in October 1823, the United States was at a 
crossroads.  Mainland Spanish America had almost entirely shed the yoke of 
colonialism and the United States had officially recognized the independence of 
several former Spanish colonies.  In Europe the army of France had overrun Spain 
to put down a popular revolution and restore King Ferdinand VII to the throne.  
The expectation in the United States was that once France achieved victory it 
would send its forces to Spanish America to either institute monarchical rule or 
entirely resubjugate the former colonies, an outcome greatly opposed by most 
people living in the American continents.  A possible solution presented itself to 
Monroe before he departed the capital that October in the form of a series of 
dispatches from the United States Minister to Great Britain, Richard Rush.  These 
dispatches outlined several conversations Rush had had with British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs George Canning on the potential for French intervention 
in Spanish America.  In the course of these conversations, Canning asked Rush 
what the United States government “would say to going hand in hand with his” in 
expressing a mutual opposition to any intervention.  He believed that “the simple 
fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, . . . by its moral effect, 
put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever 
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entertain it.”1  This proposal was completely unexpected, and Rush, feeling 
himself unable to give a definitive answer to Canning, immediately wrote to his 
government for guidance.  Canning‟s proposition and Rush‟s dispatches stepped 
off a debate in the president‟s cabinet that culminated in the enunciation of what 
history have come to know as the Monroe Doctrine. 
 The Doctrine was intended as a bold declaration of American principles, 
and not just any principles, but an expanded conception of those originally laid 
down by George Washington in his Farewell Address.  While Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams was on his father‟s farm in Quincy, Massachusetts when 
Rush‟s dispatches first arrived in the United States, it was his voice and his 
interpretation of American principles that came to shape the Doctrine that bears 
Monroe‟s name.  This chapter explores the evolution of Adams‟s foreign policy 
thought and specifically his lifelong defense of Washingtonian principles 
unclouded by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization.  Beyond gaining a better 
understanding of the original meaning and significance of the Monroe Doctrine, 
an understanding necessary to fully appreciate its domestic and international 
reception, this chapter also illuminates the impending conflict between those who 
conceived of the Farewell Address as Adams did and those who believed in 
“entangling alliances with none.” 
 
The Education of John Quincy Adams 
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 John Quincy Adams, born in 1767 to John and Abigail Adams, was 
expected to accomplish great things.  Too young to take up pen or arms during the 
American Revolution, he was able to contribute in a way no other American 
adolescent could, traveling to France in 1778 with his father as he negotiated the 
treaty of alliance that brought that nation into the war.  After serving the elder 
Adams at postings in Spain and the Netherlands, in 1781 he became Francis 
Dana‟s secretary on a mission to Russia.  When John Quincy returned to the 
United States in 1785 to enroll at Harvard University, he had already seen more of 
the world than most Americans would during their entire lives.  He graduated 
second in his class in 1787, trained to become a lawyer, and in 1790 he opened his 
own law practice in Boston.  He had no designs on political office during his first 
years in Boston, but this did not stop him from taking an interest in political 
events.  One of the earliest to draw his attention was the 1791 publication of 
Thomas Paine‟s defense of the French Revolution, The Rights of Man, and 
Thomas Jefferson‟s introductory note to the American edition.  Jefferson‟s note 
lauded the work and criticized the “political heresies which have sprung up 
among us,” a phrase many readers interpreted to be a condemnation of the 
Federalists in general and Vice President John Adams in particular.  Feeling the 
need to defend his father and his own political views, Adams published a series of 
eleven articles in the Boston Columbian Centinel under the pseudonym 
“Publicola” that were highly critical of both Paine and Jefferson.2 
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 Despite the notoriety achieved by this first publishing effort, even if his 
authorship did not become widely known, Adams still preferred maintaining a 
private life.  He remarked early on that “I have been really apprehensive of 
becoming politically known, before I could establish a professional reputation.  I 
knew that my independence and consequently my happiness in life depended 
upon this, and I have sincerely wished rather to remain in the shade than to appear 
as a politician without any character as a lawyer.”3  With the publication of 
President Washington‟s Proclamation of Neutrality in April 1793, though, Adams 
once again took up his pen in defense of the administration.  Writing as 
“Marcellus,” Adams aimed to demonstrate “what line of conduct ought to be 
pursued by the United States as a nation, and by their citizens as individuals, in 
relation to” France and Great Britain.4  Adams believed that it was the “duty” of 
the United States to maintain “an impartial and unequivocal neutrality,” and that 
“as the citizens of a nation at a vast distance from the continent of Europe; of a 
nation whose happiness consists in a real independence, disconnected from all 
European interests and European politics, it is our duty to remain, the peaceable 
and silent, though sorrowful spectators of the sanguinary scene.”5  Later in the 
year, as “Columbus,” he voiced his approval of the administration‟s handling of 
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the Genet affair, lamenting the evils of foreign influence and praising the 
president for having the French minister recalled.
6
  At the age of twenty-five, and 
three years before Washington would publish his Farewell Address, Adams was 
already defending what would become its core principles. 
 Whether aiming for a career in politics or not, Adams came to the 
president‟s attention when his father shared these pseudonymous letters with him.  
Washington approved of what he read and appointed Adams as the United States 
Minister to the Netherlands in May 1794.  Stationed in Europe until the end of his 
father‟s administration, Adams was in a position to see the other side of U.S. 
foreign policy decisions and principles.  This perspective gave him a greater 
appreciation for the wisdom of neutrality and it became a frequent thread of his 
ongoing correspondence.  Writing to his father in 1795 he observed that “The 
President of the United States has so decidedly adopted and maintained the policy 
of neutrality, and it has proved so advantageous to the country, that it is perhaps 
an idle apprehension that can imagine it will again be endangered.”7  In a letter to 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering he declared that “The system of policy 
pursued by the President since the commencement of the present European war 
has been encountered by so many difficulties and embarrassments, which the 
wisdom of his government has removed and overcome, that I feel encouraged in 
the hope that it will be successfully pursued to the end.”8  Neutrality was 
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important not just in principle but also in practice, as his European vantage point 
made it clear to him that France was actively attempting to draw the United States 
into a war with Great Britain.  He believed that “the policy of the French 
government at present is to make use of the United States . . . as an instrument for 
the benefit of France, as a passive weapon in her hands against her most 
formidable enemy;” that it was the intention of the French government “to involve 
the United States in a war with Britain.”9  Only a strict adherence to Washington‟s 
neutrality was saving the United States from this French threat. 
 Valuing both the intelligence and the keen insights his son frequently sent 
him from Europe, John Adams would often pass John Quincy‟s letters on to the 
president.  Washington at one point confided to his vice president that his son 
“must not think of retiring from the walk he is now in: his prospects if he pursues 
it are fair: and I shall be much mistaken, if in as short a time as can well be 
expected, he is not found at the head of the Diplomatique Corps.”10  Such 
approbation was not unidirectional, either, as Adams repeatedly defended not just 
the wisdom of the president‟s foreign policy, but also how essential Washington 
was to its maintenance and success.  Writing to one confidante late in 1795, 
Adams asserted that “At the present moment if our neutrality be still preserved, it 
will be due to the President alone.  Nothing but his weight of character and 
reputation, combined with his firmness and political intrepidity, could have stood 
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against the torrent that is still tumbling with a fury that resounds even across the 
Atlantic.”  Adams believed that in a time when “men who court popularity in 
America, dare to speak openly of their devotion to the interests of France as they 
have done for years back, and lose none of their influence by the barefaced 
avowal of such a partial foreign attachment,” it was only through Washington‟s 
strength that the nation could persevere.
11
  So much faith did Adams put in 
Washington and his principles, he predicted that “If his system of administration 
now prevails, ten years more will place the United States among the most 
powerful and opulent nations on earth.”12  While the timeframe for this prediction 
was optimistic, it clearly revealed that Adams saw Washington‟s principles as 
being not just important for America‟s present but also critical for its future. 
 Given his consistent endorsement of Washington‟s foreign policy 
approach, it should come as no surprise that Adams believed his Farewell Address 
to be a vital legacy to a wise administration.  Upon reading it for the first time, 
Adams wrote directly to Washington to express his fervent prayer that the people 
of the United States “may not only impress all its admonitions upon their hearts, 
but that it may serve as the foundation upon which the whole system of their 
future policy may rise, the admiration and example of future time; that your 
warning voice may upon every great emergency recur to their remembrance with 
an influence equal to the occasion; that it may control the fury of domestic 
factions and check the encroachments of foreign influence; that it may cement 
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with indissoluble force our national Union, and secure at once our dignity and our 
peace.”13  That Adams would passionately approve of Washington‟s Farewell 
Address was not surprising; he had been an outspoken proponent of Washington‟s 
foreign policy throughout his administration and understood the importance of 
that policy to America‟s growth and prosperity.  Washington‟s valedictory also 
enunciated principles that Adams himself had expressed in his Marcellus and 
Columbus essays, not to mention his correspondence, especially as regarded the 
dangers of foreign influence and the importance of neutrality for a weak nation.   
 So much did their principles of foreign policy overlap, that historian 
Samuel Flagg Bemis suggested that “John Quincy Adams‟s contributions to the 
American press and his subsequent letters from The Hague to his father had an 
appreciable influence upon the mind of the President as he thought over what he 
desired to say in the Address. . . .  So clearly do the thoughts of the younger 
Adams, even little traces of his phraseology, appear in the Farewell Address that 
one may wonder whether Washington may not have had still before him the 
letters of „Columbus‟ when he drew up the first draft of that document.”  Bemis 
did not point out these similarities in principle to claim any sort of credit for 
Adams for the Address, as it “would have been given out, in somewhat the same 
form, if Adams had never lived.”  Instead he believed that “John Quincy Adams 
shared these principles of foreign policy [with Washington] and validated them 
from his observation, on the spot, of the wars of the French Revolution.  Thus 
validated, they had reinforced Washington‟s own opinions and even shaped their 
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expression a little.”14  To extend Bemis‟s argument, it can be said that 
Washington and John Quincy Adams had mutually reinforced and validated each 
other in their conception of the principles of American foreign policy.  This 
viewpoint is critical in understanding Adams‟s future use of the Farewell Address. 
 Upon returning to the United States in 1801, Adams found a very different 
country than that which he had departed seven years earlier.  George Washington 
was dead; his father was retired from public life for the first time since the 
Revolution; Thomas Jefferson‟s Republican party was ascendant virtually 
everywhere but New England; and the Federalists, the dominant party of his state 
and the nominative party of the first two presidents, were angrily in the minority.  
Adams returned to Boston as a private citizen to resume his legal practice, but 
was soon elected to the Massachusetts state legislature, and in 1803 was elected 
by that body to the United States Senate.  Adams arrived in Washington, D.C. to 
take his seat in the Senate the day after the vote was taken to ratify the Louisiana 
Purchase, and had he arrived a day earlier he would have voted with the 
majority.
15
  While other Federalists had both principled and partisan reasons to 
oppose the treaty, Adams believed that the treaty-making power of the 
Constitution gave the president the ability to acquire any territory he could 
successfully negotiate for, and Louisiana in the hands of the United States was 
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certainly preferable to French or Spanish control.  At the same time, he argued 
that a Constitutional amendment would be needed before the government could 
legitimately dispose of the acquired territory, a point he pressed in the Senate into 
early 1804 to no avail.
16
  In holding firm to his principles and his understanding of 
the Constitution, Adams had effectively alienated himself from both political 
parties.   
 From the Federalist perspective, his behavior only worsened when he 
became the only Federalist senator to vote in favor of Jefferson‟s Non-
Importation Agreement against Great Britain in 1806 and for the Embargo in 
December 1807.
17
  Adams viewed the Embargo as the only way to keep the 
United States out of the war between Great Britain and France and to guarantee 
the maintenance of neutrality.  Just days after voting in favor of the measure, 
Adams wrote to his father that “we had no other alternative left but this, or taking 
our side at once in the war.  I do not believe indeed that the embargo can long be 
continued; but if we let our ships go out without arming them and authorizing 
them to resist the decrees, they must go merely to swell the plunder of the 
contending parties.”18  The following August, he still believed that “the true and 
only alternative was this – embargo or war; and I remain unshaken in that 
opinion.  Now, although embargo is beyond all question a distressing calamity to 
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this country, yet in comparison with war, either with Britain or France, I still 
esteem it as no more than the bite of a flea to the bite of a rattlesnake.”  He also 
remained hopeful that before long Great Britain or France would stop preying on 
American shipping and that the United States would be “released from the 
pressures of the embargo, without being driven into the war.”  This would not 
only provide for the easing of heavy economic burdens, but would also allow for 
the preservation of “the great system of American neutrality in European wars, 
which Washington with so much difficulty established, and which it has always 
been so difficult to maintain.”19  Adams recognized the damage caused by the 
embargo, but viewed the question through the lens of Washington‟s principles and 
concluded, just as Washington had when considering the Jay Treaty, that the 
maintenance of neutrality and the preservation of peace were the primary interests 
at stake that needed to be protected. 
 Adams resigned his Senate seat in June 1808 after the Federalists in the 
Massachusetts legislature implicitly condemned his record.
20
  His private respite 
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was once again short-lived, though, as soon after being sworn in as president, 
James Madison appointed him as America‟s first minister to Russia.  While this 
new commission allowed Adams to return to the diplomatic service to which he 
was best suited, it also meant that he had to watch from afar as his country 
progressed towards war with Great Britain.  Adams fervently hoped for peace, but 
understood that war was becoming increasingly unavoidable.  Should war come, 
Adams prayed “That we may not undertake it presumptuously, nor impelled by 
passion, nor without a precise and definite object for which to contend.”21  Adams 
wanted victory, but he was also greatly concerned with both the nature and the 
perception of America‟s conduct during the war.  For example, after the failure of 
a campaign against Canada, he lamented that “The acquisition of Canada . . . was 
not and could not be the object of this war. . . .  This misfortune, considered by 
itself, is not a very heavy one to the nation,” but it was still “a deep mortgage of 
reputation to redeem.”22  Adams believed that an American victory in the war was 
inconsequential if it carried with it a diminution of global respect for the United 
States.  When Great Britain rejected a Russian offer to mediate, Adams fumed at 
the show of disrespect.  According to Adams, “It has been so uniformly and 
invariably the policy of the United States to keep themselves aloof from all the 
political combinations of Europe, that the British government seems to have taken 
it for granted that their controversies with us might always be managed upon 
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principles not applicable to their intercourse with other powers, and that what they 
might be compelled to submit to as law of nations with the rest of Europe, they 
might break through with impunity in their relations with America.”  He was 
especially critical of the fact that “as a motive for declining the Russian mediation 
they have alleged that it was a dispute involving principles of internal 
administration, as if the United States were a mere appendage to the British 
dominions.”23  This war had been caused, at least in American eyes, by Britain‟s 
refusal to respect American principles and rights and now its leaders were quite 
literally adding insult to injury. 
 When Britain finally did agree to peace negotiations at Ghent, Belgium, 
Adams, who was appointed as a peace commissioner along with James Bayard, 
Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, and Jonathan Russell, wanted to ensure that the 
United States would achieve a just and honorable peace that would reflect well 
upon the United States in the eyes of the world.
24
  His view of the war had 
changed dramatically between 1808 and 1814.  Before it began he believed that 
America‟s best interests would be served by pursuing peace, but once it had 
commenced, and especially in light of British insults, peace could only be agreed 
to if it was on positive terms.  “I would sooner look forward to the chance of ten 
successive wars, to be carried on ten times more weakly than we have the present 
one,” he raged to his father, “than concede one particle of our principle by a treaty 
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stipulation.”25  When negotiations began in August 1814, the British presented 
extreme demands that would have forced the United States to give up much in 
territory and principle.  By November any of the most onerous demands had been 
dropped, but the British commissioners still clung to several points that Adams 
felt the United States could not concede.  Writing to his wife in late November, he 
admitted that “The objects upon which they still insist, and which we cannot 
yield, are in themselves so trifling and insignificant that neither of the two nations 
would tolerate a war for them.  We have everything but peace in our hands.  But 
in these trifles, in the simple consideration of interest, they have left involved 
principles to which we cannot accede.”  America‟s core interests were at stake 
and thus the principle could not be sacrificed for the sake of peace.  The British 
had “given up without qualification all demand for a cession of territory . . . but 
they have attempted to secure by an article ambiguously drawn, the possession of 
perhaps a few hundred acres of land, which we can no more give up, than we 
could a whole state in our union.  There are other points totally unimportant, but 
implicating our national honor, to which they still adhere.  We cannot agree to 
them, and if they finally persist in requiring it of us, the negotiation must break 
off.”26  Adams would rather risk the continuation of the war that give up his 
nation‟s principles. 
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 Adams‟s persistence on this point, along with the efforts of his fellow 
commissioners, resulted in a treaty that protected American interests and 
preserved American principle by leaving unresolved most of the issues at stake in 
the war, as was discussed in the previous chapter.  Despite this, Adams was still 
proud of the treaty, as the United States had “abandoned no essential right, and if 
we have left everything open for future controversy, we have at least secured to 
our country the power at her own option to extinguish the war.”27  Writing to his 
wife he admitted that “We have obtained nothing but peace, and we have made 
great sacrifices to obtain it.  But our honor remains unsullied; our territory 
remains entire.  The peace in word and in deed has been made upon terms of 
perfect reciprocity, and we have surrendered no one right or pretension of our 
country.”28  Reflecting on the war and the peace more than a year later, Adams 
echoed the judgments of many Republicans back home in declaring the war to 
have been “much more beneficial than injurious to our country.  It has raised our 
national character in the eyes of all Europe.  It has demonstrated that the United 
States are both a military and a naval power, with capacities which may hereafter 
place them in both these respects on the first line among the nations of the 
earth.”29  For this diplomat, the lasting victory of the War of 1812 was the 
principles defended at Ghent rather than the triumph at New Orleans.  After the 
successful completion of the treaty, Adams moved on to Great Britain as the 
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United States‟ representative there, before being recalled by incoming President 
James Monroe to take charge of the State Department.
30
 
 
America’s Post-War Foreign Policy Challenges 
 From the time John Quincy Adams first left the United States for France at 
the age of ten until his return from Britain at the age of fifty to take up his position 
as secretary of state, he had spent more time in Europe than he had in America.
31
  
When he returned from his first European trip to enroll at Harvard he feared “that 
by having received so large a share of my education in Europe, my attachment to 
a republican government would not be sufficient for pleasing my countrymen; but 
I find on the contrary that I am the best republican here, and with my classmates, 
if I ever have any disputes on the subject, I am always obliged to defend that side 
of the question.”32  Being a firsthand witness to the operation of different political 
systems and different political principles had given Adams a unique appreciation 
for both republican principles and the wisdom of George Washington‟s foreign 
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policy.  Whether it be observing the European side of America‟s Quasi-War with 
France in the 1790s, or attempting to uphold American principles in peace 
negotiations with Great Britain in the 1810s, Adams came into the State 
Department with a clear understanding of the importance of Washington‟s 
principles and especially his Farewell Address to the future peace and prospects 
of the United States.  This was especially true given the new global challenges the 
United States was facing in the wake of the War of 1812 and the close of the 
Napoleonic Wars in Europe. 
 The year 1815 was a pivotal one for Europe, as it saw the final defeat of 
Napoleon and a concerted effort by the various European heads of state to ensure 
a permanent restoration of order.  Two decades of war wrought by the French 
Revolution and Napoleon had alerted the sovereigns of Europe to the dangers of 
popular uprising and the need to reassert legitimate authority over the continent.  
This led to the creation of new alliances that aimed to preserve the post-war 
reordering.  The first of these – completed in September 1815 between the 
sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia and termed the Holy Alliance – was a 
declaration of a mutual belief in the nature of legitimate authority in government, 
and specifically the divine right of kings.
33
  Ultimately signed by all of the 
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sovereigns of Europe except for those of Great Britain, Turkey, and the Vatican 
(as those governments did not feature traditional monarchical sovereigns), the 
Holy Alliance quickly became a driving force in European politics.  A second 
alliance, the Quadruple Alliance, was formed between Great Britain and the 
founding members of the Holy Alliance just two months later, and was tasked 
with maintaining peace and a “just balance of power” in the wake of decades of 
upheaval.
34
  These alliances posed interesting new challenges for the incoming 
U.S. secretary of state.  This was especially the case with the Holy Alliance, 
which he described as “of a character entirely new and unexampled in the history 
of the world.”35 
 Of more immediate interest and concern to the United States were the 
ongoing revolutions throughout Spanish America.  The process of revolution had 
commenced slowly in that corner of the globe in 1808, but by 1815 had picked up 
a full head of steam throughout mainland Spanish America.
36
  They were also 
becoming increasingly problematic for the United States.  Privately, the 
government strongly approved of these revolutionary movements, as the 
replacement of Spanish colonies with independent nations represented a 
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significant opportunity for the growth of American commerce and the elimination 
of a far-reaching European colonial presence from much of the American 
continents.  The United States did not exist in a vacuum, though, and as much as 
it inwardly approved of the revolutions, it could not outwardly support them.  As 
one historian put it, “America had to subordinate the possible advantages of an 
active policy in Latin America to the need to avoid antagonizing Spain, with 
whom a number of border questions were pending, or provoking Britain, still her 
major trading partner.”37  These pending border questions with Spain included 
both recent and future negotiations over the potential acquisition of the Floridas 
by the United States.   
 After the War of 1812, the United States hardly wanted to risk war with 
Spain or Great Britain over support for Spanish America.  President Madison 
pursued a policy of “scrupulous neutrality” in the conflict between Spain and its 
colonies, and in September 1815 he issued a proclamation calling for this 
neutrality to become national policy.
38
  Secretary of State James Monroe saw the 
revolutions as becoming “daily more interesting to the United States,” and in a 
dispatch to Minister to Great Britain John Quincy Adams, he expressed his belief 
that the colonies would successfully “separate from the mother country.”  In 
Monroe‟s estimation, these emerging nations required “the acknowledgement of 
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their governments by the United States, and when it is considered that the 
alternative between governments, which in the event of their independence would 
be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from the past, must be 
expected from them, as colonies, there is no cause to doubt in which scale our 
interest lies.”39  Unquestionably that interest was American continents largely free 
of European colonies.  By the end of 1815, though, such assessments were more 
optimistic thinking than realistic expectation, given that it would be another seven 
years before the United States would finally deem any of them to have achieved a 
lasting independence. 
 Regardless, Monroe brought this positive outlook with him into his 
presidency, and raised the possibility of recognizing Buenos Aires at one of 
Adams‟s first cabinet meetings upon his return from Europe.40  Adams “explicitly 
avowed” his opinion that such a course of action was “not now expedient,” as he 
believed that a premature recognition of Spain‟s former colonies would yield no 
economic or political gains for the United States.
41
  Historian Dexter Perkins 
agreed with Adams‟s viewpoint in arguing that the potential trade lost from 
Europe was worth far more than could possibly be gained from the new nations of 
Latin America.  More importantly, the central political objective of recognition – 
seeing “European interests, and European ambitions and rivalries, banished from 
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the New World” – could not be achieved by recognition itself.  Perkins concluded 
that “acknowledgement of the independence of the new states was fundamentally 
a matter of political sympathies; it was not, certainly as matters stood in 1817, a 
matter of American interest.”42  Adams would later expand upon his conception 
of the American interests at stake in an early recognition as being a violation of 
U.S. neutrality; more than just standing up for Latin America, it would be 
interjecting the United States into the ongoing conflict between Spain and its 
colonies.  As Adams saw it, “In every question relating to the independence of a 
nation two principles are involved, one of right, and the other of fact; the former 
depending upon the determination of the nation itself, and the latter resulting from 
the successful execution of that determination.”  In the ongoing revolutions the 
United States had maintained an “impartial neutrality” and would continue to do 
so until such time as recognition was “the mere acknowledgment of existing 
facts.”43  Thus, despite Monroe‟s sympathy, since Buenos Aires had failed to 
adequately demonstrate that it had permanently secured independence, Adams 
wondered, “by what right could we take sides?”44  Until such time as 
independence was an established fact, official expressions of support for the 
Spanish American cause, let alone recognition, would be a violation of neutrality. 
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 In taking this stance on recognition – by seeing it for its relationship to 
American neutrality and interests – Adams was once again demonstrating how 
Washington‟s principles continued to shape his approach to U.S. foreign policy.  
Of course, Adams‟s was not the only definition of America‟s best interests.  
Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives and one of the nation‟s most 
vocal supporters of Spanish American independence, advocated recognition as 
being in the best interests of the United States.  Clay expressed his first interest in 
the progress of Spanish American independence as early as January 1813 and 
issued his first extended call for American support just three years later, when the 
revolutionaries were still struggling to gain significant traction.
45
  During a debate 
only indirectly concerned with America‟s foreign affairs, Clay “boldly declared” 
that should the United States “be called on to decide the question whether we 
would or would not lend them our aid,” that it would “undoubtedly be good 
policy to take part with the patriots of South America.”  He argued that, “on the 
strictest principles of public law, we have a right to take part with them, that it is 
our interest to take part with them, and that our interposition in their favor would 
be effectual.”  Specifically on the question of interest, he “considered the release 
of any part of America from the dominions of the old world, as adding to the 
general security of the new.”46  Clay‟s was a vision of American interest entirely 
antithetical to that of John Quincy Adams, a fact that the secretary of state 
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acknowledged at the end of 1817 when he bemoaned that the Speaker had 
“already mounted his South American great horse.”47  Clay represented a 
perpetual thorn in Adams‟s side on the question of recognition, repeatedly 
opposing attempts to enact stronger neutrality laws, and in early 1818 attempting 
to force the administration to recognize Buenos Aires as an independent nation.  
That his measures were defeated in every congressional vote until 1822 and the 
narrow passage of a somewhat generic resolution declaring support for some 
future move towards recognition by the administration did not deter Clay from 
this cause.
48
 
 Despite Clay‟s persistence and the widespread popular support for liberal 
revolution wherever it should occur, Adams remained undeterred in his 
assessment of American interest and in the necessity of maintaining U.S. 
neutrality.  Likewise, despite strong opposition to the cause of revolution, the 
allied sovereigns of Europe had maintained their own neutrality as well, leaving 
Spain to deal with its colonial problems on its own.  Word reached Adams in 
early 1818, though, that the Allies were considering a proposal of mediation 
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between the colonies and Spain, a development that greatly concerned the 
secretary of state.  In terms of principle, he believed that the avowal of a neutral 
position entailed the recognition of “the cause of both parties to the contest as just 
– that is, it avoids all consideration of the merits of the contest.”  As such, it did 
not matter that Europe inwardly sided with Spain because neutrality meant 
acknowledging the rights of both sides.  Adams wondered if “the proposed 
mediation [was] to be a departure from that line of neutrality?  If it is, which side 
of the contest are the allies to take?  The side of Spain?  On what principle, and by 
what right?  As contending parties in a civil war, the South Americans have 
rights, which other powers are bound to respect as much as the rights of Spain; 
and after having by an avowed neutrality admitted the existence of those rights, 
upon what principle of justice can the allies consider them as forfeited, or 
themselves as justifiable in taking side with Spain against them?”49   
 On a more practical level, Adams was angered that the United States had 
not been consulted.  In writing instructions to the U.S. minister to Russia about 
any potential mediation, Adams emphasized that the European courts were to 
“understand that the interests of this nation are so deeply concerned, and the 
feelings of the country are so much excited on this subject that we have a just 
claim to be informed of the intentions as well as the acts of the European alliance 
concerning it.”  He stressed that the United States hoped “to pursue a course for 
the future in harmony with that of the allies,” but it would not “participate in and 
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cannot approve any interposition of other powers” in Spanish American affairs 
“unless it be to promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the 
colonies.”  He believed that “it must eventually come to this result, and that it is 
rendering no service to either of the parties to endeavor to prevent or to retard 
it.”50  While Adams was advancing a somewhat hypocritical position in arguing 
that a mediation was inappropriate unless it favored Spanish American 
independence, the larger point that he was making was that the United States had 
a greater interest in the success of these revolutions than did Europe.  Regardless 
of Adams‟s view, the Allies viewed Spanish America as strictly a European 
concern.  In a meeting with the Portuguese minister to the United States in May 
1818 it was made “obvious” to Adams “that he wished me to consider the South 
America business as entirely settled by the European alliance.  I told him that if 
they thought of settling affairs of such importance, and in which we have so deep 
an interest, without consulting us, they must not complain if we pursued our 
course concerning it without consulting them.  He fully admitted our right, but in 
the course of our discussion there was something like acerbity in the collision of 
our opinions.”51  This would not be the last time the United States and Europe 
would collide over Spanish America. 
 
Reordering the Western Hemisphere 
 
 This is a critical moment in the explication of John Quincy Adams‟s 
understanding of America‟s principles of foreign policy.  The potential European 
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mediation led Adams to concretely state that, Spain excepted, the United States 
had an equal, if not a greater interest in the disposition of Spanish America than 
did Europe.  In his Farewell Address, George Washington had counseled that 
“Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote 
relation,” but he said nothing about Spanish America, which at the time was 
firmly ensconced as a European colony.
52
  By 1818, with Spanish America 
striving for independence and the potential and dramatic reduction of European 
influence in the Americas this would bring, Adams had to reassess the primary 
interests of the United States.  As a result, for the first time an American 
policymaker was extending the sphere of U.S. interests to include a territory and 
people beyond its own borders.  At this point in time this interest only ran as far 
as ensuring that Europe did not intervene politically on Spain‟s behalf, but it was 
still the recognition that the United States had a deeper interest in the fate of 
Spanish America than it did in Europe.  Likewise, in asserting the importance of 
U.S. interests, Adams was implicitly arguing for the inferiority of European 
interests in the New World (at least outside of their own colonies).  One sees in 
Adams‟s thinking at this point in time the nascent development of the ideas that 
would form the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine five years later. 
 Despite American protests, and without American participation, the 
Quadruple Alliance held a congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, France in October 1818 
with mediation on the agenda; however, the more pressing motive for the 
congress was the admittance of France to the Quadruple Alliance, and the 
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determination of what role the expanded Alliance would play in Europe.  
According to historian Leonard Axel Lawson, Russia favored a plan “to construct 
a political system which would . . . preserve the territorial status quo as created by 
the peace treaties” that ended the Napoleonic Wars.  Great Britain objected to 
Russia‟s proposals, fearing that they “foreshadowed [a] policy of intervention,” 
and arguing that “under no circumstances was [the treaty for the Quadruple 
Alliance] intended to give the Allies the right to interfere in the internal affairs of . 
. . any other country, unless the internal disturbance was of such a nature as to 
threaten the safety of other states.”53  For the time being, at least, Great Britain‟s 
objections swayed the other powers and no interventionist system was enacted.  
When discussion turned to Spanish America, all five powers quickly agreed that 
there was little likelihood of permanently reducing Spain‟s revolting colonies to 
their previous status, and, as one delegate to the Congress put it, “force could 
under no circumstances be employed.”54  In the end the Allies could agree on 
little else, though, and the question of mediation fell apart.  Spain was on its 
own.
55
 
 With no European intervention or mediation in the offing, Spain turned its 
attention to the United States in the hopes of staving off any recognition of the 
revolutionaries by that country by reopening negotiations on the Floridas.  Little 
                                                 
53
 Leonard Axel Lawson, The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine 
(New York: Columbia University, 1922), 38-39. 
54
 Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst, no. 22 confidential, 2 November 1818, in C. K. Webster, 
ed., Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830: Select Documents from the 
Foreign Office Archives, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 2:57. 
55
 For a discussion of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, see Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 
254-58 and Waddell, “International Politics,” 205. 
  
138 
 
had changed since the previous failed negotiations and the seizure of West Florida 
by James Madison until 1818 when General Andrew Jackson led an American 
invasion of East Florida in pursuit of a group of Seminole Indians who had 
attacked Fort Scott in Georgia.
56
  Jackson‟s invasion, along with Henry Clay‟s 
continued pressure in Congress to recognize Spanish American independence, 
provided the impetus Spain needed to return to the negotiating table, but these 
factors also gave the United States the upper hand as talks commenced.  While 
Luis de Onís, the Spanish minister to the United States, originally held firm to the 
same demands that had sunk previous negotiations, Adams was able to leverage 
the entire reversal of Spain‟s fortunes in the Americas into significant Spanish 
concessions and ultimately a treaty.  The basic framework of the treaty called for 
the United States to gain clear title to the Floridas and control of all Spanish 
claims north of the 42
nd
 parallel; Spain would be relieved of all existing claims 
against it by American citizens and would be guaranteed a mutually agreed upon 
border running from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean in order to prevent 
future annexations and skirmishes as had previously occurred in the Floridas. 
 Within this basic framework, two points proved more difficult to settle.  
First was determining the precise boundary between U.S. and Spanish territory.  
The United States, claiming Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase, called for a 
boundary at the Rio del Norte (the modern southwestern border of Texas), while 
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Onís demanded that the Sabine River (the southern portion of which currently 
defines the border between Texas and Louisiana) be accepted as the boundary.  
Accepting the Sabine would mean relinquishing American claims to virtually all 
of Texas, a concession Adams was not willing to make.  He continued to insist on 
the Rio del Norte until the very end of the negotiations, when pressure from 
President Monroe and the rest of the cabinet to conclude the treaty led him to 
begrudgingly accept the Sabine.  Even once the particular rivers were agreed to, 
Adams and Onís still differed on how the borders would be defined.  Onís argued 
that the center of the rivers in question should mark the boundaries, as this would 
preserve unimpaired Spanish navigation rights on these rivers.  Adams wanted 
each of the rivers ceded entirely to the United States, as in his mind the question 
of Spanish navigation rights was only a theoretical proposition, for “there was not 
the remotest probability of there ever being any Spanish settlers there,” whereas 
the United States “would have extensive settlements upon them within a very few 
years.”57  By ceding all of the rivers to the United States it meant that questions of 
use would not need to be revisited or renegotiated at any point in the future, an 
argument that Onís ultimately gave in to.  The final question at stake in the 
negotiations was recognition of Spanish American independence by the United 
States.  Onís insisted that a condition of any treaty be that the United States not 
recognize any of Spain‟s former colonies as independent nations, a condition that 
Adams rejected out of hand.  He would later record in his diary the opinion that 
any such “stipulation not to recognize the South Americans would be a breach of 
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neutrality, and as such we could not accede to it.”58  Just as any European 
mediation on behalf of Spain would have been a violation of neutrality, so too 
would have been any agreement by the United States to withhold recognition 
simply because Spain demanded it.  There was no room for negotiation on this 
point, forcing Onís to give it up to save the larger treaty. 
 With these final points settled, the Adams-Onís Treaty was signed on 22 
February 1819, bringing an end to a dispute over the Floridas that began with the 
Louisiana Purchase more than fifteen years earlier, and giving the United States 
clear title to territory running across the continent to the Pacific Ocean; and how 
fitting that it should be signed on the anniversary of George Washington‟s birth.  
Adams considered the treaty to be one of his greatest triumphs, and described the 
day it was signed as “perhaps, the most important day of my life.”  He was glad to 
have finally completed the acquisition of the Floridas, which had “long been an 
object of earnest desire to this country,” and he considered the “acknowledgment 
of a definite line of boundary to the South Sea [Pacific Ocean]” as forming “a 
great epocha in our history.”  He recognized that “There is some discontent at the 
acceptance of the Sabine as our boundary from the Gulf of Mexico to the Red 
River,” and he expected that “The Floridas will be found, in all probability, less 
valuable in possession than when merely coveted,” but he still considered the 
treaty to be a magnificent success for the United States.
59
  Historians have 
generally agreed with Adams‟s assessment of the treaty‟s import.  For example, 
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Samuel Flagg Bemis described it as the “greatest diplomatic victory ever won by 
an American Secretary of State,” and Dexter Perkins called it “the most 
successful negotiation ever carried on in the annals of American diplomacy.”60  
Adams would ultimately have to wait two long years before finally attaining his 
great victory; while the United States Senate unanimously ratified the treaty on 24 
February, Spain refused to ratify until October 1820.  On 16 February 1821, the 
Senate reratified the treaty by a vote of 40 to 4, and official ratifications were 
exchanged on 22 February 1821.
61
 
 Not all Americans were as impressed with the Adams- Onís Treaty as was 
the secretary of state.  A year after the treaty was signed and the administration 
and Congress were grappling with Spain‟s refusal to ratify, William Archer, a 
Representative from Virginia, expressed to Adams his belief that “it was the worst 
treaty the country had ever made.”  When asked why, Archer responded that “we 
should get by it nothing but Florida, and gave away for it a country worth fifty 
times as much.”62  A few weeks later, Representative David Trimble of Kentucky 
echoed Archer‟s Texas complaint and argued that Adams should “set the treaty 
aside and . . . insist upon the Rio del Norte as the western boundary,” thus 
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restoring Texas to the United States.  Adams responded that “In the negotiations 
with Spain we had a just claim to the Mississippi and its waters, and our citizens 
had a fair though very precarious claim to indemnities.  We had a mere color of 
claim to the Rio del Norte, no claim to a line beyond the Rocky Mountains, and 
none to Florida, which we very much wanted.  The treaty gives us the Mississippi 
and all its waters – gives us Florida – gives us an acknowledged line to the South 
Sea, and seventeen degrees of latitude upon its shores – gives our citizens five 
millions of dollars of indemnity – and barely gives up to Spain the colorable claim 
from the Sabine to the Rio del Norte.”  With rising temperature, Adams continued 
by reminding that “negotiation implies some concession upon both sides.  If after 
obtaining every object of your pursuit but one, and that one weak in principle and 
of no present value, what would you have offered to Spain to yield that also?”63  
Stated in these terms, it is easy to understand why the cabinet pressured Adams to 
give up on Texas in order to ensure these other gains.  This treaty laid the legal 
groundwork for America‟s westward expansion to the Pacific, but it also opened 
the door for future conflict over Texas. 
 Spain‟s delayed ratification produced no changes in the terms of the treaty, 
but it did cause the United States to delay making a final decision to recognize the 
independence of Spanish America.  Between 1819 and 1821 Henry Clay 
continued to push for recognition in Congress, and at various points the 
administration gave it serious consideration, or at least debated support for the 
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revolutionaries.
64
  Despite an increasing prevalence of sentiments favorable to the 
Spanish American cause, and regardless of how justifiable they may have been by 
on-the-ground realities, Adams persisted in his belief that any public discussion of 
recognition would only succeed in antagonizing Spain and seeing the treaty 
permanently put aside.  In considering Monroe‟s annual message to Congress for 
1820, Adams objected to passages expressing support for Spanish America on the 
grounds that as the “system” of the United States was one of “professed 
neutrality, any avowal of partiality for the South Americans was inconsistent with 
it, and liable to raise doubts of our sincerity.”  As he confided to his diary, “I 
believe that these paragraphs of the message have been the principal real cause of 
the delay of Spain to ratify the Florida Treaty.”65  In weighing America‟s interests 
and obligations while the treaty remained unratified, Adams determined that 
preserving good relations with Spain took precedence over the question of 
recognition. 
 Adams took tremendous pride in his strict adherence to Washington‟s call 
for American neutrality as a means of protecting American interests.  On the 
fourth of July 1821, Adams delivered what was arguably his most famous speech 
during an Independence Day celebration in Washington, D.C.  On that occasion 
he hailed the fact that the United States had, “in the lapse of nearly half a century, 
without a single exception, respected the independence of other nations while 
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asserting and maintaining her own.”  Alluding to both the French Revolution of 
decades earlier and the ongoing revolutions in Spanish America, he pointed out 
that the nation “abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when 
the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop 
that visits the heart.  She has seen that probably for centuries to come, all the 
contests of that Aceldama the European world, will be contests of inveterate 
power, and emerging right.  Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence, 
has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her 
prayers be.”  Despite these sympathies, the United States “goes not abroad, in 
search of monsters to destroy.  She is the well-wisher to the freedom and 
independence of all.  She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.  She 
will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the 
benignant sympathy of her example.”  He asserted that Americans understood 
“that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the 
banners of foreign Independence, [the U.S.] would involve herself beyond the 
power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, 
envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.”  
In such an event, “The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly 
change from liberty to force.”66  This was both a forceful and an eloquent 
discourse on the wisdom of Washington‟s principles for America‟s rising glory, 
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as it was a strong defense of not just neutrality but of a foreign policy approach 
defined by the protection of America‟s fundamental interests. 
 The great irony of Adams‟s 4 July 1821 speech was that it was delivered 
less than a year before the United States took its first steps in a new foreign policy 
direction.  With the final ratification of the Adams-Onís Treaty in February 1821, 
it placed the recognition of Spanish American independence back on the table as a 
viable policy choice.  By the early months of 1822 even Adams could think of no 
legitimate reason to forestall an acknowledgment of what by that point had 
become an established fact.  On 8 March President James Monroe declared to 
Congress that when the government considered “the great length of time which 
this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor 
of the Provinces, the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of 
Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is 
settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in 
the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized.”67  The first formal act of recognition 
was carried out three months later when Adams formally presented Manuel 
Torres to Monroe as Chargé d‟Affaires from the republic of Colombia.68  
Recognition was in many ways a bold departure for American foreign policy 
given that, regardless of the actual progress of Spanish American independence, 
Spain and the Holy Allies still viewed it as a question of colonies in revolt.  In 
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receiving official representatives from Spanish America, the United States 
believed that it was fulfilling its duties as a neutral nation by acknowledging the 
established fact of independence, and it prioritized this obligation ahead of any 
concerns that Europe could interpret such actions as a violation of its neutrality.  
For men like Clay, recognition represented a victory for liberal and republican 
principles, but for Adams it was primarily a question of American interest; in this 
case seeing European rule and influence eliminated from most of the American 
continents while also staying true to the obligations of neutrality.  By waiting until 
independence was an established fact, recognition represented a declaration by the 
United States that European rule over Spanish America was at an end.  The open 
question, of course, was how would Europe respond? 
 An overarching objective of John Quincy Adams‟s foreign policy had 
been the elimination of European influence in the Americas, and in North 
America in particular, where he looked to protect the ability of the United States 
to expand territorially across the continent, believing such expansion to only be a 
question of time.  The Adams-Onís Treaty and the recognition of Spanish-
American independence had been two important steps in this process, as had been 
the Convention of 1818 with Great Britain, which stipulated that the citizens of 
both nations could make full use of a wide swath of land claimed by both 
countries along the northwest coast of North America.  While all of these foreign 
policies fell under the broad umbrella of protecting America‟s best interests, they 
were also the more specific embodiment of Washington‟s warning that the United 
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States and Europe had distinct and separate interests.  An unwavering neutrality 
was one way to preserve this separation, but the actual removal of Europe from 
the Americas was a more effective long-term strategy.  Given Adams‟s 
expansionist view of America‟s future, the elimination of European rivalship 
throughout North America was especially important.  So devoted was Adams to 
this project that in 1821, despite the Convention of 1818, he famously got into a 
heated argument with Stratford Canning, the British minister to the United States, 
over British claims along the northwest coast, in which he informed Canning that 
Great Britain should “Keep what is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to 
us.”69   
 A new challenge emerged to both the United States and Britain‟s claims 
along the northwest coast in September 1821 with the issuance of an imperial 
ukase by Tsar Alexander I of Russia.  The ukase extended his country‟s territorial 
claims “from [the] Behring Straits down, to the 51° of Northern Latitude,” and 
prohibited “all Foreign Vessels, not only to land on the Coast and Islands 
belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than 
                                                 
69
 The argument took place over two days, and culminated when Adams asked Canning “„Have 
you any claim . . . to the mouth of Columbia River [in modern day Washington state]?‟ 
 “„Why, do you not know,‟ replied he, „that we have a claim?‟ 
 “„I do not know,‟ said I, „what you claim nor what you do not claim.  You claim India; you 
claim Africa; you claim ––„ 
 “„Perhaps,‟ said he, „a piece of the moon.‟ 
 “„No,‟ said I; „I have not heard that you claim exclusively any part of the moon; but there is 
not a spot on this habitable globe that I could affirm you do not claim; and there is none which you 
may not claim with as much color of right as you can have to Columbia River or its mouth.‟ 
 “„And how far would you consider,‟ said he, „this exclusion of right to extend?‟ 
 “„To all the shores of the South Sea,‟ said I.  „We know of no right that you have there.‟” 
Emphasis in original.  27 January 1821, in Adams, Memoirs, 5:252-53.  For the entire debate, see 
26 and 27 January 1821, in Ibid., 243-59. 
  
148 
 
100 Italian miles.”70  Upon hearing of the ukase, Adams protested to Russian 
minister Pierre de Poletica that “This ordinance affects so deeply the rights of the 
United States and of their citizens that I am instructed to inquire whether you are 
authorized to give explanations of the grounds of right, upon principles generally 
recognized by the laws and usages of nations, which can warrant the claims and 
regulations contained in it.”71  Adams exchanged letters with the Russian minister 
to little effect, until a dispatch arrived in August from the U.S. minister to Russia, 
Henry Middleton, asserting that “the provisions of the ukase would not be 
persisted in.  It appears to have been signed by the Emperor without sufficient 
examination, and may be fairly considered as having been surreptitiously 
obtained.  There can be little doubt, therefore, that with a little patience and 
management it will be molded into a less objectionable shape.”72  In early 1823 
the new Russian Minister to the United States, Baron von Tuyll, proposed that the 
two countries‟ differences be “terminated by means of a friendly negotiation,” to 
which Adams freely consented, informing Tuyll that Middleton would be given 
instructions on how to proceed.
73
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 On 17 July 1823, Tuyll approached Adams to discover the general 
contents of Middleton‟s instructions, and was greeted by the boldest declaration 
of American principles issued by a U.S. secretary of state to that point in the 
nation‟s history.  Adams informed Tuyll that the United States “should contest the 
right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we 
should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer 
subjects for any new European colonial establishments.”74  This non-colonization 
principle did far more than dispute Russian claims on the Pacific coast of North 
America, but warned all of Europe out of both American continents.  Adams 
expanded on this principle in his instructions to Middleton, observing that “the 
future peace of the world, and the interests of Russia herself, cannot be promoted 
by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent.  With the 
exception of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder 
of both the American Continents must henceforth be left to the management of 
American hands.”75 
 In instructions to Richard Rush, the American minister to Great Britain, 
Adams observed that “it is not imaginable that, in the present condition of the 
world, any European nation should entertain the project of settling a colony on the 
Northwest Coast of America.  That the United States should form establishments 
there, with views of absolute territorial right and inland communication, is not 
                                                 
74
 Emphasis in original.  17 July 1823, in Adams, Memoirs, 6:163. 
75
 “Observations on the claim of Russia to territorial possessions on the continent of North 
America, communicated with Mr. Adam‟s [sic] letter to Mr. Middleton of July 22, 1823,” in 
ASP:FR, 5:445. 
  
150 
 
only to be expected, but is pointed out by the finger of nature, and has been for 
many years a subject of serious deliberation in Congress.”  He concluded that “the 
American continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization.  
Occupied by civilized independent nations, they will be accessible to Europeans 
and to each other on that footing alone, and the Pacific Ocean in every part of it 
will remain open to the navigation of all nations, in like manner with the 
Atlantic.”76  This non-colonization principle as it was expressed to Tuyll, 
Middleton, and Rush represented a dramatic step forward for the United States in 
the cause of eliminating European influence in the Americas.  U.S. statesmen had 
long believed that the United States would eventually expand westward to the 
Pacific Ocean, but this declaration by Adams was the first instance that it was put 
forward as a matter of principle, directly to the European powers, that they should 
abstain from future colonization of the Americas.  What made the non-
colonization principle especially surprising was that it pertained to both American 
continents – to the United States and the new nations of Spanish America – in 
recognition that Europe had an obligation to respect American independence in its 
entirety. 
 For as bold a statement as the non-colonization principle was, this 
boldness owed more to its form than it did to the principle itself.  Its roots can be 
traced to the no-transfer resolution of 15 January 1811 (discussed in the previous 
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chapter) and to Washington‟s Farewell Address.77  The no-transfer resolution, 
while secret in its declaration, proclaimed American opposition to the transfer of 
existing European colonies from one power to another, thus expressing opposition 
to the establishment of new colonial powers in the Americas.  The non-
colonization principle was simply a broader and more forceful enunciation of this 
idea.  And as previously stated, both ideas can be traced directly from the 
Farewell Address.  As much as Adams was concerned with expansion, his 
primary objective in much of his foreign policy even beyond the non-colonization 
principle was using negotiation in times of peace to eliminate future points of 
controversy.  This was the argument Adams used to convince Onís to cede the 
entirety of the riverine boundaries to the United States and it was as much his 
focus with the non-colonization principle.  Europe was never going to settle North 
America to the extent that the United States eventually would, so rather than 
waiting for a conflict to arise at some point in the future that could threaten to 
entangle the United States in war or require a protracted negotiation to resolve, 
Adams hoped the non-colonization principle would prevent the sources of that 
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conflict in the first place.  Washington had counseled Americans in his Farewell 
Address to be wary of foreign influence, to remain neutral in European political 
concerns, and to preserve peace as the surest protection for unfettered American 
development – all of which were ideas embodied in the non-colonization 
principle.  Even the choice to present it as applying to both North and South 
America was aimed at preventing European influence in the United States‟ new 
and weak neighbors, thus reducing the likelihood of controversy with them in the 
future.  On the most basic level, Adams also understood what the Nootka Sound 
Controversy had made so clear to Washington in 1790 – that it was in America‟s 
best interests to be surrounded by free nations and not European colonies.
78
 
 By early 1823 another challenge to American continents free of European 
influence was emerging with French military intervention in Spain.  While 
unwilling to assist Spain regain its colonies in 1818, the outbreak of civil war 
between liberals and royalists in 1820 led the Holy Alliance to favor armed 
intervention in Spain to restore the king‟s authority.  At the Congress of Verona, 
assembled in November 1822, it was determined that the French army would 
invade early the next year.  The Congress was technically a meeting of the 
Quadruple Alliance, but Great Britain refused to consent to any intervention in 
Spain.  The decision of the other Allies, all members of the Holy Alliance, to push 
forward over British objections resulted in an open and irreversible split between 
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Britain and the rest of the Alliance.
79
  Incensed by the Allies‟ willingness to 
violate the territorial sovereignty of another country, British Foreign Minister 
George Canning sent a dispatch to France on the eve of invasion in March 1823 
threatening war if that country should attempt to permanently occupy Spain, 
extend its invasion into Portugal, or move to appropriate any of Spain‟s American 
colonies for itself.
80
   
 Canning did not actually believe that France would seek to establish a 
permanent military occupation of Spain or to undertake an invasion of Portugal, 
but he was distressed by the possibility of French intervention in Spanish 
America.  In this case his concern for Spanish America was less ideological than 
it was economic, as he feared the potential impact a French invasion would have 
on Britain‟s commercial interests.  The existing Spanish American trade was 
profitable, and Canning expected significant growth upon a formal recognition of 
independence, which had only been withheld to that point in order to maintain 
good relations with Spain.
81
  In his dispatch to France, Canning argued that since 
the Spanish American colonies had “thrown off their allegiance to the Crown of 
Spain, time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their 
separation from the Mother Country. . . .  Disclaiming in the most solemn manner 
any intention of appropriating to Himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish 
Possessions in America, His Majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by 
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France, to bring under Her Dominion any of those Possessions, either by 
Conquest, or by Cession, from Spain.”82  The dispatch, which was widely 
published throughout Europe and the United States, was significant not only for 
the message that it sent to France and the Holy Alliance, but also for the message 
that it sent American statesmen, as it made clear Britain‟s opposition to European 
intervention in Spanish America. 
 For John Quincy Adams the French invasion of Spain on 6 April 1823 
represented the end of Spain‟s dominion in the New World, save for Puerto Rico 
and Cuba.  He saw it as a critical turning point in the trans-Atlantic relationship 
between Europe and the Americas.  In a letter to the U.S. minister to Spain 
explaining the importance of the events taking place in Europe, Adams stressed 
the continuance of American neutrality in foreign wars, regardless of any 
sympathies Americans might have for Spaniards liberals.  His main concern 
moving forward was the disposition of Cuba and Puerto Rico, as Spain could still 
transfer “her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to 
others.”  In Adams‟s estimation, the islands were “natural appendages to the 
North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, . . . from a multitude of 
considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the political 
and commercial interests of our Union.  Its commanding position . . . gives it an 
importance in the sum of our national interests, with which that of no other 
foreign territory can be compared.”  He believed that “in looking forward to the 
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probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely 
possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal 
republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union 
itself.”83  Adams identified Cuba as having transcendent importance for 
America‟s future security and commercial growth.  Under the control of a weak 
Spain, it posed no threats, but should the island be transferred to a stronger power, 
its position at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico could prove disastrous for 
American commerce flowing through the port of New Orleans.  Adams wanted to 
avoid this at all costs, and hoped that by sending instructions to Spain 
disapproving of any transfer the United States might once again be able to ward 
off a point of future controversy. 
 As spring turned to summer and as the French invasion of Spain 
progressed, the United States looked on with great interest even before word 
started to circulate that France intended to send its army on to Spanish America 
once it achieved victory in Spain.  As a neutral nation the proverbial hands of the 
United States were tied when it came to the events taking place in Europe.  That 
was, at least, until Richard Rush‟s first dispatches reached James Monroe‟s hands 
in October 1823.   
 
The Monroe Doctrine 
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 From the beginning, Rush understood the importance of Great Britain‟s 
position on Spanish America and thus the gravity of Canning‟s proposal.84  Great 
Britain‟s naval power on the side of Spanish America would surely stave off any 
interference by the Holy Alliance.  Rush made the decision that he would assent 
to Canning‟s joint declaration if Great Britain would immediately recognize the 
independence of Spanish America, but Canning was not willing to commit to 
anything more than being “upon the eve of taking” a step towards recognition that 
was “not final, but preparatory, and which would still leave [Great Britain] at 
large to recognize or not according to the position of events at a future period.”85  
Canning‟s unwillingness to budge on recognition, and Rush‟s great hesitancy to 
commit the United States to a joint declaration without it, ultimately prevented the 
two statesmen from coming to any agreement; but while these positions were 
staked out from the beginning of their conversations, it would still take more than 
a month for their dialogue to break down entirely.  On the heels of their first 
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discussion of a joint declaration in mid-August, Canning presented Rush with five 
points that would form the framework for it.  Britain viewed “the recovery of the 
Colonies by Spain to be hopeless” and “the question of the Recognition of them, 
as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.”  Even still, it would 
not “throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them, and the 
mother country by amicable negotiation.”  Perhaps the most important points 
from the American perspective were Canning‟s final two, which declared that 
Britain aimed “not at the possession of any portion of [the colonies] ourselves” 
and that it “could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with 
indifference.”86  Based on his interpretation of U.S. policy, Rush largely agreed 
with these points.  The United States had already recognized Spanish American 
independence, thus negating one of the points, and Rush highly doubted that a 
negotiated solution between Spain and its former colonies was possible.   
 The most interesting difference in their positions dealt with Canning‟s 
final point and was really one of style rather than substance, as Rush declared that 
the United States “would regard as highly unjust, and fruitful of disastrous 
consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession 
of them by conquest, or by cession; or on any ground or pretext whatever.”87  
Rush wanted to make abundantly clear that the United States opposed all efforts 
to extend European influence in the Americas.  Discussing Canning‟s five points 
and the joint declaration, Rush would later write that “seldom, perhaps, at any 
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time among nations, had an opportunity occurred when so small an effort of two 
friendly governments might produce so unequivocal a good, and prevent such 
extensive calamities.”88  This was the idea that lingered in Rush‟s mind as his 
discussions with Canning continued into September and even October.  
Throughout that time Canning pushed Rush to agree to a joint declaration, 
especially once word reached Britain of French victory in Spain and the growing 
likelihood of a new Congress being called to determine Allied intervention in 
Spanish America.  Rush‟s primary concern was pledging his government to a 
joint declaration against its long-standing, Washingtonian policy of non-
involvement “in the political connexions of Europe.”  Canning repeatedly waved 
off such concerns, arguing in mid-September that the question of Allied 
intervention was “as much American as European. . . .  It concerned the United 
States under interests as immediate and commanding, as it did or could any of the 
states of Europe.”89  Rush remained unwilling to commit until he had heard back 
from his government but hoped to keep the dialogue with Canning open so that 
when he did receive instructions they could immediately move forward. 
 Rush was surprised in early October when Canning suddenly ended all 
substantive discussions of Spanish America.  In a dispatch to John Quincy Adams 
dated 10 October, Rush expressed the conviction that the negotiations were at an 
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end.  He felt that the “termination of the discussion” was “sudden, not to say 
abrupt, considering how zealously as well as spontaneously it was started” by 
Canning, and he concluded that from Britain‟s perspective, “it is France that must 
not be aggrandized, not South America that must be made free.”90  As far as Rush 
was concerned, the prospects for a joint declaration were closed.  What he would 
not find out until weeks later was that Canning had grown tired of waiting for an 
American response and on 9 October had entered into discussions directly with 
the French minister to Great Britain, the Prince de Polignac, over the views of 
each government on Spanish America.  Their dialogue lasted just three days and 
resulted in the Polignac Memorandum, in which Britain reiterated its belief in 
Canning‟s five points, and France pledged to not “appropriate to herself any part 
of the Spanish possessions in America” and foreswore “any design of acting 
against the Colonies by force of arms.”91  The Polignac Memorandum brought the 
crisis of European intervention in Spanish American to an end, and obviously 
made any joint declaration between Great Britain and the United States 
unnecessary.  Less than a week after Canning‟s conversations with Polignac 
concluded, Rush‟s first dispatches outlining the proposed joint declaration with 
Britain and Canning‟s five points reached President Monroe.  As far as he knew, 
not only was a Congress of the Holy Alliance and armed intervention in Spanish 
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America seemingly imminent, but he also faced the added pressure that at any 
point in time Rush might commit the United States to the joint declaration.
92
 
 From the moment Rush‟s dispatches arrived in the United States, 
American statesmen saw the larger questions at stake as bearing directly on the 
principles of foreign policy laid down by George Washington in his Farewell 
Address.  Unable to communicate more immediately with his secretary of state, 
Monroe sought advice from former presidents and fellow-Virginians Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison.  Monroe frequently sought out Jefferson‟s advice, 
most recently during the previous summer when he viewed the situation of the 
United States to be “peculiarly critical, as respects the present state of the world, 
& our relations with the acting parties in it, in Europe, & in this hemisphere.”93  
Jefferson, as if channeling Washington‟s Farewell, replied that the United States 
should not take part “in the quarrels of Europe.  Their political interests are 
entirely distinct from ours.  Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their 
complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are all foreign to 
us.”94  In October, Monroe forwarded Rush‟s dispatches on to the former 
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presidents and revealed his great hesitancy over how to proceed.  Monroe saw 
consideration of the joint declaration as boiling down to three questions, all of 
which were concerned with how this specific issue and this particular crisis 
related to America‟s larger and long-standing principles of foreign policy.  First, 
he questioned if the United States should “entangle ourselves, at all, in European 
politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others . . . ?”  To do so would 
clearly be a departure from Washington‟s Farewell Address, which led him to ask, 
“If a case can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is 
not the present instance, precisely that case?”  Finally, he wondered if the “epoch” 
had not arrived “when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the 
monarchs of Europe, or of the UStates, & in consequence, either in favor of 
Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum‟d that, aware of that necessity, 
her government has seiz‟d on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the 
most suitable to announce & mark the commenc‟ment of that career[?]”  Monroe 
concluded that the United States “ought to meet the proposal” and declare that 
“we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and 
especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves.”95  
Strictly speaking, agreeing to the joint declaration may have been a violation of 
Washington‟s call for neutrality – not to mention Jefferson‟s “entangling alliances 
with none” – but in this instance such a departure was necessary in order to 
defend the larger principle of protecting American interests and security. 
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 Jefferson saw nothing but positive outcomes in Britain‟s proposed joint 
declaration.  He agreed with Monroe‟s (and Adams‟s) assessment that the United 
States should never “entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe,” or “suffer 
Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.”  Once again recalling the 
Farewell Address, he declared that “America, North and South, has a set of 
interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own.  She should 
therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.  
While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor 
should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom.”  Here, stated quite 
explicitly, the author of “entangling alliances with none” was emphasizing the 
concurrence of interests in the American continents and was arguing for an 
American sphere separate from Europe.  As a result, Jefferson argued that Monroe 
should not fear joining with Great Britain, as to do so would be “to maintain our 
own principle, not to depart from it.”  He acknowledged that by agreeing to 
Canning‟s five points the United States would be making a pledge against a future 
acquisition of Cuba, but it also meant that Great Britain would likewise be 
pledged; this assurance alone would be significant for America‟s future security.96  
Madison believed that the United States was practically obligated to join with 
Britain in warning against European intervention given the nation‟s consistent 
support of Spanish America‟s “liberties & independence.”  Echoing Canning‟s 
original premise, he further asserted that while American cooperation “must 
ensure success, in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success 
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without that appeal.”97  With this encouragement from Jefferson and Madison in 
hand, Monroe returned to Washington, D.C. in early November believing that 
Rush should be instructed to agree to Canning‟s joint declaration and that to do so 
would be to defend American principles and American interests. 
 While Monroe was seeking the advice of Jefferson and Madison, John 
Quincy Adams was once again exchanging principled communications with 
Baron von Tuyll. The Russian minister informed Adams that the tsar of Russia 
had derived great “„satisfaction‟” from the news that when the United States 
recognized the independence of Spanish America it had also “„declared that it was 
not their intention to deviate from the neutrality which they had until then 
observed, in the contests between Spain and her American Colonies.‟”  The Tsar 
hoped that the United States would “„persevere in that course of neutrality.‟”  
Given the widespread discussion of Allied intervention, Adams took Tuyll‟s 
statement as a not-too-subtle urging that the United States should cling to that 
neutrality regardless of what took place in Spanish America.  In response Adams 
warned that America‟s policy of neutrality “„had been made under the observance 
of a like neutrality by all the European Powers to the same contest.‟”  If, however, 
“„one or more of the European powers should depart from their neutrality, that 
change of circumstances would necessarily become a subject of further 
deliberation in this Government, the result of which it was not in my power to 
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foretell.‟”98  Adams was issuing his own not-too-subtle rejoinder that the United 
States would not sit idly by should Europe act in Spanish America. 
 When Adams finally learned of Canning‟s proposal, and as cabinet 
discussions of it commenced on 7 November, these dealings with Russia and a 
distrust of Canning led him to take an entirely different view of how the United 
States should respond.
99
  From the beginning Adams doubted the validity of the 
reports that the Allies would intervene in Spanish America, or even if they did 
that they would be successful, at one point declaring that “I no more believe that 
the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent 
than that the Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean.”100  Instead Adams 
believed that Canning‟s real purpose was to “obtain some public pledge from the 
Government of the United States . . . against the acquisition . . . of any part of the 
Spanish-American possessions,” and especially Cuba.101  As far as Adams was 
concerned, by joining with Great Britain “we give her a substantial and perhaps 
inconvenient pledge against ourselves, and really obtain nothing in return.”  The 
rest of the cabinet, and especially Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, was hesitant 
to accept Adams‟s view until the arrival of Rush‟s early October dispatches 
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notifying that Canning had broken off negotiations over a joint declaration.  
Monroe saw this as a sign that Canning “was less alarmed” and that “probably 
some inducements had been presented, after the triumph of the French in Spain, to 
quiet his apprehensions” of a possible European congress on Spanish America.  
For Adams, the dispatches only bolstered him in his initial distrust of Canning, as 
they were “confirmation that the alarm was affected” and that Canning‟s “object 
was to obtain by a sudden movement a premature commitment of the American 
Government against any . . . acquisition of [Cuba] by ourselves; and, failing in 
that point, he has returned to the old standard of British belligerent policy.”102 
 From the beginning of the cabinet discussions, Adams wanted the 
administration to see Canning‟s proposal, Tuyll‟s recent communications, and the 
Russian ukase of 1821 within the bigger picture of Euro-American relations.  He 
argued that the Russian communications “afforded . . . a very suitable and 
convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at 
the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain.”  Besides offering an 
opportunity to “avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France,” it would 
also be “more candid, as well as more dignified” for the United States to take 
independent action rather than “to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the 
British man-of-war.”103  Besides, he argued, as any good Washingtonian would, 
the United States needed to be “free to act as emergencies may arise, and not tie 
ourselves down to any principle which might immediately afterwards be brought 
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to bear against ourselves.”104  For Adams, the convergence of circumstances 
presented an opportunity to announce to the world America‟s true principles of 
foreign policy as they had evolved in his mind in recent years, thus rather than 
agreeing to Canning‟s proposal he recommended bringing a reply to Tuyll, a reply 
to Canning, diplomatic instructions to various foreign ministers, and the non-
colonization principle together as “parts of a combined system of policy.”105 
 Adams best summarized the intent of this system of policy later in 
November after Tuyll presented him with another communication from the 
Russian government espousing the principles of the Holy Alliance.  He described 
the communication in his diary as “an exposition of principles . . . in a tone of 
passionate exultation” in response to “the impending success of the French army 
in Spain; an „Io Triumphe‟ over the fallen cause of revolution; with sturdy 
promises of determination to keep it down.”106  Adams wanted the reply to this 
communication to be the cornerstone of his system of policy.  “In a moderate and 
conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit,” he wanted to “declare 
our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications; to assert those 
upon which our own Government is founded, and, while disclaiming all intention 
of attempting to propagate them by force, and all interference with the political 
affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers 
will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American 
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hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will.”107  
In this brief passage Adams made clear that the various components of this 
system of policy, as well as what would ultimately come to be known as the 
Monroe Doctrine, was intended as a forceful restatement of the principles of 
Washington‟s Farewell Address with regards to the separation of the European 
and American spheres.
108
  It also represented an expansion of them to recognize a 
community of interest between the independent nations of both American 
continents. 
 Despite the strength of Adams‟s convictions, President Monroe and 
members of the cabinet were hesitant to frame the U.S. responses to Russia, 
France, and Great Britain as such bold declarations of American principles, 
especially declarations that could ultimately involve the United States in war if 
the Allies should disregard them.
109
  Adams would not relent, and on 27 
November the enactment of his system of policy began with the reply to Tuyll and 
his communication of Russian principles.  Adams informed Tuyll that “the sphere 
of [European] operations was not intended to embrace the United States of 
America, nor any portion of the American Hemisphere,” and warned “that the 
United States of America, and their Government, could not see with indifference, 
the forcible interposition of any European Power, other than Spain, either to 
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restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated Colonies in America, or to 
establish Monarchical Governments in those Countries, or to transfer any of the 
possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American Hemisphere, to any 
other European Power.”110  On 29 and 30 November Adams sent instructions to 
Richard Rush outlining the government‟s official position on Canning‟s proposed 
joint declaration, in which he linked the interests of the United States to the 
stability of Latin America.  “American affairs,” he stated, “whether of the 
Northern or of the Southern Continent, can, henceforth, not be excluded from the 
interference of the United States.  All questions of policy relating to them, have a 
bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the Unites States themselves, that 
they cannot be left at the disposal of European Powers, animated and directed, 
exclusively, by European principles and interests.”111  The sphere of U.S. interests 
had officially been extended to both American continents. 
 On 2 December 1823 the final portion of the administration‟s system of 
policy, President Monroe‟s address to Congress, was issued to the nation.  In 
discussing American foreign relations during the course of the preceding year, 
Monroe reiterated the non-colonization principle, announcing that “the occasion 
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and 
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the 
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are 
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henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any 
European powers.”112  Later in the address Monroe brought together the 
pronouncement Adams had made to Tuyll and Rush in what can be termed the 
doctrine of two spheres.  He began by restating America‟s policy of neutrality, 
declaring that “In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to 
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to 
do so.  It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent 
injuries or make preparation for our defense.”  The situation was fundamentally 
different with regards to “the movements in this hemisphere” with which the 
United States was “immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious 
to all enlightened and impartial observers.  The political system of the allied 
powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America.”113   
 Given these facts, Monroe proceeded to issue an exposition of American 
principles and expectations unparalleled in the nation‟s history to that point.  “We 
owe it,” he began, “to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the 
United States and those powers [in Europe] to declare that we should consider any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as 
dangerous to our peace and safety.”  He was quick to point out that “With the 
existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered 
and shall not interfere.  But with the Governments who have declared their 
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
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consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other 
manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the 
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”  The country 
would remain neutral “In the war between those new Governments and Spain” so 
long as “no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent 
authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of 
the United States indispensable to their security.”114  The meaning of this 
language was clear: from this point forward, Europe was to abstain from all 
involvement in American affairs, and if it failed to do so it would be met with 
resistance by the United States. 
 The non-colonization principle and the doctrine of two spheres, which 
together form the Monroe Doctrine, simultaneously represented the reiteration of 
America‟s traditional principles as well as a bold new direction for U.S. foreign 
policy.  The new principles clearly emerged out of Adams‟s understanding of 
Washington‟s Farewell Address and the recognition that its core ideas must 
evolve over time to meet new global challenges.  As Washington had 
understandably never conceived of an independent Spanish America, Adams 
adapted existing principles to protect America‟s best interests moving forward.  In 
this case, that interest was seeing the American continents made free of European 
influence.  Adams was not swayed by the increasingly pervasive “entangling 
alliances with none” view of the Farewell Address, but at the same time, as he 
                                                 
114
 Ibid.  The complete text of the Monroe Doctrine can be found in appendix B. 
  
171 
 
repeatedly pointed out, he was also not advocating the abandonment of America‟s 
long-standing neutrality.  Instead he simply argued that the United States shared 
greater common interests with Spanish America than it ever could with Europe 
and that it needed to approach foreign policy accordingly.  The bold new direction 
of the Monroe Doctrine was not the reversal of America‟s traditional principles, 
but rather the explicitly declared lengths the government would go to defend 
them.  Whereas in the past American principles were framed as strictures for 
American actions, the Doctrine and the larger system of policy it was a part of 
was an announced expectation for European behavior and a warning of the 
American response if Europe did not comply. 
 
Popular Response 
 As soon as Monroe‟s annual message to Congress was published it was 
greeted with overwhelming positivity by the American press throughout the 
nation.  The New York Evening Post applauded the message for “its wisdom as 
well as its spirit,” while the Boston Gazette praised Monroe, who “speaks the 
language of a patriot, statesman, and philanthropist,” and the message, whose 
“impulse will be felt by every worthy American who shall read it.”115  The 
National Gazette of Philadelphia predicted that the Doctrine would be “hailed by 
the liberal politicians of Europe as shedding from an exalted spring of light 
principles and lessons not only just and appropriate, in reference to their source, 
but general and inspiring and luminous for civilized society in general. . . .  Such 
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language will serve to apprise the Allies that we are alive, feelingly alive, to their 
probable designs on this hemisphere here, and that they would experience from 
this republic, a kind of resistance very different from that which the French met in 
Spain.”116  The Richmond Enquirer anticipated that the “conclusion of the 
Message will rivet every one‟s attention.  The policy chalked out towards South 
America breathes a generous and lofty spirit, which is worthy of the Chief 
Magistrate of the nation.”117  These positive responses were especially 
understandable given that they were often accompanied by reports of imminent 
intervention.  The day before Monroe delivered his message the Daily National 
Intelligencer of Washington, D.C. published a report that the “opinion seems to 
be gaining ground that France, Spain, and Portugal, have it in contemplation to 
restore the American colonies of the two latter to the legitimate sway of their 
respective mother countries.  Transports, it is said, were preparing at Lisbon, to 
carry troops to Brazil, and Governors have been appointed for Maranham and 
Para.”118  The editors of the Richmond Enquirer argued that the “strong language” 
of the message “induces us to believe, that the President is actuated to use it, at 
this time, by some extraordinary information which he has received.”119  The 
message was enthusiastically greeted, but also served to increase the fears of at 
least some that intervention was inevitable. 
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 Private individuals had a similarly positive view of the Monroe Doctrine 
as well.  William Plumer of New Hampshire, a former United States Senator and 
Governor of his state, described Monroe‟s message as “the best communication 
he has ever made to Congress.  The sentiments are manly and independent.  As an 
individual, I am proud of such language from the Chief Magistrate of the nation to 
the Legislature.‟”120  Hezekiah Prince of Maine remarked in his journal that the 
message was a “paper of much interest” for its assertions, which were “responded, 
yea, by every true-born American – that any interference of the Holy Alliance 
with the concerns of the Mexican and South American governments, whose 
independence we acknowledged by our last Congress, or any attempts of the 
powers of Europe to establish the Spanish authority over those countries would be 
considered as hostile to the peace and happiness of this government and would be 
resisted as such.”121  This was a declaration to take pride in.  Even Henry Clay, 
the Monroe administration‟s main antagonist on Spanish American affairs, 
conceded that “the part [of Monroe‟s address] relating to foreign affairs was . . . 
the best part of the message.”122  So much did Clay approve of the Monroe 
Doctrine that in January 1824 he introduced a resolution in Congress reiterating 
its principles.  The resolution declared “that the people of these States could not 
see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the Allied powers of 
Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the 
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Continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, 
respectively, Independent Governments, and which have been solemnly 
recognized by the U. States.”123  Despite the popularity of Monroe‟s message, 
Clay‟s resolution was never brought to a vote.124   
 As a direct response to impending intervention, the Doctrine, as historian 
Albert Bushnell Hart wrote, “was bound to be popular because it not only paid a 
pleasing tribute to the enlightenment of Americans, but because it expressed a 
national sense of importance in the new western world.”125  Not everyone fully 
endorsed the ramifications of the Monroe Doctrine when it was first published, 
though.  Writing a pamphlet related to the upcoming presidential election, “Philo-
Jackson” declared that he was “opposed by the sanction and guarantee that was 
made by our government” in Monroe‟s message.  This opposition stemmed from 
“The recommendation of our immortal Washington, that we should form 
entangling alliances with no nation.”  Philo-Jackson‟s greater fear was that once 
recognition was granted, and based on the expectation of impending intervention 
by the Holy Alliance, the only logical step was to depart “from the counsels of our 
great political father” and to “form an alliance with our ancient enemy, Great 
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Britain.”126  Arguments such as this make clear that observers truly did think 
intervention was likely to take place and that at least some saw Monroe‟s 
Doctrine as contravening Washington‟s Farewell Address. 
 The hesitancy of Congress to give official sanction to the Doctrine makes 
sense in light of global developments during the early months of 1824, as within 
seemingly no time at all the interventionist fears had almost entirely dissipated.  
As the crisis the Doctrine was seemingly meant to meet passed away, some 
Americans began to question its long-term utility and to back away from its 
tenets.  Rep. Lewis Williams of North Carolina wrote to his constituents that it 
would be with “extreme reluctance” that “I should see the United States engage in 
any contest not immediately and essentially connected with the defence of our 
own soil.  The first duty of a nation is to itself, and upon this principle we should 
avoid all foreign collisions.”127  Taking a bolder stance, Rep. John Long, Jr., also 
of North Carolina, in response to the “proposition to announce to the world that 
we would protect South America or espouse her quarrel under all circumstances 
of interference by Europeans to prevent the establishment of liberty in that part of 
our hemisphere,” deemed it his duty “to oppose every movement or inclination 
which might deprive us of the high stand of just and moderate neutrality.  I cannot 
believe that my fellow citizens would be willing to bear the sufferings and 
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calamities of another war, for any thing short of the actual defence of their rights 
and liberties.  It is our duty, then, to make no gratuitous pledges; to menace other 
nations with no threat of interference.  Let us be watchful to preserve 
ourselves.”128  Putting this evolving reaction against the Doctrine in perhaps the 
clearest light, Rep. John W. Taylor of New York urged his constituents to 
remember that “it is essential that our national motto should be verified to the 
people of all climes and religions.  „Justice to all nations and entangling alliances 
with none,‟ must be faithfully observed.”129  Henry Clay himself readily 
acknowledged in May 1824 that in the current state of world affairs, with the 
Holy Alliance having determined not intervene in Latin America, it was better to 
leave his resolution on the table.  In Congress he declared that “to pass the 
resolution, after all that has occurred – in the absence of any sufficient evidence 
of their cherishing inimical designs on this continent – might be construed by 
them as unfriendly, if not offensive. . . .  [I] should continue to abstain from 
pressing upon the attention of the House, this resolution; and should allow it to 
sleep where it now reposes, on the table.”130  With the resolution remaining on the 
table, Congress never sanctioned the Monroe Doctrine. 
 This sea change of opinion on the Doctrine in the space of a little over half 
a year demonstrates how firmly embedded in the American mind were their views 
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of the principles of American foreign policy and specifically the Jeffersonian 
reconceptualization of Washington‟s Farewell Address.  The Doctrine had been 
greeted enthusiastically, but once the threat had passed and cooler heads had 
prevailed, America‟s traditional principles took precedence.  For most Americans 
the relationship the United States was to have with the rest of the world was not 
changed by the existence of free nations sharing the continent.  More importantly, 
this quickly evolving view of the Doctrine made clear that most Americans did 
not conceive of it the same way that John Quincy Adams did.  While Adams 
intended it as a bold statement of American principles and as an expansion of 
Washington‟s Farewell Address to meet the new challenges posed by an Allied 
Europe and a newly independent Spanish America, most people saw it as a strong 
response to a specific crisis but as threatening to undermine Washington‟s 
Farewell Address in the future.  This disagreement over the proper interpretation 
of American principles portended future conflicts over the meanings of the 
Monroe Doctrine, the Farewell Address, and the relationship the United States 
was to have with the rest of the world.
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Four: America‟s Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy and the Panama 
Congress of 1826 
 
 On 6 December 1825, President John Quincy Adams, controversially 
elected the previous February by the House of Representatives on the heels of an 
allegedly “corrupt bargain” with new Secretary of State Henry Clay, delivered his 
first annual message to Congress.  Historians have described it as “the most 
amazing annual message of the antebellum era, calling for the use of federal 
power in almost every area of American life,” and “a bold, courageous, and 
statesmanlike assertion of the government‟s responsibility to assist the 
advancement of the nation‟s intellectual and economic well-being.”  At the same 
time, it also presented a program that “horrified states‟ rights advocates” who saw 
it as “one gigantic grab for power.”  Perhaps worst of all, the address had revealed 
Adams to be “closer to the Hamilton than to the Jeffersonian principles of 
government.”1  Despite the far-reaching implications of the message, it was 
Adams‟s discussion of the evolving relationship of the United States with the 
“independent South American States” that generated the most sustained national 
attention.  He stated that “among the measures which have been suggested to 
them by the new relations with one another, resulting from the recent changes in 
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their condition, is that of assembling at the Isthmus of Panama a congress, at 
which each of them should be represented, to deliberate upon objects important to 
the welfare of all. The Republics of Colombia, of Mexico, and of Central America 
have already deputed plenipotentiaries to such a meeting, and they have invited 
the United States to be also represented there by their ministers.”  He then 
declared that “the invitation has been accepted, and ministers on the part of the 
United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations.”  Adams 
assured Congress that the United States would participate only “so far as may be 
compatible with that neutrality from which it is neither our intention nor the 
desire of the other American States that we should depart,” but he provided no 
additional details or explanations of what issues would be discussed or what the 
United States specifically hoped to achieve.  Most importantly he failed to 
illuminate how he expected to participate in a congress of nations still at war with 
Spain without violating American neutrality.
2
 
 The debate stepped off by Adams‟s mission to Panama turned into, as one 
historian described it, “one of the severest parliamentary battles in [Congress‟s] 
history.”3  It also became the first extended debate over the meaning of America‟s 
foreign policy principles in the wake of Monroe‟s Doctrine.  And what had 
bubbled under the surface from almost the moment Thomas Jefferson first 
                                                 
2
 John Quincy Adams, “First Annual Address,” 6 December 1825, in James D. Richardson, ed., A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 11 vols. (New York: National Bureau 
of Literature, 1908), 2:302. 
3
 Charles Wilson Hackett, “The Development of John Quincy Adams‟s Policy with Respect to an 
American Confederation and the Panama Congress, 1822-1825,” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 8 (Nov. 1928): 526. 
  
180 
 
promised “entangling alliances with none” was now at the center of a highly 
principled as well as a highly partisan debate: what did Washington‟s Farewell 
Address mean?  This chapter begins with the international reactions to the 
Monroe Doctrine to understand how it shaped America‟s relationship with Latin 
America as John Quincy Adams assumed the presidency, but takes as its main 
focus the debate carried out in the popular press and the United States Capitol 
over the mission to Panama.  Adams saw the Panama Congress as an opportunity 
to see Washington‟s principles as well as his own non-colonization principle 
adopted internationally and a venue at which he could clarify and reinforce 
America‟s continued adherence to them.  His opponents, taking an entirely 
different view of the Doctrine and seeing American principles defined by the 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization, interpreted the Panama mission as the 
abandonment of sacred principles rather than the defense of them.  The debate 
over Panama enabled the United States Congress to sit in judgment of John 
Quincy Adams‟s system of foreign policy as well as to define the salient legacies 
of Washington‟s Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine.  In many ways this 
debate was the natural culmination of the debate that had been emerging during 
the previous quarter-century over the meaning of American principles and the role 
the nation should play in the world, and its outcomes would shape the directions 
and understandings of American foreign policy for the next quarter-century. 
 
Europe and Latin America React to the Monroe Doctrine 
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 One of the great ironies of the Monroe Doctrine and the larger system of 
policy it emerged from is that the portion of the world it was most directly 
concerned with – Europe – took the least notice of it.  When it was first published 
there the occasional editorial appeared questioning by what right the United States 
could instruct European powers on how they would treat the Americas, but it 
relatively quickly disappeared from the public mind.
4
  This process of forgetting 
was also facilitated by the efforts of George Canning, who was concerned for how 
Monroe‟s declarations would impact Britain‟s relationship with the Holy Allies 
and with Latin America.  His greatest fear was that his conversations with Richard 
Rush about a joint declaration would become public, as would Rush‟s insistence 
upon British recognition of Spanish American independence and Canning‟s 
refusal, and how this would impact British trade with that region.  Canning was 
able to convince Rush to keep their conversations a secret, and when news of the 
Doctrine reached Europe he immediately published the Polignac Memorandum in 
an attempt to reframe the story; rather than the United States having boldly stood 
up to the Holy Alliance, Great Britain had held France in check and Monroe had 
simply “„assisted‟ [Canning] in safeguarding Latin America.”5  When in early 
                                                 
4
 Harold Temperley, “Documents Illustrating the Reception and Interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine in Europe, 1823-4,” English Historical Review 39 (Oct. 1924): 590-93. 
5
 Quoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical 
Interpretation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 67.  For his part, Rush later 
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Powers.”  Richard Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, Comprising 
  
182 
 
1825 Great Britain officially recognized the independence of Mexico, Colombia, 
and Rio de la Plata, Canning once again deflected attention away from the United 
States by asserting that in “Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had 
known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain „with the 
Indies.‟  I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the 
Old.”6 
 Despite the turn against the Doctrine in the United States by mid-1824, 
some American statesmen continued to believe in its positive impact.  While 
Secretary of State, for example, Henry Clay regularly asserted that Monroe‟s 
message “had a powerful effect in disconcerting and arresting [Allied] progress” 
towards intervention in Spanish America.
7
  This assertion was demonstrably 
untrue, as the Polignac Memorandum had clearly had a far greater impact on the 
approach of the Holy Alliance to Spanish America than the Monroe Doctrine ever 
could have.  In this sense Canning was correct to prioritize his own efforts over 
                                                                                                                                     
Incidents Official and Personal from 1819 to 1825.  Including Negotiations on the Oregon 
Question, and Other Unsettled Questions between the United States and Great Britain 
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 Emphasis in original.  “Mr. Canning‟s Reply to the King‟s Message Relative to the Affairs of 
Portugal,” 12 December 1826, in Robert Walsh, ed., Select Speeches of the Right Honorable 
George Canning; with a Preliminary Biographical Sketch, and an Appendix, of Extracts from His 
Writings and Speeches (Philadelphia: Key and Biddle, 1835), 467.  While the United States 
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Guadalupe Victoria, President of Mexico, to the British Chargé d‟Affaires,” 31 May 1825, in 
William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the 
Independence of the Latin-American Nations, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), 
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7
 Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson, Jr. and John Sergeant, 8 May 1826, in The Papers of Henry 
Clay, ed. James F. Hopkins, 10 vols. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1959-91), 5:317.  
Also see Henry Clay to John M. Forbes, 3 January 1828, in Manning, Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 1:292-93.  
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those of the United States.  The most direct impact the Monroe Doctrine had on 
Euro-American relations was on the planned tripartite negotiations between the 
United States, Great Britain, and Russia over the northwest coast of North 
America.  When Canning first spoke with Rush after receiving the Monroe 
Doctrine, as the U.S. minister would later write, he informed him that he would 
likely “decline joining us in the negotiation with Russia, relative to the North 
West Coast, as we had proposed,” as he desired not to bring the non-colonization 
principle “into discussion at present, as England must necessarily object to it.”8  
For its part, Russia gave so little notice to the Monroe Doctrine that it very 
willingly and amicably negotiated the Russo-American Treaty of 1824 to settle 
the northwest coast controversy.  Britain and the United States could ultimately 
only agree to extend the Convention of 1818 that stipulated the joint occupation 
of the disputed region that would eventually be called Oregon.  The dispute would 
remain unresolved until the signing of the Treaty of Washington on 15 June 
1846.
9
 
 While the impact of the Monroe Doctrine in Europe was largely 
negligible, such was certainly not the case in Latin America.  By the end of James 
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Monroe‟s presidency, the United States had officially recognized five former 
Spanish colonies as independent nations, as well as Brazil‟s independence from 
Portugal.
10
  Reaction to the Monroe Doctrine in these countries was mixed.  
Conservative factions, which were usually in the minority and distrusted both 
republicanism and U.S. motives, similarly distrusted the Monroe Doctrine.  The 
more liberal elements generally greeted it with greater enthusiasm.  Brazil and 
Colombia, for example, officially endorsed its tenets, and the government of the 
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata praised the United States for having “„made 
an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of contending single-
handed with Spain; but it has constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in 
order to prevent any foreign assistance from being introduced to the aid of our 
rival.‟”11  This was the crux of why most Latin American governments had a 
favorable response to the Monroe Doctrine – they were either still at war with 
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Spain or Portugal or feared the renewal of it – and in it they saw the potential for 
substantial U.S. assistance in the preservation of their independence. 
 James Monroe and John Quincy Adams were pleased with the positive 
reception of the Doctrine in Latin America, but they were not prepared for how 
this approval manifested itself.  Despite Monroe‟s explicit declaration of 
neutrality in the ongoing conflicts between mother country and (former) colony, 
the Latin American governments saw in the Doctrine the potential for meaningful 
support; they saw the United States as having made an unconditional pledge to 
defend Latin American independence.  In the three years after the Doctrine was 
first enunciated, five separate proposals were made under its auspices by Latin 
American governments looking for a more concrete commitment, often in the 
form of formal alliances, from the United States.  The first such proposal was 
informally made to the U.S. Minister to Chile, Heman Allen, when it was 
suggested that once a Chilean minister was dispatched to the United States, “this 
government intended to propose an alliance with [the U.S.], to oppose any attempt 
upon the rights of either, by foreign powers.”12  In July, the Colombian minister to 
the United States communicated to Adams a similar hope.  While asserting that 
“Colombia is resolved to defend at every hazard its independence and liberty 
against every foreign influence and power,” he also admitted that his government 
“has seen with the greatest pleasure the Message of the President . . . that the 
Government of the United-States endeavours to oppose the policy and ultimate 
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views of the Holy Alliance.”  Should the Allies intervene in Colombia, his 
government wanted to know “in what manner the Government of the United 
States intends to resist on its part any interference of the Holy Alliance for the 
purpose of subjugating the new Republics or interfering in their political forms: if 
it will enter into a Treaty of Alliance with the Republic of Colombia to save 
America in general from the calamities of a despotic system.”13  In January 1825, 
as fears in Brazil grew of a potential war with Portugal, the Brazilian Chargé 
d‟Affaires approached Adams to ask that if Portugal should “take possession of 
any point in the Brazil: Will the Government of the United States . . . declare 
himself allied with the Government of Brazil in an offensive and deffensive [sic] 
alliance, marching with his pourful [sic] means to the camp of Battle and help to 
extricate the intruders . . . ?”14  Mexico and Rio de la Plata made similar proposals 
in 1825 and 1826, respectively.
15
  The leaders of all of these countries read 
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Monroe‟s message and believed that alliances were the logical progression of the 
relationship between the Americas. 
 In responding to each proposal, the United States fell back on its declared 
neutrality and its standing policy of avoiding alliances.  Days after receiving the 
Colombian dispatch, Adams noted in his diary the determination of the cabinet 
that Colombia was “to maintain its own independence.  Hope that France and the 
Holy Allies will not resort to force against it.  If they should, the power to 
determine resistance is in Congress.  The movements of the Executive will be as 
heretofore expressed.”16  In his official reply, Adams expressed his long-held 
belief that no interference of the Holy Alliance was forthcoming, but remarked 
that if it should, “the ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative 
Department of the Government.”  He reassured the Colombian minister that “The 
Sentiments of the President remain as they were expressed in his last annual 
message to Congress – Should the crisis . . . which gave rise to the remarks then 
made, hereafter recur, he will be ready to give them effect,” but only with the 
sanction of Congress.  Congressional approval was not the only limitation on U.S. 
action, though, as under “a deliberate and concerted system of the allied Powers 
to exercise force against the freedom and Independence of your Republic; . . . the 
United States could not undertake resistance to them by force of Arms, without a 
previous understanding with those European Powers [Great Britain], whose 
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Interests and whose principles would secure from them an active and efficient co-
operation in the cause.”17  The United States, on its own, was not powerful 
enough to wage a war against the powers of Europe on a different continent, thus 
rather than an immediate and forceful response should the Allies intervene, the 
United States would await legislative approval and British assistance before 
committing itself to defend Colombia.   
 With the ascendancy of Adams to the presidency it was left to Secretary of 
State Henry Clay to respond to the remaining proposals.  To the Brazilian Chargé 
d‟Affaires he affirmed that President Adams “adheres to the principles of his 
predecessor,” but given that “there does not appear, at present, any likelihood of 
Portugal being able to draw to her aid other powers to assist her in resubjugating 
the Brazils, there would not seem to be any occasion for a Convention founded 
upon that improbable contingency.”  Clay further asserted that any formal alliance 
with Brazil “would be inconsistent with the policy which the United-States have 
heretofore prescribed to themselves.”18  The United States was not going to depart 
from its traditional principles by forming permanent alliances with Latin America. 
 The Latin American response to the Monroe Doctrine further highlights 
the fact that John Quincy Adams and his associates had a vastly different view of 
the Doctrine than did most other observers around the world.  By mid-1824, many 
Americans began to fear that the Doctrine represented a threat to continued 
adherence to Washington‟s Farewell Address, and this fear was only confirmed 
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by suggestions that the United States further depart from Washington by 
concluding new alliances.  Regardless of how influenced one was by the 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization, these alliances were deemed to be dangerous.  
More instructive, though, is what these proposals demonstrate about Adams‟s 
understanding of the doctrine of two spheres by early 1825.  The U.S. response to 
Latin America made clear that he had no intention of departing from America‟s 
fundamental principles.  The Doctrine was an expansion of the Farewell Address, 
but more importantly it was a declaration of the specific principles that would 
guide the U.S. response to the particular threat of Allied intervention in Latin 
America.  The doctrine of two spheres, while enunciating a general principle – the 
separation of American and European spheres – was also quite limited in its 
intent; it was a warning that the Allies should not intervene in the concluding 
stages of Spanish America‟s revolution.19  While Adams did see North and South 
America as sharing some common interests, especially as it pertained to relations 
with Europe – a fact acknowledged in the Monroe Doctrine – he by and large did 
not see the Doctrine as having any bearing on the larger direction of U.S. foreign 
policy towards Latin America.  To put it another way, once the threat of Allied 
intervention passed away so too would the utility of the doctrine of two spheres; 
all that would remain were the general principles.  For Adams, who never 
believed that the Allied would intervene, those principles were all that ever really 
mattered.  He had such a complex view of both the Doctrine and U.S. foreign 
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policy, though, that it is easy to understand why almost no one else saw things the 
way that he did. 
 
President John Quincy Adams 
 Throughout his career John Quincy Adams was both blessed and cursed 
by timing and circumstance.  He began and ended his term as a United States 
senator by supporting the Louisiana Purchase and Jefferson‟s Embargo, two 
issues that served to alienate him from the Federalists who elected him.  At the 
same time, those votes earned him the respect of then-Secretary of State James 
Madison, who as president returned him to the diplomatic service in Russia, at 
Ghent, and in Great Britain.  The convergence of circumstances at the end of 1823 
allowed him to forcefully assert America‟s foreign policy principles to the world, 
but in 1825 his presidency was doomed to virtual failure almost before it began 
due to the state of American politics and his association with those principles.  By 
1820 the Federalist party had essentially ceased to exist as a nationally viable 
entity and James Monroe ran unopposed for reelection to the presidency, winning 
all but one electoral vote.
20
  By 1824 no second party had risen to replace the 
Federalists, but with no sitting president running for reelection, and no uniform 
method for nominating candidates for the presidency, five men put themselves 
forward: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of War John C. 
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Calhoun, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, Secretary of the Treasury William H. 
Crawford, and America‟s foremost military hero of the day, Andrew Jackson.21  
Calhoun quickly backed out of the crowded field to focus his efforts on securing 
the vice presidency, leaving four candidates, each with regional appeal, and a 
deadlocked Electoral College.  One “corrupt bargain” later and Adams was 
elected president by the House of Representatives and Clay was soon after 
appointed secretary of state.  The supporters of Jackson and Crawford were livid 
and lined up behind Jackson, stepping off the development of the second party 
system.  This development, more than any other, came to define Adams‟s 
presidency. 
 At the heart of Adams‟s agenda during his first year as president was 
seeing the permanent restoration of peace to Latin America.  His efforts took two 
main forms.  First, he wanted Spain, which was still attempting to resubjugate its 
former colonies, to recall its armies and put an end to war.  The United States had 
little to no influence over Spain, so instead turned to Russia in hopes that that 
country would intercede to convince the Spanish that it was in its best interests to 
accept the loss of mainland America and be happy that it still had its Caribbean 
colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico.
22
  Second was limited participation in the 
Congress of Panama. 
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 One of the first issues Clay brought to Adams‟s attention was an informal 
invitation from the Colombian and Mexican ministers for the United States to 
participate in a congress of American nations scheduled to take place at Panama.  
Discussions of the formation of some sort of Latin American or pan-American 
organization had reached Adams as early as May 1820, when he noted in his diary 
after a discussion with a representative from Colombia that the Latin Americans 
“were jealous of the European alliance. . . .  They were desirous of combining an 
American system to embrace the whole hemisphere in opposition to that of 
Europe.”23  As the revolutions achieved lasting success, and especially in the 
wake of American recognition, the Spanish American desire for such a system 
grew.  The main architect of this pan-American movement was Simon Bolivar, 
the Spanish American revolutionary widely recognized as being the pivotal figure 
in the success of the Spanish American revolutions.
24
  In a toast at a public dinner 
in 1820, then-Speaker of the House Clay went so far as to label Bolivar “the 
Washington of South America, and the Republic of Colombia.”25  Early on 
Bolivar recognized that the former Spanish colonies, regardless of when they 
achieved independence or the forms of government they chose, all shared 
common interests and common challenges that could best be met through 
collective negotiation and action.  A pan-American system would not only 
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provide easier defense against future attacks by Spain or other foreign powers, but 
would also facilitate the maintenance of peace between the nations of Latin 
America.  Bolivar‟s original conception of this system did not include the United 
States, and when he issued his circular letter on 7 December 1824 inviting nations 
to Panama it was not sent to Washington, D.C.
26
   
 Despite Bolivar‟s intention of having a Latin American congress, three 
separate informal invitations were extended to the United States by mid-1825.  
Adams initially hesitated to involve the United States in this international 
meeting, but after multiple cabinet discussions, and several weeks of prodding by 
Clay, he relented.
27
  He stipulated that the United States would not depart from its 
long-standing neutrality, participate in negotiations of a belligerent nature, or 
commit itself to anything without the sanction of its own Congress, but would 
otherwise fully take part in the proceedings.  Three weeks later he offered the 
mission to U.S. minister to Colombia, Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky, who 
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readily accepted.  In November a decision was made to send a second delegate, 
and the post was offered to Albert Gallatin – America‟s finest diplomat (after 
Adams) – who declined the mission.  The second spot was ultimately given to 
John Sergeant of Pennsylvania, with William Rochester of New York named 
secretary.
28
  By the end of November, with formal invitations received and 
accepted and with ministers selected, Adams was prepared to announce the 
American mission to Panama in his first annual message to Congress.
29
 
 The American press was not sure what to make of the Panama Congress 
itself or of U.S. participation in it after the publication of Adams‟s message.  
Newspapers had been printing stories about the Panama Congress throughout 
1825, so were not surprised by Adams‟s discussion of it.30  With his message to 
Congress he mainly confirmed what had long been rumored but his lack of 
specific detail opened the door to competing interpretations.  The Richmond 
Enquirer, which had expressed its disapproval of the mission in October in 
declaring that “it is not the interest of our own country to accede to the plan, and 
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to dispatch ministers to the Congress,” likewise disapproved of it in Adams‟s 
message.
31
  The Daily National Intelligencer of Washington, D.C. expressed 
relief that participation was “to be done under instructions to [the ministers] to act 
as counsellors [sic] only, and with a perfect understanding, between this and other 
governments, that no deviation is expected of the United States from that strict 
neutrality which it has heretofore declared and maintained between the present 
belligerents.”  It was especially relieved “that the idea of alliance between the 
United States and those powers is wholly out of question.”32  Unsurprisingly, 
these two papers would go on to be two of the Adams administration‟s biggest 
critics and supporters, respectively.  The Boston Courier understood the interest 
in the mission, but observed that the “specific object such a measure is intended to 
produce, or what indirect benefit is to be expected from it, we are not informed.”33 
 The confusion of this Boston newspaper was understandable at this 
juncture as Adams never actually spelled out what he hoped to achieve by sending 
ministers to Panama.  For that matter, he never explained that there was even a 
legitimate or compelling reason to participate at all.  He had emphasized that the 
United States would not depart from its long-standing neutrality, nor was it 
expected to by the inviting countries, but beyond that the nature of U.S. 
involvement was an open question.  But, in what would become one of the more 
frequent refrains of the congressional debate, many Americans wondered if the 
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United States would be violating its neutrality just by sending delegates to the 
international congress in the first place.  Insight into why Adams accepted the 
invitations can be gained from two messages to the House of Representatives that 
he drafted but never sent.  In the first he revealed that “the decisive inducement to 
me, to accept the invitation, was to meet in the spirit of kindness and friendship, 
an overture of kindness and friendship from three Sister Republics of this 
Hemisphere.”  As he had done repeatedly, he qualified that this favorable 
response contained “an explicit avowal on our part . . . that the United States 
should take no part in measures at the Congress which should import a departure 
from the neutrality which they were determined to maintain.”34  Expanding on 
these points in a second message, Adams noted that even if the subjects for 
deliberation had been of less immediate interest to the United States, he still 
would have accepted the invitation “if for no other reason than because it had 
been given. . . .  The invitation was to a meeting of consultation, between 
ministers of the American nations to deliberate upon objects of deep and common 
interest to them all.”35  There was no reason to shy away from the open discussion 
of issues of genuine common interest between the United States and Latin 
America.  Given Adams‟s long-held belief in the wisdom of negotiating in times 
of peace to remove points of future controversy, it is unsurprising that he attached 
such importance to the Congress of Panama.  As a meeting of the recently 
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independent nations of the Americas, which were still struggling to chart their 
own course in the world, it represented an ideal opportunity to not only foster a 
sense of international friendship and cooperation, but also to guide them towards 
American principles and policies that would both serve U.S. interests and the 
long-term interests of Latin America. 
 Adams‟s specific goals for the Panama Congress were first concretely 
expressed to Congress at the end of December when he formally submitted 
nominations for Anderson and Sergeant to the Senate.  In addition to transmitting 
a “report from the Secretary of State and copies of the correspondence with the 
South American Governments on this subject,” he also outlined his expectations 
for the meeting.  He began by clarifying U.S. neutrality, stating that “the United 
States neither intend nor are expected to take part in any deliberations of a 
belligerent character; that the motive of their attendance is neither to contract 
alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility to any 
other nation.”  Within this context he urged that “the principles of a liberal 
commercial intercourse should be exhibited” to Latin America, and they should 
encourage the “consentaneous adoption of principles of maritime neutrality.”  He 
hoped that, “without entering into any treaty, the moral influence of the United 
States” could be “exerted with beneficial consequences” for the “advancement of 
religious liberty.”  He also looked towards the “indirect influence which the 
United States may exercise upon any projects or purposes originating in the war 
in which the southern Republics are still engaged, which might seriously affect 
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the interests of this Union, and the good offices by which the United States may 
ultimately contribute to bring that war to a speedier termination.”  Most 
importantly for the debate that followed, though, Adams sought “An agreement 
between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own 
means against the establishment of any future European colony within its 
borders.”  This was the non-colonization principle that had been “announced by 
my predecessor to the world,” and he desired it to be “developed to the new 
southern nations that they will all feel it as an essential appendage to their 
independence.”  Given the move away from the Monroe Doctrine in the rest of 
the United States, Adams‟s inclusion of one of its tenets as a reason for a mission 
to the Panama Congress proved to be controversial, and led many of his 
opponents in Congress to openly question what his true motivations were.
36
 
 The best evidence of what Adams hoped to specifically achieve at Panama 
is Secretary of State Henry Clay‟s instructions to Anderson and Sergeant.  While 
they would not be made available to Congress or the public until 1829, these 
instructions spell out in great detail the objectives and scope of American 
participation.  In later years Clay would point to the importance of commerce in 
the instructions and to the American mission, but a close reading makes clear that 
the administration was arguably most concerned with spreading American 
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principles for the conduct of foreign policy.
37
  To put it another way, these 
instructions make clear one of the central goals of the Panama mission was 
international adoption of Washington‟s Farewell Address in both its original and 
expanded forms.  This congress represented “a new epoch in human affairs” at 
which dramatic steps could be taken to ensure the permanent separation of the 
European and American spheres while at the same time providing for the 
equitable and profitable expansion of worldwide commerce.
38
   
 Clay emphasized the neutral and purely “diplomatic” role the ministers 
were to play, and to reinforce this position he suggested they take this as an 
opportunity to permanently put to rest the idea of the doctrine of two spheres as 
justification for alliance.  Clay argued that because the danger posed by the Holy 
Alliance had “disappeared, there can be no necessity, at this time, for an offensive 
and defensive alliance between the American Powers, which could only find a 
justification, at any period, in the existence, or continuation of such a danger.  
Such an alliance, under present circumstances, would be worse than useless, since 
it might tend to excite feelings in the Emperor of Russia and his Allies, which 
should not be needlessly touched or provoked.”  Clay pointed to that portion of 
Washington‟s Farewell Address dealing with the avoidance of alliances, noting 
that this maxim “was directed to Europe, which, having a system of connexions 
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and of interests remote, and different, from ours, it was thought most advisable 
that we should not mix ourselves up with them.  And it is also true that, long since 
the origin of the maxim, the new American Powers have arisen, to which, if at all, 
it is less applicable.”  As if taking direct aim at the Jeffersonian 
reconceptualization, Clay was arguing that the Farewell Address was written with 
Europe in mind and did not preclude a closer relationship with Latin America.  
Despite this distinction, though, it remained the policy of the United States to only 
depart from “that established maxim” of avoiding alliances in circumstances of 
“great urgency,” which did not then exist.39 
 The avoidance of permanent alliances was not the only portion of 
Washington‟s Farewell Address put forward by Clay as principles for the U.S. 
ministers to “inculcate” in their counterparts at the congress.  Clay argued that 
“the preservation of peace among [the Latin American nations], and with the rest 
of the world,” should be instilled in the congress‟s participants, as “the true 
interest of all Nations, but it is especially that of infant States.”  As he saw it, 
“Peace is now the greatest want of America,” and he hoped that “the policy of all 
America will be the same, that of peace and neutrality.”  Clay also urged the need 
for the Latin American governments to work to prevent “foreign interference, 
either in the formation, or in the conduct, of their Government,” and that they be 
“equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in the original structure, or 
subsequent interior movement, of the Governments of other independent 
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Nations.”40  These principles had allowed the United States to develop from an 
infant nation into a growing power, and the ministers at Panama should advocate 
for their adoption. 
 Perhaps more than any other point in his lengthy instructions, Clay 
stressed the importance of Latin American adoption of Adams‟s expanded 
Farewell Address principle of non-colonization.  The Adams administration 
believed, as Monroe‟s had in 1823, that the entirety of the American continents, 
with only “one or two inconsiderable exceptions,” belonged to “Sovereign, 
resident American Powers.”  As a result, there was “no chasm, within the 
described limits in which a new Eropean [sic] Colony could be now introduced 
without violating the territorial rights of some American State.  An attempt to 
establish such a Colony and, by its establishment, to acquire sovereign rights for 
any European Power, must be regarded as an inadmissible encroachment.”  To 
give greater weight to Monroe‟s original declaration of this principle, as well as 
“To prevent any such new European Colonies, and to warn Europe, beforehand, 
that they are not, hereafter, to be admitted,” the president wanted the ministers to 
“propose a joint declaration of the several American States, each, however, acting 
for, and binding only, itself, that, within the limits of their respective territories, 
no new European Colony will, hereafter, be allowed to be established.”41 
 Clay was explicit that this proposal was “not intended to commit the 
parties . . . to the support of the particular boundaries which may be claimed by 
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any one of them; nor is it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against 
any future attempt to plant a new European Colony.”  As if taking a page from 
George Canning‟s original proposal to Richard Rush in August 1823, Clay 
expressed the belief “that the moral effect alone, of a joint declaration, emanating 
from the authority of all the American Nations, will effectually serve to prevent 
the effort to establish any such new Colony.”  Only if this joint declaration failed 
and an “attempt should actually be made,” would it be necessary “for the 
American Powers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, 
and, if necessary, of adopting, in concert, the measures which may be necessary to 
check and prevent it.”  Adams and Clay firmly believed that international 
adoption of the non-colonization principle was a vital step in permanently 
eliminating European influence and control in the Americas, but at the same time 
were adamant that it only be adopted in the non-binding form of a joint 
declaration.  Clay added that it would “not be necessary to give to the declaration 
now proposed, the form of a Treaty,” and later in the instructions he reiterated that 
it “does no more than announce, in respect to the United States, the existing state 
of their Institutions and Laws.”  Properly executed, it “Neither contracts any new 
obligations, on their part, nor makes any alteration, as to them, in the present 
condition of things.”42  Taken as a whole, these instructions clearly demonstrate 
that Adams had high hopes for what could be achieved at Panama and they reveal 
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that he was motivated by the same understanding of the Farewell Address and 
American principles that had guided him in 1823.
43
 
 The problem Adams soon encountered was that both his message to 
Congress nominating Anderson and Sergeant and the documents accompanying it 
lacked the explicitness and the clarity of these instructions as to the goals of the 
mission.  This made it much easier for those senators and congressmen who 
opposed Adams and/or the mission to interpret the president‟s actions and 
motives as being dangerous for American security and as a departure from 
Washington‟s principles.  Further complicating the debate over the Panama 
mission as it played out in both houses of Congress and especially in the 
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American press was that it coincided with the reemergence of rival political 
factions throughout the country.  As a result the pall of partisanship hung over 
Congress‟s proceedings, and while this certainly shaped the course of the debate, 
it has also tended, both in contemporary and historical accounts, to overshadow 
the legitimate principled differences that existed between John Quincy Adams and 
most of his opponents.  Partisanship may have led to an exaggerated view of 
Adams‟s motives, but those congressmen who believed in Washington‟s Farewell 
Address as defined by “entangling alliances with none” were always going to 
have a problem with American participation at Panama.  This debate ushered in 
the second American party system, but it was also the proverbial day of reckoning 
for these two increasingly divergent views of the Farewell Address and the 
fundamental principles of foreign policy.
44
 
 
The Panama Debate 
 Adams‟s message nominating Anderson and Sergeant was referred to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and when it reported back on 16 January 
1826 it did so in Executive Session, meaning that all proceedings were kept 
confidential and were not reported by the press.  The committee, which was 
composed entirely of men who would ultimately align themselves with the 
opposition party and Andrew Jackson, issued an extended report condemning the 
mission for a variety of reasons, and a resolution declaring “that it is not 
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expedient, at this time, for the United States to send any Ministers to the Congress 
of American nations, assembled at Panama.”45  Rather than immediately take up 
the committee‟s report, the Senate waited more than six weeks to begin the 
debate.  The press took a keen interest in the Panama mission and many 
newspapers began speculating as to the cause of the delay in approving it.  By the 
end of February, papers both in favor of and opposed to the mission began 
criticizing the Senate.  The Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser disclosed that 
“public opinion is strongly against the Senate for so long delaying to decide,” but 
cautioned patience in judging as it was “unwilling to believe that a majority or 
even one third of the senators would consent to unite in any improper opposition 
to any measure proposed by the executive.”46  The Richmond Enquirer described 
the Panama question as “absolutely a mystery to us,” and expressed disbelief at 
reports that “the Senate have not even yet debated the expediency of the mission!  
They have not gone yet upon the merits of the question.”47  The most pointed 
criticism appeared in the Charleston Courier, which described the American 
people as looking on “with astonishment at all this dumb shew, and marvels at its 
meaning, if meaning it have any.”  It placed the fault for the delay at the feet of 
the Senate, concluding that “The majority of that body must be either for, or 
against the Panama Mission; and it shews a want of self confidence, as well as of 
courtesy, not to avow their decision.  If the majority be in favor of the President‟s 
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proposal, it will „tell well in history,‟ that they allowed a worrying minority to 
defeat them, by protracting the discussion, until its object was unattainable.”48  
The Courier‟s critique proved to be an accurate reflection of what actually took 
place. 
 Once the debate did commence in early March it turned into a far-ranging 
discussion of international commerce, religious freedom, slavery, and race, but at 
its core it revolved around the meanings of America‟s principles of foreign policy, 
and specifically Washington‟s Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine.  The 
most consistent principled criticism of the mission‟s opponents, despite President 
Adams‟s repeated assurances to the contrary, was that it threatened American 
neutrality.  Robert Hayne of South Carolina argued that sending ministers to the 
Congress of Panama would produce “an entire change of the neutral position 
which we have hitherto so happily occupied.”  He asserted that the mission was 
part of a wider system of foreign policy being pursued by the Adams 
administration that was designed to entwine the United States in “entangling 
alliances,” and should the Senate vote to send ministers to Panama, it would 
“violate the maxim of the Father of his Country, which enjoins upon us, as the 
most sacred of duties, „to cultivate peace and honest friendship with all nations, 
entangling alliances with none.‟”49  Hugh White of Tennessee echoed Hayne‟s 
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sentiments when he declared that “if this mission should be advised, a new era 
will have commenced in the history of our foreign relations.  Have peace with, 
and good will towards, all Nations; entangling alliances with none – has been our 
cardinal principle in times past.  It was recommended by the Father of our 
Country – repeated, and practiced upon by his republican successors.”50  From the 
beginning it was clear that the debate over the Panama mission was actually a 
debate between those, like Hayne and White, who saw Washington‟s Farewell for 
the Jeffersonian reconceptualization, and those, like Adams, who did not. 
 Senators opposed to U.S. involvement looked at the documents 
transmitted with Adams‟s nominations and simply could not believe that it would 
be possible for the United States to participate at Panama without compromising 
its neutrality; the belligerent objectives of the other nations precluded it.  Levi 
Woodbury of New Hampshire put this position into stark relief when he 
incredulously remarked, “I have been utterly astonished, that any gentleman could 
read these documents, and still contend that this was not a belligerent Congress.  
What! a Congress, originating with those engaged in war; confined for years, in 
its incipient stages, to those only who are engaged in war; to be convened within 
the territories of those engaged in war; and having for its main objects, as again 
and again repeated, the triumphant prosecution of that very war; and yet a 
Congress, in no degree belligerent, and perfectly safe for neutrals to unite in?”51  
That Adams had specifically agreed to attend only to take part in discussions of a 
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nonbelligerent nature was an insufficient safeguard, as several senators argued 
that by virtue of their very presence at the congress the United States would 
assume a state of co-belligerency with the South American republics in the eyes 
of the world, if not in actual fact.  White made the point that regardless of what 
actions the United States did or did not take, participation would permanently 
hinder U.S. relations with Spain.  He argued that “if we send Ministers to this 
Congress of belligerents, we lose all influence with Spain.  It is hardly possible 
that we could ever satisfy her that we were impartial in any question between her 
and her former colonies.”52  With one diplomatic mission, Adams could negate 
thirty years of foreign policy precedent and achievement. 
 Even if participation in and of itself would not technically violate 
American neutrality, the prospect of a mission was further complicated by Latin 
America‟s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a pledge of support in future 
wars.  Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis estimated that the United States was 
approached about participating in the Congress of Panama in order to “convert the 
Monroe Doctrine into a conditional multilateral alliance among the states of the 
Western Hemisphere.”53  While Adams had no intention of involving the United 
States in such an endeavor, and explicitly sought to use the congress as an 
opportunity to put the doctrine of two spheres to rest, the fears of many senators 
as to how participation would have been perceived in light of the Monroe 
Doctrine were quite legitimate.  Hayne lamented that “the new States have 
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conceived themselves entitled to our aid whenever foreign interference shall be 
threatened,” while John Macpherson Berrien of Georgia argued that President 
Monroe “had no authority, by his own act alone, to pledge the United States to a 
foreign Power.  He did not intend to do so.  It was a mere declaration of the 
policy, which, under given circumstances, he believed it proper for the United 
States to pursue.  It did not bind him.  It did not bind Congress.  [Congress] 
declined to respond to it.  No foreign Power could demand the enforcement of it, 
because no foreign Power was party to it.” 54  White concluded that, regardless of 
Monroe‟s intentions, “If we send Ministers . . . then, indeed, will the United States 
be pledged.”55  Since the Latin American nations saw in the Monroe Doctrine a 
concrete pledge of support, attendance at the Panama Congress would only 
confirm its existence.   
 Even with regards to the non-colonization principle, the opposition denied 
the need for the Panama mission, largely because they misinterpreted – perhaps 
unintentionally, perhaps not – Adams‟s aim in seeing it adopted internationally.  
White argued that “whenever we can feel the necessity for such a stipulation, to 
guard our Territory against the encroachments of European nations, then, indeed, . 
. . we are prepared for the vassal condition of colonies.  If these new States set so 
little value upon independence, as to require such an agreement to stimulate them 
to exert their means to prevent colonies from being planted within their limits, 
then I shall conclude they are unfit for self-government, and that no agreement 
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with them, upon any subject, can be of much utility to us.”56  Mahlon Dickerson 
of New Jersey dismissed non-colonization entirely, concluding that “if the powers 
of Europe possess, by right, any portion of either of these continents, they may 
colonize such possessions, and this Government will not prevent them – the 
pledge of the late President to the contrary, notwithstanding.”57  In the view of 
many, the non-colonization principle was a worthless international pursuit, and 
seeing it spread was certainly not worth the potential dangers associated with U.S. 
participation. 
 Despite their vigorous opposition, the mission‟s opponents knew from the 
beginning that they likely did not have the votes necessary to actually block its 
passage.  Thus they relied on introducing what historian Robert Remini described 
as a succession of “dilatory motions” that brought the proceedings to a virtual halt 
and on giving speeches of “gargantuan length, all deliberately conceived to 
consume as much time as possible.”58  If they could not prevent the mission, they 
would at least delay its approval.  The awkward part of the debate was that while 
a majority of the Senate ultimately voted to ratify Adams‟s nominations, it was 
not because they necessarily disagreed with some of the assessments of the 
opposition, but rather because they trusted Adams when he said that American 
neutrality was not at stake.  By 14 March they had had enough of the delay and 
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they voted down the Foreign Relations Committee‟s resolution and to confirm the 
appointments of Anderson, Sergeant, and Rochester.
59
 
 In many ways the work of the Senate opposition only truly began once the 
mission was approved.  In the days following the vote the Senate voted to remove 
the injunction of secrecy from their debates, meaning that they would be made 
publicly available.  The official Legislative Journal only contained a limited 
amount of information – texts of motions and resolutions, votes, and the like – but 
not the bulk of the speeches, as these were typically recorded by newspaper 
reporters.  Sensing a genuine rhetorical advantage in being able to marshal the 
Farewell Address and Washington‟s promise of “entangling alliances with none” 
in support of their cause, the mission‟s opponents saw to it that transcripts of their 
speeches were made available to Washington‟s leading newspapers, knowing that 
they would subsequently be reprinted throughout the country.  Many of these 
speeches, primarily by the mission‟s opponents, were also quickly published and 
distributed in pamphlet form as well.
60
  Regardless of the outcome of the debate, 
they aimed to shape public opinion of the mission by ensuring that their 
arguments reached more people than did those of the mission‟s supporters.  Even 
the opposition press used passage of the mission in the Senate as an opportunity to 
once again criticize it.  The Richmond Enquirer, for example, remarked that 
“Whatever may be the diversity of our feelings on the subject of comparative 
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merits . . . there is but one pervading maxim of foreign policy, „peace, friendship, 
and commerce, with all nations, entangling alliances with none.‟  The ordinary 
mode of diplomatic intercourse, has been found all sufficient to secure us the full 
benefit of this policy.  The proposed Congress, if conformable to it, is 
unnecessary; if opposed to it, ought not, and I am sure will not, be sanctioned by 
the people.”61 
 In Congress, approval of the nominations was only the first hurdle for 
Adams as he still needed to secure passage of an appropriations bill through both 
houses of Congress in order to fund the mission.  The day after the Senate 
completed its work, Adams transmitted a lengthy message to the House 
advocating for the utility of the mission and the allocation of the funds necessary 
to support it.  Samuel Flagg Bemis described this message as “one of the most 
important papers of [Adams‟s] diplomatic career,” to which “he summoned all the 
powers of rhetoric, all the weight of his experience.”62  While Adams sought to 
remind the House that the Congress of Panama was “in its nature diplomatic and 
not legislative,” and that its decisions were non-binding unless ratified by the U.S. 
Congress, his central concern was explaining the relationship of the congress to 
Washington‟s Farewell Address.63  This message put forward the clearest 
explication of Adams‟s expanded view of the Farewell, a view unclouded by 
Thomas Jefferson‟s “entangling alliances with none.” 
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 Adams began by reassuring the House – and by extension the American 
people – that he was “mindful of the advice given by the father of our country in 
his Farewell Address, that the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign 
nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little 
political connection as possible.”  At the same time, he also readily understood 
that “like all the counsels of wisdom, [the Farewell] was founded upon the 
circumstances in which our country and the world around us were situated at the 
time when it was given,” specifically a world dominated by European powers and 
European colonies.  In such a world, Washington‟s warnings that “Europe had a 
set of primary interests, which to us had none, or very remote relation,” and that 
“our detached and distant situation, invited and enabled us to pursue a different 
course,” were both wise and necessary.  Adams asked the House to “Compare our 
situation and the circumstances of that time with those of the present day. . . .  
Europe has still her set of primary interests with which we have little or a remote 
relation.  Our distant and detached situation with reference to Europe remains the 
same.”  Much had changed since 1796, though, as “we were then the only 
independent nation of this hemisphere, and we were surrounded by European 
colonies, with the greater part of which we had no more intercourse than with the 
inhabitants of another planet.”  Thirty years later that was no longer the case, as 
“Those colonies have now been transformed into eight independent nations, 
extending to our very borders, seven of them Republics like ourselves, with whom 
we have an immensely growing commercial, and must have and have already 
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important political, connections; with reference to whom our situation is neither 
distant nor detached; whose political principles and systems of government, 
congenial with our own, must and will have an action and counteraction upon us 
and ours to which we can not be indifferent if we would.”  This was why Adams 
had articulated the Monroe Doctrine as an expansion of Washington‟s principles 
and this was why he wanted to see those principles spread and adopted throughout 
Latin America.
64
 
 Adams concluded that if Washington had written his Farewell in 1826 
instead of 1796 he would have asserted “that America has a set of primary 
interests which have none or a remote relation to Europe,” and that economically, 
geographically, and ideologically it was in the best interests of the United States 
to not isolate itself from its American neighbors.  As a result, “the acceptance of 
this invitation, . . . far from conflicting with the counsel or the policy of 
Washington, is directly deducible from and conformable to it.”65  This was a 
masterful explanation of how Washington‟s principles should best be understood 
and applied in a world fundamentally different from the one the Father of his 
Country had inhabited three decades earlier.  At the same time, Adams‟s logic 
flew in the face of those who understood the Farewell Address as meaning 
“entangling alliances with none,” because for those people the existence of a free 
Latin America did not necessitate a new foreign policy or the abandonment of 
Washington‟s wisdom.  The United States had grown and prospered due to a strict 
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adherence to this maxim and there was no compelling reason to move away from 
it. 
 Adams‟s message struck a chord with many Americans.  One 
correspondent wrote to Adams that it had “wrought wonders in disabusing mens 
[sic] minds here and it would seem like flattery to say how strong a feeling of 
admiration is expressed even from lips of political indifference.”66  Former 
president Thomas Jefferson, Massachusetts Governor Levi Lincoln, and former 
secretary of state and U.S. senator Timothy Pickering also wrote approvingly of 
the message.
67
  As could be expected, the increasingly partisan press took a varied 
view.   The Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser viewed the message as 
throwing “the opposition in the Senate far in the back ground, and proves it to 
have been an opposition to persons not to measures, an opposition becoming 
partizans better than patriots, and highly to be censured in the present instance, as 
having no perceivable good object in view.”68  The Charleston Courier declared 
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that the message did “not contain a sentiment to which an unprejudiced American 
would not, with his whole heart respond.”69  Taking an entirely different view, the 
Richmond Enquirer asserted that the message had done nothing “to shake the 
objections which we took in October last to such a Mission,” and still contended 
that there “were no urgent considerations for us to join it, and impelling us to 
depart from the sound maxims of two of the soundest men who have ever sat in 
the Presidential Chair: Washington and Jefferson.”  While the Enquirer refused to 
see the logic of Adams‟s message, it was at least one of the few commentators to 
denote Jefferson as the author of “entangling alliances with none.”70 
 Such newspaper coverage throughout February and March, and even as it 
further devolved in April, highlights the precarious relationship between the press 
and the burgeoning political parties in this period.  At stake in the debate over the 
Panama mission was more than just the fate of a diplomatic appointment but also 
the legacies and future meanings of Washington‟s Farewell Address and 
Monroe‟s Doctrine, as each side, while operating under a developing partisan 
framework, was also advancing highly principled arguments in support of their 
cause.  In the press these principled differences were usually dismissed as being 
nothing more than partisan differences.  In early April the Charleston Mercury 
predicted that the Panama mission would not receive its appropriation and that it 
was becoming generally an unpopular subject throughout the city.  The Courier, a 
newspaper generally supportive of Adams, was highly skeptical of the Mercury‟s 
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coverage, declaring instead that “The Messages of the President to both Houses of 
Congress . . . have placed the propriety and necessity of this measure in so clear a 
point of view, that there are few who do not approve it, excepting those who are 
determined to oppose the administration, right or wrong.”71  Both newspapers 
were attempting to sway the city‟s readers to their view of the mission, with little 
regard for the legitimate and differing interpretations that each side was 
advancing. 
 Back in Congress, the House Committee of Ways and Means reported a 
bill on 25 March “making appropriations for carrying into effect the appointment 
of a mission at the Congress of Panama.”72  The Committee of Foreign Relations 
also issued its own report and resolution likewise approving of the mission.
73
  The 
House would not consider either measure until 3 April, at which time it took up 
the Foreign Relations resolution over the objections of those who argued that it 
was the duty of the House to immediately consider the Ways and Means 
appropriation; however, considering the Foreign Relations resolution allowed for 
a wider-ranging debate of the issues at stake in the Panama mission. 
 A vocal minority in the House were unwilling to accept Adams‟s 
assurances that the mission would not violate U.S. neutrality or threaten American 
principles.  The vast majority of the House debate on the Foreign Relations 
resolution centered not on the resolution itself, but on two proposed amendments 
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to it, both of which sought to limit the scope of the ministers‟ actions and 
authority at Panama.  The first amendment, introduced on 3 April by Louis 
McLane of Delaware, sought to explicitly tie approval of the mission to both the 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization of Washington‟s Farewell Address and a 
rejection of the internationalization of the non-colonization principle.  It was “the 
opinion of this House,” the amendment stated, that it had “always been the settled 
policy of this Government, in extending our commercial relations with foreign 
nations, to have with them as little political connection as possible; to preserve 
peace, commerce, and friendship, with all nations, and to form entangling 
alliances with none.”  As a result, the ministers to Panama “ought not to be 
authorized to discuss, consider, or consult, upon any proposition of alliance, 
offensive or defensive, between this country and any of the South American 
Governments, or any stipulation, compact, or declaration, binding the United 
States in any way, or to any extent, to resist interference from abroad with 
domestic concerns of the aforesaid Governments.”  Furthermore, they should be 
prohibited from pursuing any “measure which shall commit the present or future 
neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European 
nations, or between the several States of Mexico and South America.”74 
 More interesting than the amendment itself was how McLane justified it.  
In structuring it he had “endeavored . . . to embrace all those principles which had 
characterized the policy of the United States from our earliest history” in hopes to 
“preserve that policy unimpaired.”  As he saw it, “this House cannot vote the 
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resolution recommended by the committee [of Foreign Relations], apart from 
some expression of its opinion, without committing itself to the doctrine, that a 
different line of policy is to be observed towards the New, from that which we 
have hitherto observed towards the Old World.”75  Adams would not necessarily 
have disagreed with McLane on this point; he was urging a new course of policy 
towards the New World from that followed towards the Old.  What McLane failed 
to grasp, though, was that by Adams‟s calculus, both lines of policy were dictated 
by the original policies and precepts laid out by Washington.  In that respect, 
while the mission to Panama did represent a new line of policy towards the 
independent nations of the New World, it did not represent a change in the 
fundamental principles underlying American foreign policy.  From McLane‟s 
perspective, what applied to Europe in 1796 applied to Latin America in 1826; the 
meaning of “entangling alliances with none” remained unchanged. 
 William C. Rives of Virginia felt that McLane‟s amendment did not go far 
enough in placing limits on the mission.  He proposed the insertion of an 
additional clause that sought to prevent “any compact or engagement by which 
the United States shall be pledged to the Spanish American States to maintain, by 
force, the principle that no part of the American continents is henceforward 
subject to colonization by any European Power.”76  This issue of the Monroe 
Doctrine as a pledge became a central question in the House debate.  Charles 
Wickliffe of Kentucky asserted that it was “not until after the message of 
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President Monroe, of 1823, had superinduced the belief, in some of these 
Republics [of Latin America], that the United States had „pledged themselves . . .‟ 
do we hear of any determination, officially, to invite us to take part . . . in the 
deliberations of this Congress.”77  Wickliffe was not alone in believing that the 
United States owed to the Monroe Doctrine its invitation to Panama.  John Carter 
of South Carolina raised the issue when he stated that “without pretending to say, 
or know, what the exact meaning of [Monroe‟s] declaration was, I think very little 
doubt can be entertained but that we owe the invitation we have received to send 
Ministers to Panama, to nothing else.”78  John Forsyth of Georgia was especially 
critical of the mission in light of the Latin American perception of the Monroe 
Doctrine.  He believed that the purpose of U.S. involvement in the Congress of 
Panama was “to concert means of resisting European interference; these being 
considered as the principles of Mr. Monroe‟s message, that we have been invited, 
and have consented to go to Panama.  We go not to undeceive them; not to 
explain to them their mistake, in supposing us pledged to any efforts for the 
defence of their rights; but to discuss the question of means, as if the pledge 
existed in full force.”79  Clearly Forsyth did not put any faith in Adams‟s 
assurances that the United States was not going to Panama to participate in 
discussions of a belligerent nature. 
 James Buchanan of Pennsylvania and James Hamilton of South Carolina 
were especially critical of the administration‟s handling of the Latin American 
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nations‟ mistaken belief in a pledge.  They both pointed to examples in the 
diplomatic correspondence provided to the House of U.S. foreign ministers 
explicitly referring to a pledge by Monroe, and asserted that their actions 
represented a conscious and intentional change of the established foreign policy 
of the United States by John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay.  Buchanan argued 
that the Monroe Doctrine “contained no pledge to any foreign Government.  It left 
us perfectly free: but it has since been converted into such pledge by the present 
Administration.”80  Hamilton believed that the “basis of our negotiations with the 
South American Republics” had been “this declaration of Mr. Monroe (which has 
been most unjustifiably termed by the administration a pledge, and, by their 
subsequent commentaries on it, converted into one).”81  Buchanan and Hamilton 
went further than anyone else in accusing the administration of intentionally 
fostering the Latin American belief in a pledge and, as a result, perverting the 
long-standing principles of U.S. foreign policy. 
 Several representatives took the opposite view of the Monroe Doctrine 
altogether and conceded that, while it may have constituted a pledge at the time 
that it was enunciated, it no longer stood as such by 1826.  Edward Livingston of 
Louisiana looked to the Doctrine as a pledge: “A pledge, not to ourselves or to 
posterity . . . but a pledge to the world, that we would interfere, according to our 
means, to resist [European] interference.”  The key, though, was that such a 
pledge “related only to the state of things that then existed. . . .  The circumstances 
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under which the declaration was made, have passed away; they are not likely 
again to recur; but, I should wish all Europe to understand, that if they should, our 
conduct would redeem the pledge our Executive then made.”82  In many ways this 
was the exact view taken by the administration.  Adams likely never would have 
termed the Doctrine a pledge, but the idea of its conditionality was reiterated 
multiple times, most notably in Clay‟s Panama instructions. 
 The existence of such varying perspectives begged the question, if the 
Monroe Doctrine‟s purpose had been served by 1826 – at least in terms of the 
doctrine of two spheres and the threat of European intervention in Spanish 
America – was it still pertinent?  Could it still represent an important declaration 
of U.S. foreign policy principles if it was no longer applicable to the existing 
global context?  John Forsyth of Georgia and Daniel Webster of Massachusetts 
believed that it could and did.  Forsyth argued that “the law of self-defense 
requires us to act, whenever any combination of Powers – Asiatic, African, 
European, or American – interferes with the domestic concerns of the American 
States.  This was all that was rightfully asserted by the message of 1823.”83  
Pledge or no pledge, Monroe‟s message was founded on the basic principles of a 
nation‟s right to defend itself against foreign interference.  This idea was just as 
true in 1826 as it had been in 1823, and as it had been in 1796 when Washington 
warned of its dangers in the Farewell Address. 
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 Webster echoed these sentiments in proclaiming that Monroe‟s 
“declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly 
from a regard to their preservation.”  He never believed that the Doctrine had 
constituted a pledge, as “it did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any 
indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America.”  
Instead, Monroe‟s declaration was important because it was a statement of 
American rights and American principles, rights and principles that were hailed 
when they were announced but were under attack in 1826.  Webster looked upon 
the Monroe Doctrine “as forming a bright page in our history,” but questioned 
“how should it happen . . . that there should now be such a new-born fear, on the 
subject of this declaration?  The crisis is over; the danger is past. . . .  Most of the 
gentlemen who have now spoken on this subject, were at that time here [in 
Congress].  They all heard the declaration.  Not one of them complained.  And 
yet, now when all danger is over, we are vehemently warned against the 
sentiments of the declaration.”84  Webster‟s understanding of the Doctrine‟s 
contemporary meanings and importance was founded both on the idea that 
President Adams had not and would not pervert its meanings, and independently 
of its interpretation as a pledge in Latin America, two points which the opposition 
was clearly, and on the latter point understandably, unwilling to concede. 
 For Adams, the Monroe Doctrine was still pertinent and important, if not 
because of the declaration of rights and principles contained within the doctrine of 
two spheres, then at least because of the non-colonization principle.  Despite the 
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importance Adams placed on it, many congressmen felt that it would be a 
worthless exercise to advance such a principle abroad.  Charles Wickliffe, for one, 
wondered why the United States should “be called upon to stipulate by treaty that 
we will not suffer our own soil to be invaded; to be occupied by an European 
Power; to be colonized?  We need no paper stipulations upon such a subject.  We 
have a stronger guarantee than all the parchment the South can give us: it is that 
devotion to liberty and self government which is felt and seen by our citizens.  For 
the honor and character of my country, I would not enter into such a stipulation 
with any Power.”85  Louis McLane expressed a similar sentiment when he argued 
that “any stipulation, or any treaty, on the subject of a resistance to colonization, 
or of interference, by European Powers, with the Independence of the South 
American States, [is] utterly incompatible with the settled policy of this 
Government.”  He argued that no nation could ever “negotiate about its own 
policy or attitude towards foreign nations. . . .  It consults its own honor and 
interests, and the happiness of its citizens; and when it has decided on its course, 
it is its duty to announce its policy to the world – not to negotiate about it.”  In the 
case of the United States, “it is the duty of the Executive to say to all People that 
our policy is pacific – it is neutral – it is to steer clear of the difficulties and 
quarrels of other People, and not to negotiate with any body whether we shall 
commit ourselves to their destiny.”86  Wickliffe and McLane believed that 
entering into agreements based on the non-colonization principle would not 
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strengthen the ability of the United States to defend itself against foreign 
interference and would likely only serve to weaken it by binding the U.S. to 
defend other nations‟ sovereignty.  They were arguing against a different object 
than Adams was proposing, though.  He did not seek the aid of other nations in 
defending the territorial integrity of the United States, nor did he intend to bind 
the nation to militarily defend the principle abroad.  He simply wanted the Latin 
American nations to adopt the principle for themselves and to declare it to the 
world as the United States had in 1823. 
 Several representatives did understand and agree with this position.  John 
Wurts of Pennsylvania felt that the arguments advanced by men like Wickliffe 
and McLane were “not treating the question fairly.  It is not proposed to go abroad 
to gather strength, or create inducements to defend our own soil.  The 
colonization of any part of the continent of North America, within our territorial 
limits, by any Government, never will be permitted, so long as this Republic 
retains the power to prevent it.  The stipulation, therefore, would bind us to no 
course other than that to which our feelings and our policy would prompt us, 
independent of it.”  Rather, pursuing the non-colonization principle abroad 
“would be the mean by which we should obtain the security, so far as 
international stipulations can give it, that no part of the territorial dominion of the 
Southern Republics should pass, by cession or otherwise, to European Powers, 
who might prove to be troublesome and mischievous neighbors to both of us.”87  
Daniel Webster similarly stressed that such agreements with the South American 
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republics could not impact America‟s ability to defend the non-colonization 
principle at home.  Instead, he argued, it would behoove the United States to 
encourage these new nations to “settle it, as part of their policy, not to allow 
colonization within their respective territories,” because it would provide for 
domestic security, and help to protect American commerce with these nations.
88
 
 These discussions of the Monroe Doctrine as a past and future pledge, as 
defending national interests and rights, and as advancing a useful or useless non-
colonization principle, revealed a great deal about the short-term legacy of the 
Monroe Doctrine.  It was generally believed that the Doctrine had been an 
appropriate response to the threat of European intervention in 1823, but by 1826 
many felt that the Doctrine had served its purpose and now belonged to the annals 
of history.  There still were those who saw the Doctrine as of perpetual 
importance as a statement of American principles and as an assertion of American 
rights, but very few saw it as an essential component of American foreign policy 
thought moving forward.  If anything, many saw it as endangering those truly 
important American principles enunciated by Washington in 1796.” 
 For most involved in this debate over a U.S. mission to the Congress of 
Panama, the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine was intimately connected with but 
also of secondary importance to the legacy and meaning of Washington‟s 
Farewell Address.  In the Senate an overarching contention of the mission‟s 
opponents was that it contradicted Washington‟s wisdom, and such arguments 
carried over into the House.  “A crisis has now arrived,” James Buchanan 
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declared, “in which it is the duty of this House to take a firm stand in favor of the 
ancient and the approved policy of the country.  We should proclaim to the world, 
that it is our determination „to preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all 
nations, and to form entangling alliances with none.‟”89  James Hamilton similarly 
feared that Adams was attempting to pervert “the spirit and meaning of the advice 
of Washington.”  He described the Farewell as the “warnings of a parting friend.  
Posterity has the reversionary interest; and it is not the sophistry of Mr. Adams 
that can deprive our children of the full benefit of this long enduring legacy.  
Founded on the then and ever enduring circumstances of our country, were these 
counsels.  Sir, they rest permanently on our immutable condition, as a federative 
Republic.”90  Contrary to Adams, who argued that foreign policy had to be a 
reflection of America‟s evolving relationship with the rest of the world and 
founded on U.S. interests, Hamilton believed that the nation‟s approach was 
permanently established by its form of government.  Charles Wickliffe similarly 
declared, “There are certain great principles which never change; and among them 
I recognize those prescribed by the Father of his Country, in his Farewell Address 
to his beloved People, as the rule of our conduct with and toward foreign 
nations.”91  These men all firmly believed that as long as the United States 
endured, so too should Washington‟s principles. 
 Such professions of loyalty to Washington‟s Farewell Address were not 
simply political posturing in the course of the debate either, as similar sentiments 
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appeared in the private correspondence of many of those involved in the debate 
both in and out of Congress.  Andrew Jackson, for one, believed that even if they 
“let the primary interests of Europe be what they may, or let our situation vary as 
far as you please from that which we occupied when the immortal Washington 
retired from the councils of his country, I cannot see, for my part how it follows 
that the primary interests of the United States will be safer in the hands of others, 
than in her own.”  Regardless of a changing global context, he did not understand 
how it could “ever become necessary to form entangling alliances, or any 
connection with the governments of South America. . . .  The doctrine of 
Washington is as applicable to the present as to the then primary interests of 
Europe, so far as our own peace and happiness are concerned, and I have no 
hesitation in saying so far as the true interests of South America are concerned.”  
Letting his personal dislike of Adams show through, he argued that “to abandon a 
policy so wise in itself, and so beneficial an experiment to our country displays a 
weakness of wickedness not paralelled [sic] in the history of any country.  It is a 
bold game of ambition, that puts at once to hazzard [sic] our peace, our happiness, 
and for what is known may lead to the destruction of our liberty at last.”  The key 
to Jackson‟s understanding – and of all the mission‟s opponents, for that matter – 
was his assertion that all of this was risked “without the least apparent cause for a 
departure from that wise policy recommended by Washington, „peace with all 
nations entangling alliances with none.‟”  Jackson and his supporters rejected 
Adams‟s contention in his 15 March message to the House that his expansion of 
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the Farewell Address flowed naturally from Washington‟s original maxims, 
instead seeing it for the rigid and unwavering Jeffersonian reconceptualization.
92
 
 All of the bitterness over the true meanings of Washington‟s Farewell 
Address aside, at the root of these debates still rested the amendments of McLane 
and Rives.  The central purpose of these proposed amendments was to force 
President Adams and his ministers at Panama to conform to America‟s 
fundamental principles of foreign policy, as defined by the mission‟s opponents.  
Many in the House purported to believe in the spirit of these amendments but not 
in the power of the House to actually pass them, as constitutionally it had no 
purview over foreign relations and thus could not instruct the ministers how to 
conduct themselves at Panama.  On 18 April James Buchanan proposed another 
amendment designed to “test the sincerity of those gentlemen who had declared, 
that their only objection to the amendments now before the committee, was, that 
they contained an instruction from this House to the Ministers which would be 
sent to Panama.”  The amendment stated that the House of Representatives, in 
approving of the mission, “Do not intend to sanction any departure from the 
settled policy of this Government, that, in extending our commercial relations 
with foreign nations, we should have with them as little political connexion as 
possible; and that we should preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all 
nations, and form entangling alliances with none.”  Based on this view of 
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America‟s “settled policy,” the “Government of the United States ought not to be 
represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic character, nor 
ought they to form any alliance, with all or any of the Spanish American 
Republics; nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any 
joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the 
European Powers with their independence or form of Government, or to any 
compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continent of 
America.”  Instead, “the People of the United States should be left free to act, in 
any crisis, in such a manner as their feelings of friendship towards these 
Republics, and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate.”93  
Buchanan maintained the spirit of the previous amendments, but reframed them as 
clearly expressing the opinion of the House rather than a direct instruction.  
McLane accepted Buchanan‟s amendment, and Rives withdrew his entirely, 
believing that it was no longer necessary.
94
 
 On 20 April voting on the Panama mission commenced in the House.  The 
first vote was on the Buchanan/McLane amendment, and the result could not have 
been closer, as it was defeated by just one vote.
95
  A vote was then taken on 
McLane‟s original amendment, which narrowly passed by four votes.96  The 
following day the amended resolution of the Committee of Foreign Affairs was 
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handily voted down by an almost three-to-one margin.  The House immediately 
moved to consider the bill of the Committee of Ways and Means, and after 
minimal debate overwhelmingly approved the funding for the mission to 
Panama.
97
 
 In the Senate, the Committee of Finance reported the House appropriation 
without amendment.  In a last attempt by the Senate‟s opponents of the mission to 
put some form of limitation, even if non-binding, on the prerogatives of the 
president and the ministers in carrying out their diplomatic duties at Panama, John 
Macpherson Berrien offered what was essentially the Buchanan amendment to the 
House Foreign Relations resolution as an amendment to the appropriation bill.
98
  
The irony of this amendment was that it was originally introduced in the House to 
assuage the reservations of those representatives who felt that the House could not 
issue instructions to the president on diplomatic matters.  If it was successfully 
attached to the appropriation bill and passed in the Senate, it would then be 
returned to the House, where, if approved, it would embody the very reservations 
it was designed to relieve: the House would be giving diplomatic instructions to 
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the president.  Such potential complications proved to be moot, though, as the 
amendment was rejected with 19 in favor to 24 opposed.
99
  The unamended 
appropriation bill was passed the following day by a vote of 23 to 19; after nearly 
five months of delay and debate, the mission to the Congress of Panama was 
finally approved.
100
 
 
The Congress of Panama and a Legacy of Failure 
 Despite months of intense coverage of the Panama debate, final passage of 
the mission received little extended attention in the press.  This proved just as 
well for Adams and Clay, as the Congress of Panama was a complete failure, 
especially from the U.S. perspective.  As demonstrated in Clay‟s instructions to 
Anderson and Sergeant, the president and secretary of state still had ambitious 
hopes for what could be achieved, for the influence the United States could exert 
over Latin America.  It was an opportunity to not only form agreements with the 
young nations of Latin America that would benefit U.S. commerce and security, 
but also to see American foreign policy principles adopted and individually 
defended throughout the western hemisphere.  This congress was to be the venue 
in which Washington‟s Farewell Address would be asserted to protect both 
American continents from European interference.  The problem for the United 
States was that their ministers never made it to Panama.  The delayed approval of 
the mission meant that travel to Panama would commence at the height of the 
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summer disease season.  John Sergeant notified Clay in early May that he was 
unwilling to take his life in his hands and that he would not depart until later in 
the year.
101
  Richard C. Anderson, stationed in Colombia, did not learn that he 
was to set out for Panama until early June, and was not finally prepared to leave 
until just three days before the congress assembled.  More than a month later, 
after the congress had already adjourned, Anderson took ill and died, never 
having made it to Panama.
102
 
 The congress assembled 15 June 1826 and was attended by just four 
countries: Colombia, Peru, Central America, and Mexico.  Lasting one month, the 
delegates produced five agreements that were to be ratified by their respective 
governments before the congress was to reassemble at Tacubaya, Mexico early 
the next year.
103
  Despite their setbacks, Adams and Clay continued to press for 
the utility of the mission and its continuance.  In his second annual message to 
Congress, Adams stated that the course of events to that point had only 
“confirmed me in the conviction of the expediency to the United States of being 
represented at the congress.”104  In early 1827 he nominated Joel R. Poinsett of 
South Carolina, the U.S. minister to Mexico, to take Anderson‟s place on the 
mission.
105
  By March it seemed increasingly likely that the congress would never 
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reassemble, but Clay still urged Sergeant and Poinsett that “the objects, which are 
contemplated by your instructions, are so highly important, that the President 
thinks their accomplishment ought not to be abandoned whilst any hope 
remains.”106  In the end, the agreements passed at Panama were not ratified by the 
participating nations, governments refused to appoint ministers to attend at 
Tacubaya, and Bolivar himself abandoned the congress in favor of a different plan 
of Latin American unification and self-aggrandizement.
107
  By the end of 1827, 
Adams had to regretfully inform Congress that “the treaties concluded at Panama 
do not appear to have been ratified by the contracting parties, and that the meeting 
of the congress at Tacubaya has been indefinitely postponed.”108  For Adams, the 
internal divisions in Latin America that had caused the congress to fall apart only 
reinforced how important the ideas and ideals he had hoped to inculcate truly 
would have been to the long-term stability of the American continents.  For the 
opposition, it validated how right they were to oppose it, and bolstered the sense 
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of success they felt over effectively preventing U.S. participation in the first 
place. 
 The great irony of the congressional debate on the U.S. mission to Panama 
was that, technically speaking, Adams was the victor in his showdown with 
Congress – the mission was approved and all attempts to limit its scope was 
defeated.  Yet because the congress itself was futile and American participation 
amounted to nothing, the historical memory of the debate quickly became the 
failure of Adams and the victory of the opposition.  More importantly, though, it 
became the story of the failure of Adams to abandon Washington‟s Farewell 
Address and extend the Monroe Doctrine, and the victory of the opposition in 
ensuring America‟s adherence to Washington‟s wisdom.  The project began by 
those senators who ensured the publication of their speeches was continued the 
following year by congressmen who reminded their constituents what had been at 
stake.  Such letters were epitomized by that of James K. Polk of Tennessee who 
presented the mission as having been a departure from the nation‟s traditional 
principles.  “From the commencement of the Government down to that period,” 
he argued, “our policy in relation to foreign Nations, had been distinctly marked 
and was well understood.  „A strict neutrality,‟ „friendship with all Nations, but 
entangling alliances with none,‟ were our mottos.”  The proposed congress, 
“whose powers were undefined & whose secret objects were enveloped in 
darkness and uncertainty,” had to be opposed.  “The United States had nothing to 
gain” by participating, “but much to lose, by becoming members of such an 
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extraordinary Assembly.  I was not prepared to say that the policy laid down by 
Washington, and steadily pursued by his republican successors, a policy under 
which the Country had been prosperous and happy, should be abandoned for 
untried and hazardous experiments.”109 
 At the close of Adams‟s presidency, when at attempt was made by those 
supporters of the mission who still had positions in Congress to see Adams‟s and 
Clay‟s instructions to Anderson and Sergeant published, the force of this 
historical memory was made especially clear.  Robert Hayne dismissed this 
renewed attempt “to convince the people that the minority was right and the 
majority wrong.”110  John Macpherson Berrien refused “to revive the discussion 
of a transaction, which was a political experiment in its origin – a political 
abortion in its result; which agitated the public mind in its progress; and of which 
the consummation may be sought in the decisive judgment pronounced by the 
American people on the project and its projectors.”111  While the instructions were 
ultimately published they received little national attention beyond Adams‟s most 
ardent defenders.
112
  For most Americans the Panama Congress was best left in 
the past. 
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 The significance of this historical memory was more than just the lasting 
view it left of the Congress of Panama, but also the impact it had on American 
views of the nation‟s principles of foreign policy.  The debate made abundantly 
clear that a significant portion of Congress rejected Adams‟s expanded 
interpretation of the Farewell Address and greatly feared the extension of any part 
of the Monroe Doctrine.  These men would point to “entangling alliances with 
none” and legitimately argue that Adams was attempting to move away from it 
and towards closer relations with Latin America.  Just as important as the efforts 
of the mission‟s opponents, though, was that its supporters never made a strong 
stand on behalf of the principles Adams was advocating.  Most never defended 
the non-colonization principle as a viable international pursuit, and no one ever 
argued for the legitimacy or necessity of his interpretation of Washington‟s 
Farewell Address.  Daniel Webster did issue an impassioned vindication of the 
Monroe Doctrine as having been declared in defense of American rights, and 
many others made the argument that participation did not represent a violation of 
American neutrality, but this was the limit of their defense.  As a result, despite 
final passage of the mission, the dominant arguments emerging from Congress 
were ones opposed to Adams and his principles.  The subsequent failure of the 
United States to discuss these principles abroad and see them adopted in an 
international context only further cemented the outcomes of the congressional 
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debate.  Rather than gaining widespread adoption of American principles, Adams 
was left with the negative judgments of Congress.
113
 
 In the minds of most Americans, Washington‟s Farewell Address would 
continue to mean “entangling alliances with none” and the Monroe Doctrine was 
largely forgotten as having been expressed to meet a set of contingencies that had 
ceased to exist.
114
  By introducing the non-colonization principle as a prominent 
point of discussion at Panama, Adams was attempting to put that principle 
forward as the salient legacy of the Monroe Doctrine.  Had the American mission 
succeeded in seeing it adopted at Panama, this international adoption would have 
become the second chapter in the history of the Doctrine.  Instead, the Doctrine 
was left aside without any explicit definition of its lasting importance, meaning 
that it could be taken up by later generations as a blank slate free to be given new 
meanings and interpretations.  All of this is not to say that the Monroe Doctrine 
would have necessarily been viewed any differently in the short term after 
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Panama or used any differently in the long term.  The rhetoric surrounding its use 
would certainly have been different, though, especially in the context of American 
foreign policy principles defined by the Washingtonian idea of a closer interest in 
Latin America, as opposed to the distinct separation of the United States from the 
rest of the world as called for by “entangling alliances with none.”
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Five: The Revaluing of American Principles, 1826-1850 
 
 In his first annual address to Congress in December 1845, President James 
K. Polk formally reintroduced the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the American 
people.  As had become standard practice in these “state of the Union” messages, 
as they would later come to be called, he invested a great deal of time discussing 
the status of America‟s relations with the rest of the world.  After pages of details, 
Polk paused to take a broader view, observing that “The rapid extension of our 
settlements over our territories heretofore unoccupied, the addition of new States 
to our Confederacy, the expansion of free principles, and our rising greatness as a 
nation are attracting the attention of the powers of Europe.”  So concerned were 
these powers with America‟s growth that “lately the doctrine has been broached 
in some of them of a „balance of power‟ on this continent to check our 
advancement.”  While the United States was “sincerely desirous of preserving 
relations of good understanding with all nations,” it could not “in silence permit 
any European interference on the North American continent.”  He boldly declared 
that “should any such interference be attempted,” the nation would be “ready to 
resist it at any and all hazards.”  He reminded his audience in Congress and 
around the world that “this Government has never interfered with the relations 
subsisting between other governments.  We have never made ourselves parties to 
their wars or their alliances; we have not sought their territories by conquest; we 
have not mingled with parties in their domestic struggles; and believing our own 
form of government to be the best, we have never attempted to propagate it by 
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intrigues, by diplomacy, or by force.”  This was the course navigated by the 
United States under the guidance of Washington‟s Farewell Address and the 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization.
1
 
 Employing the doctrine of two spheres as the expansion of the Farewell 
Address it was originally intended as, Polk claimed “on this continent a like 
exemption from European interference. . . .  The people of the United States can 
not . . . view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the 
independent action of the nations on this continent.”  The European idea of the 
balance of power “can not be permitted to have any application on the North 
American continent, and especially to the United States.  We must ever maintain 
the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their 
own destiny.”  Most importantly to Polk was the idea that “Should any portion of 
them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our 
Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any 
foreign interposition.  We can never consent that European powers shall interfere 
to prevent such a union because it might disturb the „balance of power‟ which 
they may desire to maintain upon this continent.”  Polk was not just concerned 
with the doctrine of two spheres, as, after quoting the non-colonization principle 
directly, he promised that it would be applied “with greatly increased force should 
any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America.”  
According to Polk, “The reassertion of this principle, especially in reference to 
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North America, is at this day but the promulgation of a policy which no European 
power should cherish the disposition to resist.  Existing rights of every European 
nation should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that 
the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial 
limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy 
that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or 
established on any part of the North American continent.”2 
 While Polk framed these declarations as a simple restatement of Monroe‟s 
Doctrine, in reality they represented something much different.  The Doctrine was 
being reasserted as America‟s guiding and “settled” policy.  Polk limited its 
expression to North America, the region most directly connected to U.S. interests 
and subject to U.S. influence, but his version of the Doctrine was presented as a 
much more aggressive warning to Europe to keep out of American affairs and out 
of the United States‟ way.  This chapter will examine the evolution of American 
principles and policies in the wake of the debate over the Panama mission in order 
to understand the reemergence of the Monroe Doctrine as Polk conceived of it.  
Throughout this period Americans remained attached to George Washington and 
his Farewell Address, but their view of America‟s relationship with the rest of the 
world was restricted by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization.  This was amply 
demonstrated during the Panama debate.  At the same time, the near-isolationism 
Thomas Jefferson first envisioned with “entangling alliances with none” had been 
thoroughly abandoned by presidents from James Monroe forward in the 
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recognition of new governments, the completion of new commercial treaties, and 
the dispatching of ministers and consuls all over the world.  Despite this 
expansion, or perhaps because of it, policymakers originally opposed to the 
Monroe Doctrine were drawn back to the expansive view of the Farewell Address 
that it offered.  By the 1840s it was these principles and not the Jeffersonian 
reconceptualization that was asserted as the foundation for American foreign 
policy.  While policymakers in Washington were moving in this direction, 
popular understandings of American principles remained unchanged; if anything, 
many people attached themselves more firmly to “entangling alliances with none” 
after Polk put forward his aggressive view of the Monroe Doctrine.  After the 
annexation of Texas and war with Mexico, and as the nation‟s sectional crisis 
deepened, the Farewell Address increasingly became a symbol of Union for many 
Americans, while for others its principles became too strict a limitation on the 
ability of the United States to more forcefully assert itself on the world stage.  For 
generations adherence to the Farewell and “entangling alliances with none” had 
been the main reason for American growth and prosperity; by 1848 some saw it as 
the main obstacle.  This chapter begins, though, with the revelation that the 
Farewell Address may not have been Washington‟s work in the first place. 
 
The Authorship Controversy 
 Given the place that the Farewell Address occupied in American cultural 
and political life by the 1820s, any suggestions that it was not solely 
Washington‟s work were met with passionate objections; that there was 
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documentary evidence in the form of a complete draft of it in Alexander 
Hamilton‟s handwriting made the claims impossible to ignore.  The authorship 
controversy had its roots in Hamilton‟s unexpected death in the summer of 1804 
at the hands of Vice President Aaron Burr.  Hamilton‟s untimely passing meant 
that he left his heirs no direction as to how his papers, and specifically those 
related to his role in writing the Farewell Address, should be handled.  Questions 
as to how he would want them made public, if he wanted that at all, were left 
unanswered.  As a result, when one of the executors of Hamilton‟s estate, Judge 
Nathaniel Pendleton, discovered these documents amongst his papers in 1810, he 
was unsure of how to proceed.  Fearing that they would be made public by 
Hamilton‟s widow in an attempt to restore her deceased husband‟s public image, 
and dreading the impact this could have, he bundled them up and gave them to his 
close confidant, Rufus King. 
 By early 1811 confidential letters with information about the controversy 
began circulating.  One man who became quite involved was Judge Richard 
Peters of Pennsylvania, who contacted acquaintances that might have insight into 
the authorship question: Timothy Pickering and John Jay.  Peters never 
questioned that Washington was the sole author, and was specifically looking for 
information that would confirm this belief.  In writing to Jay he asserted that 
Hamilton had done no “more than dress it,” but also admitted that he did “most 
likely interweave some good Things.”  More revealing of his mindset was his 
comment that “If I had it in his Hand-Writing (Hamilton‟s) I would burn it.  What 
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Good does the Development of this Fact do?  Hamilton has fame enough.  He can 
get no more from those who admire him; of whom I am one.  He will not gain a 
Feather from his, or the Enemies of Washington‟s Principles.  But those 
Principles would lose Force, by being ascribed to Hamilton, & deducted from 
Washington.”3  For Peters, preservation of the Farewell Address as a guiding 
instrument was a primary concern, and any evidence to undermine it should be 
ignored.  Pickering, who had been Washington‟s secretary of state when the 
Farewell Address was published, would only go so far as to say that when it came 
to Washington‟s state papers, he “did not take credit to himself when he was 
assisted by others; but the credit was bestowed upon him by his fellow citizens & 
the world and this credit he could not disclaim without defeating the national 
object he had in view in what appeared under his name.”4  Pickering was very 
familiar with Washington‟s habit of having men more skilled with the pen than he 
draft his important letters and addresses, and was thus willing to believe the story 
circulated by Hamilton‟s family.5 
 It was the version of events put forward by John Jay in response to 
Peters‟s letter that would prove persuasive both at that time and in later years in 
shaping private and public views of the authorship question.  He revealed to 
Peters that he had met with Hamilton in the summer of 1796 in order to discuss 
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Washington‟s draft of a Farewell Address.  When they met, Hamilton “observed 
to me in words to this effect, that after having read and examined [Washington‟s] 
draft, it appeared to him to be susceptible of improvement.  That he thought the 
easiest and best way was to leave the draft, untouched, and in its fair state; and to 
write the whole over with such amendments, alterations, and corrections as he 
thought were advisable, and that he had done so; he then proposed to read it and 
to make it the subject of our consideration.”  The two of them then discussed, in 
great detail, Hamilton‟s draft “until the whole met with our mutual approbation.”6  
At that point both the revised draft and the original “untouched” draft were sent 
back to Washington.  As far as Jay knew, the president then crafted his Farewell 
Address using these documents.  This was the evidence Peters was looking for, as 
it demonstrated some logical reason for there to be papers related to the Address 
in Hamilton‟s handwriting that did not challenge Washington‟s authorship. 
 Historians who have discussed the authorship controversy, most notably 
Victor Hugo Paltsits, have treated the 1811 episode as having been limited to this 
private correspondence; however, contemporary newspapers did report that the 
Hamiltons planned to take credit for the Farewell Address in a forthcoming 
biography by Dr. John Mitchell Mason.  As one editorial put it, Mason intended 
to “robe [Hamilton] in the highest honors; and, at the expense of General 
Washington, to claim for Hamilton the rank which Washington now holds in the 
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hearts of a grateful country. . . .  [N]ot only would he prove that Hamilton was the 
author of all the state papers signed George Washington, but that he would 
demonstrate that the farewell address of president Washington . . . was actually 
from the pen of Alexander Hamilton.”7  The tone of the article made clear that its 
author not only disbelieved the claim, but also and that men like Mason should be 
viewed with great contempt.  Fortunately, from the perspective of many 
observers, the story gained no real traction as many Americans dismissed it out of 
hand and because no Hamilton biography by Mason ultimately appeared. 
 The controversy remained largely dormant until May 1825, when the 
Hamiltons sued Rufus King in a very public attempt to get the bundle of 
documentary evidence returned.  Word of the suit and the authorship claim behind 
it quickly spread and began to be openly debated in the popular press.  In 1826 the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania chose to investigate the controversy in order to 
put it to rest.  The committee charged with the investigation contacted Jay, Peters, 
John Marshall, Washington‟s heirs, and even David C. Claypoole (the man in 
possession of Washington‟s final draft of the Farewell Address) to gather 
evidence, but they uncovered little more than what Peters had been able to 
discover in 1811, and the main piece of evidence in their report was Jay‟s old 
letter.  Their report concluded that their investigation “must remove all doubts on 
the subject.  The facts stated in Mr. Jay‟s letter to Judge Peters well account for 
the mistake which has accompanied this question.”  Then, ignoring the main point 
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of Jay‟s letter that he and Hamilton had made substantial changes to a draft of the 
Address, the report continued that “The whole address appears to have been 
copied by General Hamilton, whose affectionate attachment to the President 
prevented him from thinking any trouble on his account too great; and this copy 
having, we know not how, returned to his possession, was probably the cause of 
the opinion that he was the original author.”8  This particular conclusion was a tad 
nonsensical, a fact emphasized by Pickering when he exclaimed, “Hamilton is 
supposed to go through the drudgery of copying Washington‟s Farewell Address!  
An Address prepared on purpose to be soon published!  How absurd!”9  
Apparently the committee was more concerned with preserving Washington‟s 
name and the sanctity of the Farewell Address than with making complete sense.  
The committee‟s report aside, publication of the Jay letter settled the matter for 
most Americans, as it put forward a plausible explanation that accounted for the 
Hamilton documents while still giving credit squarely to Washington. 
 The more important revelation emerging from this report (and out of the 
authorship controversy more generally) was the importance Americans attached 
to the Farewell Address as the work of George Washington, and not just for its 
principles.  Judge Peters alluded to this in 1811 in his comment that the Farewell 
“would lose Force, by being ascribed to Hamilton, & deducted from 
Washington.”  As he put it in 1826 in his reply to the committee‟s inquiries, 
should Hamilton have been shown to have been the author of the Address, “our 
                                                 
8
 Emphasis in original.  Committee on Washington‟s Valedictory Address, “Papers,” 242-43. 
9
 Emphasis in original.  Timothy Pickering to William Coleman, 5 October 1826 (Reel 38, page 
306A), Timothy Pickering Papers.  
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nation would suffer a serious injury, by having the fascinating name of 
Washington taken from the creed of every friend to his country.”10  John 
Marshall, writing to Bushrod Washington several months before the committee 
began its investigation, expressed his belief in Jay‟s version of events, but he also 
argued that even had the Address been written solely by Hamilton, “I can have no 
doubt that it was published in the name of Washington from a perfect conviction 
that the valuable sentiments it contains would do more good if proceeding from 
him than from any other person.  The public opinion of General Washington will 
remain unaltered, but their respect for the address will be changed.”11  This 
overriding sense of the importance of the Farewell as a Washingtonian statement 
of principle obviously influenced the committee‟s approach to their 
investigation.
12
  When the authorship controversy became an issue of public 
concern it forced Americans to confront the question of why they placed such 
value on the principles of the Farewell Address – was it the wisdom of the 
                                                 
10
 Emphasis in original.  Letter of Richard Peters, 19 February 1826, in Committee on 
Washington‟s Valedictory Address, “Papers,” 247. 
11
 John Marshall to Bushrod Washington, 3 October 1825, in Paltsits, Washington‟s Farewell 
Address, 285. 
12
 While the controversy was settled in the public‟s mind, there was still the matter of the 
documents in Rufus King‟s possession.  Once the Jay letter had been published and Washington‟s 
reputation was secured, King relinquished the letters to the Hamilton family.  The following year 
James Hamilton and Washington biographer Jared Sparks met to review all of the pertinent 
documents from each family‟s collection.  Even if natural familial biases skewed each man‟s 
reading of the documents, at the very least they would have been able to finally make some 
informed conclusions as to the process followed by Washington and Hamilton and they would 
have been able to trace the evolution of the Address‟s various drafts.  Despite the knowledge that 
would have been gained at this time, it was another thirty-two years before a publication appeared 
that would bring all of the documents together to finally prove the extent of Hamilton‟s role in 
writing the Farewell Address.  Paltsits, Washington‟s Farewell Address, 91-94.  Horace Binney, 
An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington‟s Farewell Address (Philadelphia: Parry & 
McMillan, Publishers, 1859). 
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principles themselves or merely that of their author?  The answer was 
resoundingly the latter. 
 
A Consistent Foreign Policy 
 One of the unfortunate side effects of the heightened partisanship that 
emerged during the Panama debate and its aftermath was that is served to mask 
the great deal of overlap that existed in the foreign policies of John Quincy 
Adams and his successor, Andrew Jackson.  Both men faced the same basic 
foreign policy challenges and, with the exception of the Panama Congress, 
pursued very similar solutions.  Among these challenges were the maintenance of 
peace and the expansion of commercial relations with an increasingly fractious 
Latin America that was also being subjected to the growing political and 
economic influence of Great Britain and France; longstanding boundary disputes 
with Mexico over Texas, and with Britain over Maine in the northeast and Oregon 
in the northwest; claims of U.S. merchants against Latin America and Europe 
dating back as far as the Napoleonic Wars; and the desire to purchase Texas from 
Mexico. 
 Despite dramatic differences in domestic priorities, both administrations 
were guided by similar foreign policy principles; specifically their conception of 
those enunciated by Washington in his Farewell Address.  Washington had 
preached an honest assessment of American interests and the construction of 
foreign policies best-suited to protect them.  For the original President Adams, 
this meant talking tough with France during the Quasi-War of the late 1790s 
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while avoiding taking precipitate action that could lead to the outbreak of actual 
war.  For the negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812, it meant 
finding common ground to treat upon and a mutual understanding to put off 
irresolvable issues to future negotiations.  It was the trust placed in the eventual 
peaceful resolution of diplomatic questions that led to so many treaties being 
signed during the Jackson and subsequent administrations to resolve issues years 
and even decades old.  Commercial claims against France dating from as far back 
as 1803, for example, were not treated until 1831, and payments were not made 
until 1836, yet the two nations chose peace over war or a fractured relationship.
13
  
The same basic approach was taken with the northeastern and -western boundary 
disputes with Great Britain.  They had existed since 1783 and 1815, but were not 
resolved until 1842 and 1846, respectively.  Relations along these contested 
borders did not always remain peaceful on the ground, but both nations 
understood the benefits of peace, an understanding preached by Washington in his 
Farewell Address. 
 A similarity in approach and principle extended to the Monroe Doctrine as 
well, as Jackson‟s foreign policy pronouncements revealed the first hints of its 
reemergence as an expansion of Washington‟s Farewell Address and a declaration 
of the separation of American and European spheres.  In his annual address to 
Congress in December 1832 he praised the nation for maintaining “a state of 
prosperity and peace” with the rest of the world, which was “the effect of a wise 
                                                 
13
 For an extended discussion of the spoliations claims against France and their slow resolution, 
see John M. Belohlavek, “Let the Eagle Soar!”: The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 91-125. 
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attention to the parting advice of the revered Father of his Country on this subject, 
condensed into a maxim for the use of posterity by one of his most distinguished 
successors – to cultivate free commerce and honest friendship with all nations, but 
to make entangling alliances with none.  A strict adherence to this policy has kept 
us aloof from the perplexing questions that now agitate the European world and 
have more than once deluged those countries with blood.”  In and of itself, the 
discussion of the Farewell Address is unremarkable, but it was his effort later in 
the message to concretely spell out the meaning of U.S. abstention from the 
European sphere that stands out.  He clarified that when he discussed events 
taking place in foreign nations, it was done “solely in cases where those events 
affect our political relations with them, or to show their operation on our 
commerce.  Further than this it is neither our policy nor our right to interfere.  Our 
best wishes on all occasions, our good offices when required, will be afforded to 
promote the domestic tranquillity [sic] and foreign peace of all nations with whom 
we have any intercourse.  Any intervention in their affairs further than this, even 
by the expression of an official opinion, is contrary to our principles of 
international policy, and will always be avoided.”14  While he was only reiterating 
one half of the doctrine of two spheres, the specificity with which he did so made 
clear that he was actively thinking about the separation between American and 
European interests.  At the same time, it is quite remarkable that nearly four 
                                                 
14
 Andrew Jackson, “Fourth Annual Message,” 4 December 1832, in Richardson, Messages and 
Papers, 2:592, 596. 
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decades after its publication, presidents were still vocally proclaiming their 
faithfulness to Washington and his Farewell Address. 
 
The Washington Centennial 
 Indeed, the Farewell continued to be of great importance to virtually all 
Americans.  Nowhere was this put on better display than in annual celebrations of 
Washington‟s birthday.  With the decline of the Federalists after 1815 and thus 
the loss of their stranglehold on Washington as a symbol, he quickly reemerged as 
a truly national figure.  Birthday celebrations, which were sponsored by civic and 
fraternal organizations as well as city and state governments, played an important 
role in refreshing American interest in and devotion to Washington‟s precepts as 
much, if not more so, than national debates such as the one surrounding the 
Panama Congress.  Birthday festivities still usually centered around a public 
address, but also often featured prayers and sermons, dinners, parades, and even 
dances.  For a people accustomed to elaborate celebrations of Washington‟s birth, 
the occasion of the centennial anniversary of that event in 1832 meant the need to 
go to new and greater lengths.  The additional pomp was especially noticeable in 
major cities.  In Philadelphia, events were planned from morning to night, but the 
highlight of the day was a grand procession featuring virtually every important 
(and unimportant) city and state official, large swaths of the local military, and an 
impressive representation from a plethora of regional trade associations.
15
  In New 
                                                 
15
 For a broadside laying out the ordering of the grand procession, see “Washington‟s Birth Day.  
Centennial Celebration,” (Philadelphia, 1832).  For a more detailed broadside describing the 
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York City, the day began with a gun salute at sunrise fired by the Veteran 
Company of Artillery, continued with a “national salute to be fired at the Battery 
at noon, and such other military display . . . as the season will permit,” a 
procession to the Middle Dutch Church for an oration by Major General Morgan 
Lewis, a reception with the Mayor, and a “Military and Civic Ball” in the 
evening.
16
  In Washington, D.C. a public dinner presided over by Senator Daniel 
Webster and attended by senators, congressmen, judges, and other distinguished 
citizens was held in Washington‟s honor.17 
 It is through the grand orations given at these types of festivities 
throughout the nation that the modern observer can gain the best appreciation for 
how central the Farewell Address and its foreign policy principles were to 
Americans‟ admiration of Washington and their conception of the country‟s place 
in the world.  In Lexington, Kentucky, for example, Charles Caldwell announced 
that “We are assembled to unite, in sentiment, with millions of our fellow-
citizens, in a festive act, which the nation honors, and all enlightened freemen will 
learn to revere.  We are pledged to perform our part, however humble, with 
suitable feelings, and in such fitness of style and manner as we can attain, in the 
great Jubilee of the first Centennial Anniversary of the Birth-day of Washington.”  
                                                                                                                                     
procession after the fact, see “Grand Civic and Military Procession in Philadelphia, February 22d, 
1832 . . .” (Philadelphia, 1832). 
16
 Emphasis in original.  Celebration of the Centennial Anniversary of the Birth of George 
Washington.  New-York, February 22, 1832 ([New York, 1832]), 4-5, 10; also see Morgan Lewis, 
An Oration Delivered in the Middle Dutch Church, in the City of New-York, Before the Common 
Council and Citizens, on the First Centennial Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington, the 
Father of His Country (New York: G. F. Hopkins & Sons, 1832). 
17
 Speeches and Other Proceedings at the Public Dinner in Honor of the Centennial Anniversary 
of Washington.  To Which is Added, Washington‟s Farewell Address (Washington, D.C.: Jonathan 
Elliot, 1832). 
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This was an important day for the nation, a day when literally millions of 
Americans would be united in their celebration of the Father of their Country.  On 
this day of national significance, Caldwell focused on the idea of the “Century of 
Washington” concluding on that day, and extolled the virtues of Washington put 
on display during his life and how they were instrumental to the progress and 
development of the nation, even after his death.  Such progress could only be 
maintained so long as the states continued “to be governed on the same principles, 
which shed such a lustre on the administration of Washington, and are so forcibly 
inculcated in his Farewell Address.”18  Francis C. Gray, speaking before the 
Massachusetts state legislature, praised that “system of administration established 
by [Washington], and the main principles both of foreign and domestic policy 
which he laid down, [that] have, for the most part, been adhered to ever since by 
the American government, and have never been departed from without reason for 
regret.”19  In Nashville, Tennessee the Farewell Address was read aloud to the 
gathered crowd before Philip Lindsley took the stage and remarked, “With what 
thrilling emotions have we not listened again to his last paternal counsels, and 
yielded the conviction of honest hearts to the truth and wisdom of all his 
sagacious and ever seasonable instructions! . . .  Nor can a more appropriate 
tribute of respect be offered to his memory, than the solemn recital, in the ears of 
                                                 
18
 Charles Caldwell, A Discourse of the First Centennial Celebration of the Birth-Day of 
Washington, Delivered by Request, to the Citizens of Lexington, On the 22nd of February, 1832 
(Lexington, KY: Printed by N. L. Finnell & J. F. Herndon, 1832), 6, 8, 56. 
19
 Francis C. Gray, Oration Delivered before the Legislature of Massachusetts, at their Request, 
on the Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington (Boston: Dutton and 
Wentworth, 1832), 66. 
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the people, on each returning anniversary of his birth-day, of this precious 
valedictory.  It is a text-book for our statesmen to study. . . .  Let every youth 
commit it to memory.  Lets its maxims be engraven upon every American 
heart.”20 
 Perhaps the most laudatory address given by anyone on that day was 
Daniel Webster‟s at the public dinner in Washington, D.C.  He began by giving 
an exposition of “The maxims upon which Washington conducted our foreign 
relations,” which were “few and simple.”  Washington “regarded other nations 
only, as they stood in political relations to us.  With their internal affairs, their 
political parties and dissensions, he scrupulously abstained, from all interference; 
and, on the other hand, he spiritedly repelled all such interference by others with 
us or our concerns.”  Washington had repeatedly expressed his “deep fears, that 
foreign influence would insinuate itself into our councils,” and “never forgot that 
we had interests peculiar to ourselves.”  Webster hailed Washington‟s Farewell 
Address for being “full of truths, important at all times, and particularly deserving 
consideration at the present.  With a sagacity which brought the future before him, 
and made it like the present; he saw and pointed out the dangers that even at this 
moment most imminently threaten us.  I hardly know how a greater service of that 
kind could now be done to the community than by a renewed and wide diffusion 
of that admirable paper, and an earnest invitation to every man in the country to 
                                                 
20
 Philip Lindsley, An Address Delivered at Nashville, Ten. Feb. 22, 1832, at the Request of the 
Citizens of Nashville and its Vicinity, on the Occasion of the Centennial Birth Day of George 
Washington (Nashville, TN: Hunt, Tardiff & Co., 1832), 5.  
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reperuse and consider it.”21  As if following Webster‟s advice, two days after 
Washington‟s birthday the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a resolution 
declaring that “it is important that the principles inculcated in that address should 
be spread through the community, and facilities should be afforded for their 
diffusion.”  It thus called for “three thousand copies of said address in the English 
and three thousand copies in the German language” to be printed “in pamphlet 
form for the use of the members.”22 
 While it did not focus on the Farewell Address itself, the most interesting 
commemoration for what it portended about America‟s future direction was that 
planned by the United States Congress.  Congress did not have a long history of 
officially celebrating Washington‟s birthday.  The first attempt to formally 
acknowledge the day was made in the House of Representatives in 1826 with a 
proposal to adjourn in honor of Washington, but was relatively easily voted 
down.
23
  By 1832, given the magnitude of the day, there was considerably less 
resistance to the idea that Congress should play some sort of role in the national 
festivities surrounding the centennial; however, less resistance did not mean 
complete acceptance.  In early February a joint committee was appointed to make 
arrangements for the day, and among its recommendations was a call for 
Congress to adjourn on the 22
nd
 and for “Congress to adopt the necessary 
                                                 
21
 Speeches and Other Proceedings at the Public Dinner in Honor of the Centennial Anniversary 
of Washington, 7-8. 
22
 Washington‟s Valedictory Address to the People of the United States.  Published in September, 
A. D. 1796, Printed in Pursuance of a Resolution of the Senate of Pennsylvania, Adopted on the 
24th of February, A. D. 1832 (Harrisburg, PA: Henry Welsh, 1832), 2. 
23
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measures to carry into effect the resolution which was passed by Congress on the 
24th day of December, 1799, for the removal of the body of George Washington, 
and its internment in the capitol at the city of Washington; and that the ceremony 
be performed on the 22nd instant.”24  The committee wanted to memorialize 
Washington‟s one hundredth birthday by moving his remains from Mount Vernon 
to the nation‟s capital.25 
 While the propriety of engaging in “Man-worship,” as Littleton Tazewell 
of Virginia labeled it, featured in the debate over the committee‟s 
recommendations, it was the question of moving Washington‟s remains that 
caused tensions to dramatically rise and foreshadowed the deepening sectional 
crisis that would come to plague the nation.
26
  Unsurprisingly, Virginians 
expressed the most ardent objections to moving the remains.  Richard Coke, Jr. 
“felt as if he, as a Virginian, and the State of which he was a native, were on the 
verge of losing something in comparison with which all the riches of the world 
would, in his and her estimation, weigh but as dust in the balance, and he begged 
[Congress], under the influence of such feeling, whilst the sad decree was yet 
unexecuted, to refrain from depriving them of that which was beyond all price.”  
Coke urged the House “to make allowance for the feelings of Virginia in this 
matter.  There were at the present time, in the flag of the confederacy, the 
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 Cong., 1
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glittering stars of twenty-four sovereign and independent States; but the time 
might perhaps arrive, when, at some distant period, those stars should be dimmed 
of their original brightness, and present to the view twenty-four fragments of a 
great and powerful republic, warring the one with the other.  At that lamentable 
time, then, he would ask, should Virginia, in offering homage to the memory of 
the mighty dead, be forced to pay a pilgrimage to the remains of her own son, 
through scenes of blood, shed perhaps by kindred hands?”27  Coke‟s vision of 
civil war was a stark sentiment to be expressed in a debate over what was meant 
to be a joyous national celebration.  Edward Everett of Massachusetts dismissed 
Coke‟s pleas for sympathy, noting that “though Washington was by birth a native 
of the colony of Virginia, he lived and died a citizen of the United States of 
America; united more by his labors, counsels, and sacrifices, than those of any 
other individual.  The sacred remains are, as the gentleman well said, a treasure 
beyond all price, but it is a treasure of which every part of this blood-cemented 
Union has a right to claim its share.”28 
 In a refrain that would oft be repeated in years to come, the figure and 
legacy of Washington came to be simultaneously claimed as the pre-eminent 
symbol of the Union and as the great hero of Virginia and the South.  In 1832, 
unlike in later years, the sectional divide did not prove determinative to most 
members of Congress, as the committee of arrangements‟ plan relatively easily 
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 Richard Coke, Jr., 7 February 1832, in Ibid., 1785. 
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passed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
29
  Congress endorsed 
moving Washington‟s remains, but the much-anticipated event did not take place 
due to the objection of Washington‟s heir.  This refusal ruined the day for John 
Quincy Adams, who had been one of the House members on the committee of 
arrangements and one of the most vocal proponents of the proposal.  Adams had 
been elected as a Representative from Massachusetts in 1831, and remained in 
that position until his death in 1848.  At the end of his presidency Adams was best 
known for his foreign policy service and achievements, but his entry into the 
House marked a fundamental shift in focus, as from that point forward he 
dedicated himself to the anti-slavery cause.  For him, much like for Coke, the 
debate over Washington‟s remains related directly to the deepening sectional 
crisis; however, Adams saw Washington as the defining symbol of the Union.  As 
he noted in his diary on 22 February 1832, “The solemnities intended for this day 
at this place lost all their interest for me by the refusal . . . to permit the remains of 
George Washington to be transferred to be entombed under the Capitol. . . .  I did 
wish that this resolution might have been carried into execution, but this wish was 
connected with an imagination that this federative Union was to last for ages.  I 
now disbelieve its duration for twenty years, and doubt its continuance for five.  It 
                                                 
29
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is falling into the sere and yellow leaf.”30  While Adams‟s prediction proved 
overly dire (but ultimately true), the larger debate over Washington‟s remains 
illustrated that even at this early date the larger fault lines that were already 
developing over the issue of slavery were impacting at least some Americans‟ 
views of George Washington, and by extension the Farewell Address.  By the 
middle of the 1840s, these fault lines would begin to shape their approach to 
foreign policy and understanding of foreign policy principles. 
 
Evolving Conceptions of American Foreign Policy 
 No foreign policy question more than Texas contributed to these 
developments.  Americans had laid claim to at least a portion of Texas as part of 
the Louisiana Purchase and had only begrudgingly renounced it as a condition of 
the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819.  Texas was gone but not forgotten, as many held 
onto hope of regaining the territory at some point in the future.  When Mexico 
achieved its independence, Texas, along with all other Spanish territory on the 
North American continent went with it, meaning that the United States now had to 
negotiate with its southern neighbor.  As president, John Quincy Adams offered 
Mexico one million dollars for Texas, and Andrew Jackson quintupled that offer, 
but the Mexican government was unwilling to sell the region.  Mexico lost Texas 
anyways in 1836 when its inhabitants, primarily immigrated Americans, rebelled 
and declared the independent Republic of Texas.  When this new nation 
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immediately requested annexation to the United States, most Americans, instead 
of seeing it as a question relating to U.S. foreign policy, understood it as a 
domestic issue bearing directly on the sectional balance and slavery.  Southerners 
saw a tremendous opportunity for economic expansion while many northerners, 
especially those opposed to slavery and its extension, feared the first movement in 
a grand slave power conspiracy.
31
 
 President Jackson favored American acquisition of the territory but 
understood that annexation of an independent nation was a fundamentally 
different question than the purchase of territory from another country.  In his final 
annual address to Congress, Jackson, channeling Washington‟s Farewell Address, 
cautioned that the nation could not commit the “great error of suffering public 
policy to be regulated by partially [sic] or prejudice” in its dealings with Texas 
and Mexico.  Concerned with more than just regional tensions, he feared that 
“The known desire of the Texans to become a part of our system . . . is calculated 
to expose our conduct to misconstruction in the eyes of the world.  There are 
already those who, indifferent to principle themselves and prone to suspect the 
want of it in others, charge us with ambitious designs and insidious policy.”32  If 
Americans did not proceed cautiously, it would be too easy for international 
observers, both in Latin America and in Europe, to accuse the United States of 
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engineering the Texas revolution just so that it could annex the territory.  Jackson 
did not want to give foreign nations cause to distrust U.S. motives or actions. 
 Jackson reiterated this cautious approach in a special message to Congress 
several weeks later in which he declared that it was “known to the world that the 
uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in 
disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and 
eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party, without reference to 
our particular interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy.”  
Despite the U.S. sympathy with and desire for Texas, this was still an internal 
Mexican question until such time as Texan independence was an established fact.  
When it came to officially recognizing the Republic of Texas, “It becomes us to 
beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the 
imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a 
view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves.  Prudence, therefore, seems to 
dictate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not 
until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the 
independence of the new Government, at least until the lapse of time or the course 
of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of 
that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the Government 
constituted by them.”33  Only once independence was widely acknowledged or 
entirely indisputable could the United States act and be above suspicion or 
reproach.  In the months following Jackson‟s message, Congress grew impatient 
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with the president‟s patience but had little recourse given that recognition of 
foreign governments was solely at the president‟s discretion.  Members of 
Congress were not accustomed to delays that were not of their own creation and 
decided to act to spur Jackson along.  The House of Representatives appropriated 
funds for a diplomatic agent to Texas to be available whenever the president 
should decide to appoint one, and the Senate passed a resolution declaring its 
opinion that Texas had achieved a state of independence and deserved 
recognition.  On the final day of his presidency, Jackson sent a message to 
Congress acknowledging “these proceedings as a virtual decision of the 
question,” his “duty to acquiesce therein,” and he appointed a chargé d‟affaires to 
the Republic of Texas, officially recognizing its independence.
34
 
 Most Americans, and even the Texans themselves, believed that 
recognition was merely a precursor to annexation, but this proved not to be the 
case.  Much the same concerns that had caused Jackson to preach caution weighed 
on his successor, Martin Van Buren.  So too did constitutional considerations over 
the ability of the United States to annex an independent nation, and the desire to 
maintain a positive relationship with Mexico, which could only be damaged by 
immediate action.  More persuasive than any of this, Van Buren recognized that 
Texas had become directly linked to slavery in the popular consciousness, and 
thus any move towards annexation would split the country along sectionally 
divisive lines.  For both national as well as political reasons, this was an argument 
he wanted to avoid.  In his inaugural address Van Buren pledged his allegiance to 
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the nation‟s longstanding principles of foreign policy, describing them as having 
been “so uniform and intelligible as to constitute a rule of Executive conduct 
which leaves little to my discretion, unless, indeed, I were willing to run counter 
to the lights of experience and the known opinions of my constituents.  We 
sedulously cultivate the friendship of all nations as the conditions most 
compatible with our welfare and the principles of our Government.  We decline 
alliances as adverse to our peace.”35  When Texas formally requested annexation 
in August 1837, Van Buren declined after only a brief debate in the cabinet.
36
  
Texas would remain at the front of Americans‟ minds, but receded as a focus of 
U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of Van Buren‟s term. 
 
The Haphazard Reemergence of the Doctrine of Two Spheres 
 Jackson and Van Buren had been actively concerned with international 
opinion when they decided to proceed with caution in Texas.  They themselves, 
though, went to great lengths to avoid taking official notice of questionable 
actions taken by Great Britain and France in Latin America.  Multiple incidents 
throughout the region, especially during Jackson‟s eight years in office, could 
have warranted a response, even if only in the form of a note of protest, under the 
auspices of the Monroe Doctrine.  The Doctrine, of course, had been “rejected” by 
Congress in 1826, and it remained largely dormant, at least in any official sense, 
throughout the 1830s.  Implicit references to it crept into the occasional 
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diplomatic dispatch, but by and large U.S. principles in this period were framed 
solely with regard to Washington‟s Farewell Address.37  The one notable, and 
curious, exception occurred in February 1839 when, in response to a French naval 
blockade of a portion of the coast of Mexico, the House of Representatives passed 
a resolution introduced by Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts requesting 
information from the president on the role of the United States in the affair and 
the effect that it had had on American vessels.  What made this resolution so 
interesting was that in a lengthy preamble it quoted extensively from the Monroe 
Doctrine (without citing Monroe by name), looking to justify interest in French 
actions under its precepts.  It was passed with no debate.
38
 
 The resolution was clearly something of an outlier, both in terms of the 
interest it took in European actions in Latin America and in the principles it cited, 
but it did point to a shift that was about to take place in the official discourse 
surrounding American principles.  Between 1840 and James K. Polk‟s first annual 
message to Congress in 1845, it became clear that American presidents and 
policymakers were feeling increasingly restricted by Washington‟s Farewell 
Address as defined by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization.  They began to have 
an expanded sense of the sphere of American interests and as a result began to 
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express more expansive versions of Washington‟s principles.  With the doctrine 
of two spheres, what John Quincy Adams had seen as the logical extension of the 
principles of the Farewell Address in 1823, and had been rejected by Congress as 
endangering those principles in 1826, was being recreated to circumvent the 
narrowness of “entangling alliances with none” in the 1840s.  The key, though, 
was that even as they were expressing these principles during this five year 
period, the Monroe Doctrine itself was only rarely discussed, and it was never 
mentioned by a president in his public messages until Polk.
39
   
 The first important evidence in the reemergence of the doctrine of two 
spheres was Van Buren‟s final annual message to Congress in December 1840.  
He pledged the nation to “A rigid and persevering abstinence from all interference 
with the domestic and political relations of other States, alike due to the genius 
and distinctive character of our Government and to the principles by which it is 
directed.”  He further described the United States as being “Bound by no 
entangling alliances, yet linked by a common nature and interest with the other 
nations of mankind.”40  This last statement simultaneously moved closer to and 
further away from the principles of the Jeffersonian reconceptualization, as it 
cited “entangling alliances with none” but also acknowledged the common 
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interests that now existed with other nations, an idea at the heart of John Quincy 
Adams‟s conception of the doctrine of two spheres as an expansion of the 
Farewell Address.  Whig President John Tyler completed Van Buren‟s circle in 
December 1842 when he declared that as the United States was “Carefully 
abstaining from interference in all questions exclusively referring themselves to 
the political interests of Europe, we may be permitted to hope an equal exemption 
from the interference of European Governments in what relates to the States of 
the American continent.”41  Here in one sentence was the explicit enunciation of 
two spheres of interest, that of Europe and that of the “States of the American 
continent.” 
 That the Tyler administration took an expanded view of American 
principles was not surprising given the president‟s overwhelming desire to annex 
Texas and that his first secretary of state was Daniel Webster.  Webster 
considered himself to be a true disciple of Washington and had been one of the 
only members of Congress to actively defend the Monroe Doctrine during the 
Panama debate.  He repeatedly demonstrated a broader understanding of 
American interest and of Washington‟s Farewell Address, a fact exemplified by 
his approach to Texas.  When annexation was raised in 1836 and 1837, he had 
been adamantly opposed to it, but unlike many others who shared this view, he 
still cared deeply about Texas‟s political situation.  Writing to Nicholas Biddle in 
September 1838, he expressed his relief that Texas had formally withdrawn its 
annexation request, describing it as “an event, eminently favorable to both 
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countries.”  He sincerely hoped that Texas would be “able to maintain her 
position” as an independent nation, given that “Any connexion with a European 
State, so close as to make her dependent on that State, or to identify her interests 
with the interests of such State,” would be “greatly unfortunate for us.”  The 
significance of this letter for Webster‟s understanding of American foreign policy 
can be seen in his suggestion that Biddle “remember the strong opinion, expressed 
by Mr. Monroe, that the U.S. could not consent to the recolinization [sic] of those 
portions of this Continent, which had severed the ties, binding them to a European 
connexion, & formed free & independent governments for themselves; or to the 
establishment of the European Colonies, in America.  The spirit, & reason, of 
these sentiments, would lead us to regard with just fear, & therefore with just 
jealousy, any connexions between our near American neighbours, & the powerful 
states of Europe, except those of friendly & useful commercial intercourse.” Here 
was, in 1838, the application of both the doctrine of two spheres and the non-
colonization principle to Texas.  It was clear, though, that he understood both 
principles in their original context as an expansion of the Farewell Address and 
not for how they were treated in Congress in 1826.  Webster wanted Texas to 
“keep herself free from all particular European connexion” and urged that 
“whatever aid can be furnished to her, by individuals, or corporations, in the U. 
States, in the present state of her affairs, to enable her to maintain a truly 
independent & national character, would tend to promote the welfare of the U. 
States as well as of Texas herself.”42  Stated more succinctly, “I go for our 
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America – free as possible from all European entangling connexions.”43  This was 
the crux of Webster‟s view, that the Monroe Doctrine was being redeployed as a 
means of protecting U.S. interests by preserving Texan independence. 
 With more than just Texas, which was not his primary concern while he 
was secretary of state, Webster brought this understanding of American principles 
with him into the State Department.  Two episodes in particular stand out as 
deserving brief consideration.  The first stemmed from the completion of the 
Treaty of Washington with Great Britain in August 1842.  The treaty, also known 
as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, settled the U.S.-Canadian border from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains, and most notably the border of Maine.  
Article 8 of the treaty contained provisions for suppressing the international slave 
trade on the high seas, especially along the coast of Africa.  Lewis Cass, a 
Democrat from Michigan and the U.S. minister to France, issued a strong protest 
to Webster regarding Article 8 that stepped off an extended trans-Atlantic debate 
over the meaning and direction of U.S. foreign policy and specifically George 
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Washington‟s Farewell Address.  The editors of Webster‟s diplomatic papers 
framed the debate as hinging on Webster‟s and Cass‟s “respective interpretations 
of the basic American foreign policy of isolationism.  Webster‟s views seem to 
have been derived from Washington‟s Farewell Address . . . ; Cass seems to have 
relied more on Thomas Jefferson‟s „entangling alliances with none‟ inaugural 
message.”44  In other words, Webster was guided by his expanded view of the 
Farewell Address, while Cass endorsed the Jeffersonian reconceptualization. 
 Cass saw Article 8, “by which we might be pledged to concur, with [Great 
Britain] in measures for the suppression of the Slave Trade,” as representing a 
departure “from our former principle of avoiding European combinations upon 
subjects not American,” and was critical of Webster for agreeing to it.45  Webster 
was taken aback by Cass‟s letter, which he received “as a sort of protest, or 
remonstrance, in the form of an official despatch, against a transaction of the 
Government to which you were not a party, in which you had no agency 
whatever, and for the results of which you were no way answerable.”  On the 
question of American principles, Webster argued that the United States had not 
“departed in this treaty, in the slightest degree, from their former principles of 
avoiding European combinations upon subjects not American, because the 
abolition of the African Slave Trade is an American subject, as emphatically as it 
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is an European subject.”46  As far as Webster was concerned, American interests 
extended across the Atlantic Ocean to seeing the illegal slave trade stopped.  This 
truly was a more expansive view of American interests and principles.  Cass 
fundamentally disagreed with Webster‟s interpretation, arguing that 
“combinations of this kind are among the „entangling alliances‟ against which the 
great statesman, whose exposition of our Constitution will go down to posterity 
with the instrument itself, warned his Countrymen.”47  Cass later expanded on this 
point, adding that “our duties can be fully performed without any European 
combination, and that such a mutual arrangement is injurious and violates one of 
the articles of our political faith.”48  If the United States could accomplish the 
same goal without committing itself to another power, it should do so, especially 
when the cost was the abandonment of the nation‟s principles.  This was 
ultimately the last word in the debate between Webster and Cass, as no concrete 
resolution was achieved; but the debate‟s significance lies not in any conclusion 
but in the competing interpretations of American interests and principles it 
expressed. 
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 The second episode of note from Webster‟s secretaryship dealt with the 
Sandwich, or Hawaiian Islands.  Representatives of the Hawaiian government had 
been dispatched to the United States at the end of 1842 to seek a formal 
recognition of the islands as an independent nation.  While Webster and President 
Tyler deemed recognition unnecessary, the secretary of state did declare to the 
representatives that “The United States . . . are more interested in the fate of the 
Islands and of their government, than any other Nation can be; and this 
consideration induces the President to be quite willing to declare . . . that the 
government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought 
either to take possession of the Islands as a conquest or for the purpose of 
colonization; and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the 
existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of 
commerce.”49  Less than two weeks later, in what some historians have labeled 
the Tyler Doctrine, the president reiterated and even strengthened this position by 
declaring to Congress that Hawaii, being “Far remote from the dominions of 
European powers,” and given its “near approach to this continent and the 
intercourse which American vessels have with it,” should be respected.  It “could 
not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by 
another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of 
the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government.”50  Where 
Webster made abstract references to other powers, Tyler specifically aimed his 
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declaration at Europe.  Both men extended the American sphere of influence and 
self-interest to include Hawaii.  The doctrine of two spheres had been reiterated 
and now it was being expanded. 
 
The Return of Texas 
 His Doctrine aside, Tyler‟s most significant contribution to the evolution 
of American principles of foreign policy was brought about by his obsession with 
the annexation of Texas.  From the moment he took office upon William Henry 
Harrison‟s death in 1841, it became his primary objective while president, but it 
was not until the end of 1843 that he took his first step.  In his third annual 
message to Congress, Tyler boldly extended the U.S. sphere of interest to include 
Texas.  With Mexico still waging a war against that nation in an attempt to 
resubjugate it, Tyler claimed that “Our own interests are involved in the matter, 
since, however neutral may be our course of policy, we can not hope to escape the 
effects of a spirit of jealousy on the part of both of the powers.  Nor can this 
Government be indifferent to the fact that a warfare such as is waged between 
those two nations is calculated to weaken both powers and finally to render them 
– and especially the weaker of the two – the subjects of interference on the part of 
stronger and more powerful nations.”  Such interference would surely be 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States.  We could not be expected 
quietly to permit any such interference to our disadvantage.”  Given America‟s 
close and historic relationship with Texas, the United States was “bound by every 
consideration of interest as well as of sympathy to see that she shall be left free to 
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act, especially in regard to her domestic affairs, unawed by force and unrestrained 
by the policy or views of other countries.”51  On one level Tyler was simply 
extending the same protection to Texas as he had to Hawaii, but given the 
precarious position of both Texas and Mexico, the seemingly imminent threat of 
European intervention, and the impact that this could have on U.S. interests, it is 
curious that he would not extend the same protections, even if just rhetorically, to 
Mexico.  In reality, he was using the doctrine of two spheres to expedite the 
American acquisition of Texas; by the time he had made this pronouncement, the 
United States was already negotiating a treaty of annexation with that country. 
 Tyler‟s logic in extending American protection over Texas in this manner 
was two-fold.  First, he sought to ward off European interference before 
annexation could be achieved.  The interest at stake for the United States was not 
the larger implications of European interference in American affairs, but the 
potential loss of Texas.  More than this, the administration was particularly 
concerned with Great Britain and recent rumors that it was going to exert its 
efforts to see slavery abolished in Texas (and ultimately in the United States as 
well).  John C. Calhoun, Tyler‟s secretary of state from February 1844 forward, 
was one of the leading advocates of the immediate need to annex Texas to stave 
off British abolitionism.  Writing to the British minister to the United States, 
Richard Pakenham, in April 1844, he explained that “So long as Great Britain 
confined her policy to the abolition of slavery in her own possessions and 
colonies, no other country has a right to complain. . . .  But when she goes 
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beyond, and avows it as her settled policy, and the object of her constant 
exertions, to abolish it throughout the world, she makes it the duty of all other 
countries, whose safety or prosperity may be endangered by her policy, to adopt 
such measures as they may deem necessary for their protection.”52  In the case of 
the United States, the appropriate measure was the annexation of Texas.   
 While Tyler was concerned with preventing European interference, his 
second objective in extending the doctrine of two spheres over Texas in the 
manner that he did was to introduce the specter of European interference as a 
means of spurring congressional action.  When the annexation treaty was 
submitted to the Senate in April 1844, Tyler once again raised the threat of losing 
Texas to Europe, warning that it was “inevitable, that if the boon now tendered be 
rejected Texas will seek for the friendship of others.  In contemplating such a 
contingency it can not be overlooked that the United States are already almost 
surrounded by the possessions of European powers.”  If the United States did not 
act, Europe would.  In this message, Tyler also used the doctrine of two spheres to 
justify the very act of annexation, arguing that “Our right to receive the rich grant 
tendered by Texas is perfect, and this Government should not, having due respect 
either to its own honor or its own interests, permit its course of policy to be 
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interrupted by the interference of other powers, even if such interference were 
threatened.  The question is one purely American.”53 
 When the Senate rejected the treaty in early June, citing concerns over 
slavery, sectionalism, and the real potential of war with Mexico, Tyler remained 
undeterred.  He sent the treaty to the House of Representatives with a message 
reiterating the doctrine of two spheres, apparently in an effort to put at ease those 
concerned for the European response to annexation.  Somewhat ironically, Tyler 
was using the threat of European interference to justify annexation, while 
simultaneously arguing that Europe likely would not interfere because of the 
doctrine of two spheres.
54
  At the end of 1844 he once again argued for America‟s 
“direct interest” in the disposition of Texas and that the ongoing war between that 
power and Mexico “subjected both . . . to the interference of other powers, which . 
. . might eventuate the most serious injury to the United States.”  Should the 
United States accomplish annexation, he did not “apprehend any serious 
complaint from any other quarter; no sufficient ground exists for such complaint.  
We should interfere in no respect with the rights of any other nation. . . .  We seek 
no conquest made by war. No intrigue will have been resorted to or acts of 
diplomacy essayed to accomplish the annexation of Texas.  Free and independent 
herself, she asks to be received into our Union. It is a question for our own 
decision whether she shall be received or not.”55  Influenced in no small part by 
the election of James K. Polk to the presidency on an expansionist platform, in the 
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last days of Tyler‟s presidency Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the 
annexation of Texas, a measure sanctioned by Tyler on his last day in office.  By 
the end of 1845 Texas had been admitted as the twenty-eighth state of the Union. 
 By the time Democrat James K. Polk assumed the presidency in March 
1845 American principles had undergone a sea-change.  What began in 1840 as 
the natural expansion of the definition of American interest and interpretation of 
American principle was perverted into something much more aggressive and 
insidious once Tyler set his sights on Texas.  The doctrine of two spheres, as 
Tyler came to define it, became a tool to undermine that declaration‟s true 
meaning.  Tyler‟s repeated assertions that Europe had no right to complain of U.S. 
dealings with Texas was correct (if naïve), but it disregarded the right of Latin 
America, and Mexico in particular, which still laid claim to Texas, to protest.  
Tyler sacrificed America‟s relationship with Mexico and jeopardized relations 
with Latin America and Europe for the short-term gain of the more immediate 
acquisition of Texas.  Even if one believed that European intervention in Texas or 
Mexico was imminent, thus necessitating a U.S. response, the most troubling 
aspect of Tyler‟s use of the doctrine of two spheres was his view of what that 
response should be.  For John Quincy Adams and James Monroe that response 
could only be determined once specific action had been taken; for Tyler it was to 
preemptively annex Texas to prevent such intervention from taking place.  When 
one considers how widely doubted European intervention actually was, it makes 
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Tyler‟s actions and rhetoric all the most suspect.56  Most significantly from 1843 
to 1845, for all of the discussion of American interests and American principles, 
virtually none of its was framed with reference to Washington‟s Farewell 
Address, largely because there was no way to square annexation with its larger 
ideals.  Whether motivated by the slave interest (as many proponents of 
annexation were), or concern for his personal legacy, Tyler had moved the United 
States away from strict adherence to Washington‟s maxims in its international 
relations. 
 
James K. Polk and the Monroe Doctrine 
 With Texas secured as part of the Union, the expansionist Polk could turn 
his attention to the vast reaches of territory along the north- and southwestern 
borders of the United States, most notably Oregon and California.  Two months 
before he delivered his first annual address, Polk relayed in his diary that “He 
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would maintain all our rights, would take bold and strong ground, and reaffirm 
Mr. Monroe‟s ground against permitting any European power to plant or establish 
any new colony on the North American continent.”57  The doctrine of two 
spheres, if only in principle and not in name, had been used by Tyler, and now 
Polk would revive the non-colonization principle.  Three days later he clarified 
that “in reasserting Mr. Monroe‟s doctrine, I had California & the fine bay of San 
Francisco as much in view as Oregon.”  He believed that Great Britain had its 
sights on California and he wanted to make clear to the rest of the world “that the 
people of the U. S. would not willingly permit California to pass into the 
possession of any new colony planted by Great Britain or any foreign 
monarchy.”58  Unlike when they were first declared by Monroe and Adams two 
decades earlier, these principles would be reasserted not in defense of any larger 
ideal, but to preserve unimpaired America‟s ability to expand territorially across 
the continent.  Secretary of State James Buchanan echoed Polk‟s concerns in 
writing to the U.S. consul at Monterey, California.  He stated that the United 
States “could not view with indifference the transfer of California to Great Britain 
or any other European Power.  The system of colonization by foreign monarchies 
on the North American continent must and will be resisted by the United States.”  
Buchanan urged the consul to “warn the Government and people of California of 
the danger of such an interference to their peace and prosperity,” and “to inspire 
them with a jealousy of European dominion, and to arouse in their bosoms that 
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love of liberty and independence so natural to the American Continent.”59  Polk 
and Buchanan embraced American principles, but a specific view of those 
principles that served their larger territorial ambitions; the diplomacy and patience 
that had marked previous administrations were largely being replaced by 
rationalization and lust. 
 In instructions to James Slidell, the new minister to Mexico, Buchanan 
expressed the idea that “The nations on the continent of America have interests 
peculiar to themselves.”  As he phrased it, “The interests and the independence of 
these sister nations require that they should establish and maintain an American 
system of policy for their own protection and security, entirely distinct from that 
which has so long prevailed in Europe.  To tolerate any interference on the part of 
European sovereigns with controversies in America; to permit them to apply the 
worn-out dogma of the balance of power to the free States of this continent; and 
above all, to suffer them to establish new Colonies of their own, intermingled 
with our free Republics, would be to make, to the same extent, a voluntary 
sacrifice of our independence.”  In addition to such principled ends, Buchanan 
and Polk also authorized Slidell to offer up to twenty-five million dollars for the 
purchase of California.
60
  Mexico declined to receive Slidell, thus preventing a 
negotiated acquisition of California, but the more important implication of 
Buchanan‟s letters was that the United States was once again pursuing the 
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expansion and international adoption of the Monroe Doctrine.  There was 
certainly a great irony to the fact that Polk and Buchanan had been among the 
most ardent opponents of the Panama mission in 1826, yet were now responsible 
for pursuing the same objects in Mexico.  Ironies aside, Polk‟s reassertion of the 
Monroe Doctrine in December 1845 was thus not just an abstract declaration of 
principles, but was part of a much larger effort to see the continent unite behind 
the ideal of keeping the European powers out of American affairs so as to best 
defend the (territorial) interests of the United States.  In effect, he wanted the 
Mexican government to adopt principles that would facilitate his government in 
taking the California territory away from it. 
 In January 1846 Senator Robert Allen, a Democrat from Ohio, sought to 
give legislative sanction to the spirit of Polk‟s first annual message to Congress 
by introducing a joint resolution “declaratory of the principles by which the 
Government of the United States will be governed in regard to the interposition of 
the Powers of Europe in the political affairs of America.”  Linking the need for 
Polk‟s message with the “manifestations of a disposition by certain Powers of 
Europe to interfere in the political arrangements of this continent, with a view to 
the enforcement of the European principle of the „balance of power,‟” the 
announcement of “the counter principle of non-intervention . . . was demanded by 
the manifest hazard to which such interference would inevitably expose the 
relations of peace now subsisting between the Old World and the New.”  The 
resolution then declared “to the civilized world the unalterable resolution of the 
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United States to adhere to and to enforce the principle, that any effort of the 
Powers of Europe to intermeddle in the social organization or political 
arrangements of the Independent nations of America, or further to extend the 
European system of Government upon this continent by the establishment of new 
Colonies, would be incompatible with the independent existence of the nations, 
and dangerous to the liberties of the people of America, and therefore would 
incur, as by the right of self-preservation it would justify, the prompt resistance of 
the United States.”61  Allen was essentially seeking legislative sanction of this 
more aggressive version of the Monroe Doctrine; sanction that the original never 
received. 
 John C. Calhoun, returned to the Senate after his brief tenure as secretary 
of state, was among the first to stand up and object to Allen‟s resolution.  Calhoun 
was uniquely qualified to offer insight on the resolution, as he was not only the 
most recent head of the State Department, but he had also been a member of 
James Monroe‟s cabinet when the annual message that became known as the 
Monroe Doctrine was formulated and debated.  He declared that “No man could 
view with stronger feelings of indignation than he did the improper interference of 
the European Powers with the nations of this continent.”  That was not the 
question put before the Senate in Allen‟s resolution, though.  Instead it asked 
“whether we should take under our guardianship the whole family of American 
States, and pledge ourselves to extend to them our protection against all foreign 
aggression.”  He questioned if the United States had “arrived at that state of 
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maturity when we could wisely and effectually do so?  Was this to be the 
understood and settled policy of our Government?  If so, it would become 
necessary to pursue a different course from that we have heretofore adopted.”  
Given that the resolution expressed the same sentiments contained in Polk‟s 
message, he wondered “Why should we not, for the present, be satisfied with this 
announcement?”  Looking back to Monroe‟s original declarations, he noted that 
“it had been followed by no action on the part of our Government,” and 
questioned why a greater step was warranted in the present case?
62
  Calhoun was 
directly challenging Allen on the grounds that his resolution represented a 
departure from America‟s long-standing principles. 
 Allen responded that “should Congress remain silent, that silence would 
be a negation of what the President has laid down – a declaration to all Europe 
that, as far as this principle is in question, it is not recognized by the people of the 
United States, so far as the legislative branch is concerned.”  In Calhoun‟s mind, 
Allen was missing the point.  As he put it, “It was the part of wisdom to select 
wise ends in a wise manner.  No wise man, with a full understanding of the 
subject, would pledge himself, by declaration, to do that which was beyond the 
power of execution, and without mature reflection as to the consequences.  There 
would be no dignity in it.  True dignity consists in making no declaration which 
we are not prepared to maintain.  If we make the declaration, we ought to be 
prepared to carry it into effect against all opposition.”63  Since the United States 
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was not going to defend both American continents against European intervention, 
it should not make a grand declaration that it would, and it should not sanction it 
by the vote of the legislature.  In a certain respect, Calhoun‟s remarks were an 
indictment of the original Monroe Doctrine as much as its reiteration. 
 The resolution was tabled until the end of January, when Allen called it 
back up and Lewis Cass entered the debate.  Cass saw the resolution both for its 
larger significance and its practical bearing on America‟s more immediate future.  
Looking back to Monroe‟s declaration in 1823, he argued that as “no response 
was made to it by Congress, . . . it has therefore remained a dead letter upon the 
history of our intercourse with other nations.”  In the present case, Congress could 
not afford to ignore Polk‟s “assertion of a great principle – of an everlasting 
principle – of the right of the independent nations upon this hemisphere to be free 
from the control of the powers of Europe, and an assertion by the oldest of the 
family of nations upon this continent, made by one for the benefit of all.”  As if 
taking a page from Polk‟s diary, Cass cited the British threat on America‟s 
borders and declared that “Oregon and California, if gained, and Mexico 
influenced, if not ruled, would complete the circle, and would place our 
boundaries everywhere in contact with the territories of a great power.”  
Expressing a train of thought that would gain great momentum in succeeding 
years, he argued that “We are young, but we are every day becoming stronger as 
we become older.  Time is dealing well by us.  What we now want is to prevent 
any future pretence that by our acquiescence we have recognized this new-fangled 
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doctrine of interference.  Let us say to the world, we have no lot nor part in it.”  
The only way to give effect and significance to Polk‟s declarations – the only way 
to protect them from becoming “as barren as was that of Mr. Monroe” – was for 
Congress to sanction them.
64
 
 For Allen, Cass, and Calhoun, the core disagreement boiled down to the 
implications of a broad and general declaration for American policy and 
American principles.  Allen believed that “interference should cease; it must 
cease; and they might as well tell Europe calmly and mildly in the form of those 
resolutions, at the beginning, as by a declaration of war.  The sovereigns of 
Europe could not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of this continent.”65  Cass 
declared that “The principle for which I contend is this: by such a declaration as 
that contemplated in the resolution, we would merely place our protest on record, 
not being thereby bound to any definite course of action, but being left free to 
maintain neutrality or actively engage in enforcing the principle, as we might see 
fit.”66  Calhoun fundamentally disagreed, and asked “would it not be better to wait 
for the emergency in which we would have sufficient interest to interfere, and 
sufficient power to make that interference influential? . . .  Will mere vaporing 
bravado have any practical effect?  No. . . .  We must meet each particular case by 
itself, and according to its own merits, always taking care not to assert our rights 
                                                 
64
 Lewis Cass, 26 January 1846, in Ibid., 240-41.  
65
 Robert Allen, 26 January 1846, in Ibid., 246. 
66
 Lewis Cass, 26 January 1846, in Ibid., 245. 
  
287 
 
until we feel ourselves able to sustain our assertions.”67  To put this another way, 
Calhoun was arguing for the preservation of the freedom to act as circumstances 
would dictate, which was one of the core premises of the Farewell Address.  The 
reason many Americans had backed away from the Monroe Doctrine and 
condemned the Panama mission in the first place was that they were seen as 
committing the United States to foreign policies that might ultimately not serve 
American interests.  By going back on this idea if these resolutions were passed, 
the nation would be jeopardizing its future safety and security and violating the 
spirit of both the Farewell and the Jeffersonian reconceptualization.
68
  The 
resolutions were ultimately referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
were never seen again. 
 The debate on Allen‟s resolutions provides an important window on the 
state of foreign policy thought as the nation approached a crossroads.  Within a 
few months, the Oregon Treaty would be concluded, finally bringing to an end 
America‟s long-standing territorial disputes with Great Britain, and war would be 
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declared on Mexico.  If the annexation of Texas represented a step away from 
Washington‟s Farewell Address and its expansion of the doctrine of two spheres, 
the Mexican War threatened their complete abandonment by at least some 
Americans.  A war started under false pretenses, and widely recognized at the 
time as being fought for territorial aggrandizement, clearly suggested a much 
more aggressive (and divisive) definition of American interest.  The prosecution 
of the war itself is less important here than are the impacts it had on American 
priorities and principles.  Most notable in this vein were events in the Mexican 
state of Yucatan, which had declared its neutrality in the war and grabbed the 
attention of the president and Congress in early 1848.  In his diary entry for 7 
March, Polk made note of “an application from an agent of the Department of 
Yucatan in Mexico, setting forth that a savage and cruel war was now waging by 
the Indians of Yucatan against the white race, and . . . requesting that the U. S. 
would afford assistance to the white population to save them from destruction.”  
Secretary of State Buchanan “earnestly urged” that ten thousand pounds of gun 
powder immediately be shipped to the whites of Yucatan to facilitate their 
defense, but Polk countered that “the power [gun powder] proposed to be 
introduced into Yucatan might be transported to other parts of Mexico and be 
used in the war against the forces of the U. S.”69  Polk needed assurances that this 
would not happen before he would proceed. 
 Yucatan largely disappeared from the cabinet‟s view until the end of April 
when word reached Washington that “the Gov. of Yucatan asks the aid of the U. 
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S., & states that the same aid had been asked from the Governments of Great 
Britain & Spain, & that the Yucacatnas [sic] were ready to surrender their country 
& the sovereignty over it to any Government which would protect & save them 
from extermination.”  This changed the question in Polk‟s mind, as he “could 
never agree to see Yucatan pass into the hands of a foreign monarchy to be 
possessed and colonized by them.”  He instructed Buchanan to draft a message to 
Congress “placing the interposition of the U. S. upon the ground that it would be 
dangerous to us, and a violation of our settled policy, to permit either Great 
Britain or Spain to possess & colonize the country, and to [prevent] this the U. S. 
ought to afford the aid asked.”70  Four days later, after perfecting the message, he 
submitted it to Congress.  It presented “a case of human suffering and misery 
which can not fail to excite the sympathies of all civilized nations. . . .  [T]he 
Indians of Yucatan are waging a war of extermination against the white race. . . .  
The inhabitants, panic stricken and destitute of arms, are flying before their 
savage pursuers toward the coast, and their expulsion from their country or their 
extermination would seem to be inevitable unless they can obtain assistance from 
abroad.”  Given this dire situation, the “constituted authorities” in Yucatan 
“implored the aid of this Government to save them from destruction, offering in 
case this should be granted to transfer the „dominion and sovereignty of the 
peninsula‟ to the United States.”  To that point Polk was framing a case for 
humanitarian aid, yet he was quick to point out the similar offers made to Spain 
and Britain, and declared that “according to our established policy, we could not 
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consent to a transfer of this „dominion and sovereignty‟ either to Spain, Great 
Britain, or any other European power.”  Concerns for “Our own security” required 
“that the established policy thus announced should guide our conduct, and this 
applies with great force to the peninsula of Yucatan.”71 
 Given the mix of humanitarian and security concerns expressed by Polk, it 
was no surprise that the resulting debate moved in many different directions.  
Generally speaking, responses were divided between those who looked at 
Yucatan as an isolated question and those who placed it into the larger scope of 
American foreign policy and principles.  In the first group, many were swayed by 
the humanitarian concerns, while others feared the political impact a military 
entry into Yucatan would have on relations with Mexico with the war still not 
fully resolved.
72
  It is the second focus of the debate that warrants greater 
consideration.  A not-inconsiderable number of senators believed that the United 
States, fresh off a convincing military triumph, now had an obligation to assert 
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itself more actively on the world stage in defense of American principles as well 
as liberal, democratic, and republican principles whenever and wherever they 
should come under attack.  In the case of Yucatan, they argued, American 
intervention would not only prevent a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but it 
would also uphold the right of those in power in Yucatan to determine their own 
form of government against European intrusion.  Others strenuously argued that 
the United States had no right and no authority to intervene in Yucatan, regardless 
of how it was rationalized, and they pointed to the great irony that Polk was using 
the Monroe Doctrine and its principles of non-intervention to justify U.S. 
intervention in Yucatan; in other words, intervention to uphold non-intervention. 
 In many respects the debate that ensued was but a continuation of that of 
January 1846 over the Allen resolution.
73
  As soon as Polk‟s message was read, 
John C. Calhoun immediately took the floor to express his disquietude with the 
proposition that the United States should intervene in Yucatan, especially when 
justified by the Monroe Doctrine.  He understood Polk to be asserting “the 
principle as deduced from Mr. Monroe‟s declaration, that when the people of any 
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portion of this continent is placed in the condition in which Yucatan is, and either 
party should be compelled to apply to us for protection, we should interpose to 
protect them, to prevent the interference of England, or some other foreign 
Power.”  This was “A broad and dangerous principle, truly!  It goes far beyond 
Mr. Monroe‟s declaration.”74   
 In spite of Calhoun‟s objections, Polk‟s message was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, which a week later reported a bill authorizing 
the president to “take temporary military occupation of Yucatan.”75  Debate over 
the bill consumed much of the Senate‟s time and attention over the next two 
weeks, but it was once again the remarks of Lewis Cass and John C. Calhoun that 
epitomized the arguments on each side.
76
  Cass focused on the Monroe Doctrine 
in an attempt to demonstrate that its principles fully supported the proposed 
intervention in Yucatan.  He reminded the Senate that the “declaration of Mr. 
Monroe . . . contemplated no interference with European settlements on this 
continent.  They merely looked to a prevention of the reduction of any of the free 
                                                 
74
 John C. Calhoun, 29 April 1848, in Ibid., Appendix, 590-91. 
75
 4 May 1848, in Ibid., 727. 
76
 The remarks of John J. Crittenden of Kentucky also deserve brief consideration given the 
applicability of the sentiments they expressed to future American conflicts.  He saw the proposed 
measure as being hypocritical as it was a “violation of the principle of intervention which we laid 
down for the observance of all other nations.”  Once the United States had violated this principle, 
“Other nations would be induced to create slight pretexts, on which they would justify themselves 
in following our example,” and which could lead to “a slobbering and protracted war everywhere.”  
Furthermore, if the U.S. military was authorized to enter Yucatan, no one had discussed how or 
when it would leave.  Crittenden strongly disliked that there “were no fixed limits to the 
occupation in the bill.  How long may it be before the vengeance of these Indians will be satisfied?  
How long will it be before these fifty thousand white people would be able to make head against 
their enemies?  We must make a permanent military settlement there to effect any beneficial 
result.”  Crittenden objected to American entry into a war in violation of its long-standing 
principles and without a clearly defined exit strategy.  John J. Crittenden, 5 May 1848, in Ibid., 
730. 
  
293 
 
States of America to European dependence.”  With this in mind, he saw the 
“policy of our country” as being “not to interfere with other Powers, but to 
prevent other Powers from interfering with us,” and to “act promptly and 
vigorously when we see any evidence of a desire on the part of European Powers 
to interfere with us.”  In Cass‟s estimation, “The war with Mexico . . . placed us in 
a position to enforce the policy laid down by Mr. Monroe.  If we had not obtained 
a foot of land in Mexico, the war would be worth all that it has cost us, in the 
glory which it had shed around our country.  No European Power will now 
venture an interference with us.”  As all of this related to Yucatan, Cass pointed to 
the fact that Britain had already “stretched her powerful arm so as to touch every 
cape and headland on every ocean,” and recent intelligence indicated that there 
were already “four companies of British artillery in the southern portion of 
Yucatan.”  He did not know “what course England would pursue, but it was our 
duty to be on our guard against any interference which may be injurious to our 
interests.  When she lays the lion‟s paw on Yucatan, it will be difficult to displace 
it.”77  As a result, the United States had an obligation to Yucatan, to its own 
principles, and to its own security to intervene before Great Britain could.  Cass 
envisioned a world where the United States lived and acted much more outside its 
own borders than had previously been contemplated by those who attached 
themselves to George Washington‟s principles of non-interference in the concerns 
of other nations. 
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 Rather than seeing the Yucatan measure as providing an opportunity for 
the United States to achieve a positive good, Calhoun saw it as “pregnant with 
consequences, both near and remote, which may deepyl [sic] affect the peace and 
interests of this country.”  He saw a great value in the doctrine of two spheres 
when it was enunciated by Monroe in 1823, but argued that it belonged “to the 
history of that day” and had ceased to be applicable shortly thereafter.  Calhoun 
also rejected the non-colonization principle, but for different reasons.  On the 
most basic level, British intervention in Yucatan would not technically be 
colonization – Yucatan had requested aid and Britain would be providing it.  
British intervention (or American, for that matter) could lead to colonization, but 
was not a necessary result.  Calhoun also voiced fundamental problems with the 
association of the non-colonization principle with the Monroe Doctrine in the first 
place, as “it never became a subject of deliberation in the cabinet. . . .  It 
originated entirely with Mr. Adams.”  Not having been submitted to the cabinet, it 
lacked, in Calhoun‟s words, the “precision and clearness” that marked the fully 
vetted doctrine of two spheres, and he had grave objections to its perpetuation.
78
 
 Looking beyond the specific Yucatan question, Calhoun objected to the 
continuing use of the Monroe Doctrine as a part of U.S. foreign policy.  Its tenets 
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were “declarations, nothing more; declarations, announcing to the world that we 
should regard certain acts of interposition of the Allied Powers as dangerous to 
our peace and our safety.”  The Doctrine did not contain “one word . . . in 
reference to resistance” to European intervention, but this did not stop President 
Polk from holding forth “these declarations as imposing a solemn duty on him as 
Chief Magistrate to resist on all occasions; and not only to resist, but to judge on 
the measure of that resistance.”  More troubling, Polk had described the Doctrine 
as being “the settled policy of this country,” to which Calhoun retorted that 
“Declarations are not policy, and cannot become settled policy.”  He surmised 
that Polk “must mean that it has become the settled policy of this country to resist 
what these declarations refer to; and to resist, if need be, by an appeal to arms.”  
He wondered, though, “Is this the fact?  Has there been one instance in which 
these declarations have been carried into effect by resistance?  If there be, let it be 
pointed out.  Have there not been innumerable instances in which they have not 
been applied?  Certainly.”  The best evidence in support of Calhoun‟s point was 
that “these declarations, under this broad interpretation, were disavowed entirely 
three years afterwards by the vote of the Republican party, when the 
administration of Mr. Adams endeavored to carry them out practically, by sending 
ministers to the Congress at Panama.”  This was yet another example of the 
memory of the Panama debate being of the failure of the administration and a 
rejection of its principles rather than of the passage of the mission.  Lending 
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further credence to Calhoun‟s point was the fact that the Doctrine had to be 
reintroduced by Polk in the first place. 
 Calhoun concluded that the Monroe Doctrine “is not, and never has been, 
the established policy of the country.  And if it should ever become so, to the wide 
extent to which these declarations have been interpreted to go, our peace would 
ever be disturbed; the gates of our Janus would ever stand open; wars would never 
cease.”  He believed that “What the President has asserted in this case is not a 
principle belonging to these declarations; it is a principle which, in his 
misconception, he attempts to graft upon them, but which has an entirely different 
meaning and tendency. . . .  It goes infinitely and dangerously beyond Mr. 
Monroe‟s declaration.”79  Calhoun saw the Monroe Doctrine, especially when 
framed as aggressively as Polk had presented it, as being dangerous to American 
peace and safety, while Cass saw it as facilitating the defense of American 
security.  Calhoun was arguing for the maintenance of America‟s traditional 
principles as defined by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization of the Farewell 
Address, while Cass looked towards a foreign policy not limited by the overly 
restrictive “entangling alliances with none.”  All of the gnashing of teeth over 
intervention in Yucatan proved to be for naught, as it was announced on 17 May 
that a treaty had been agreed to between the whites and Indians and the war in 
Yucatan was over.
80
  Much as Tyler had with the doctrine of two spheres and 
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Texas, Polk was using the Monroe Doctrine to legitimize preemptive intervention 
in international affairs.  More importantly, the debate over Yucatan revealed a 
growing tension in a newly emerging debate over the Farewell Address between 
those who asserted its continuing importance and those who believed that the 
United States had outgrown it. 
 
The Nadir of the Farewell Address 
 While the Yucatan debate acted as an important, albeit abortive, epilogue 
to the Mexican War, the more significant long-term impact of the war was the 
exacerbated sectional tensions that thrust slavery permanently forward as not just 
a dangerously divisive issue but as one that weighed on the consideration of all 
other questions, domestic and foreign.  Slavery and the sectional crisis are so 
important in this context because they threatened and weakened the Union of the 
states Washington placed at the heart of his Farewell Address.  Indeed, throughout 
the 1840s, while the Address continued to be publicly celebrated, it was 
increasingly clear that Unionist concerns and a growing ambivalence about 
America‟s foreign policy principles were having an impact.  The Farewell and its 
principles were still praised, but more as a means of celebrating Washington than 
for their own lasting value.  At annual birthday ceremonies held at Georgetown 
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the assumed aggressive policy of England.  Now, if that be the consideration on which the bill was 
upon us, why postpone it?”  The war in Yucatan may have been over, but “There is no evidence at 
all that the designs of England, if they ever existed, have been abandoned. . . .  The argument of 
humanity has, I understand, been given up; the argument of policy still remains.”  John Niles, 17 
May 1848, in Ibid., Appendix, 641. 
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College in 1842, Joseph Johnson of Mississippi described the Farewell as 
containing “the golden treasure of wisdom, adorned with a perspicuity of thought 
and force and reasoning, which will do everlasting honor to the heart and intellect 
of its author; an address which has justly been celebrated to the present time, and 
will continue to be held up to our admiration as long as wisdom finds its admirers 
and patriotism is regarded with veneration.”  Speaking at the same ceremony, 
John M. Heard of Maryland urged that “it be frequently rehearsed; every 
statesman, connected in any manner with government, should make it the object 
of his most serious attention; like the name of its illustrious author, it should be 
the first thing lisped by every babe of America.”81  C. P. Krauth, speaking at 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in 1846, warned that “When we as a people shall cease 
to disregard [sic] the advice of our Washington, when a spirit different from that 
of his valedictory address shall prevail in our midst, when we trample upon the 
sacred truths which he inculcates, then may be written upon the Capitol of our 
Country, and all its ensigns, „the glory hath departed.‟”  He also recommended 
that Washington‟s “advice be pondered well; and as the last counsel of him whom 
all delight to honor, commending itself by its wisdom and excellence, adopted to 
produce the highest good to us and our posterity, we should give heed to it, the 
more earnest heed, lest at any time we let it slip.”82 
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 The following year in Albany, New York, William B. Sprague proclaimed 
Washington to have seen “with a prophet‟s eye; he wrote with a prophet‟s pen; 
and when we see how much more he knew of the future and how much wiser he 
was in providing for it, than other great men of his age, even the greatest, we are 
ready almost to say, without a figure, that he was a prophet indeed.”  He predicted 
that if the Farewell Address “be engraven on the memory and the heart of the 
young men of the nation, and till they shall have gone to their graves at least, 
there will be a wall of fire round about our liberties, which will be proof alike 
against treason and faction at home, and jealousy and tyranny abroad.”83  
Celebrations in the nation‟s capital in 1848 took on a somber tone when on 21 
February John Quincy Adams fell into a stupor at his desk in the House of 
Representatives, only to die two days later in the office of the Speaker of the 
House, Robert C. Winthrop.  That Fourth of July, in an oration originally intended 
to be delivered by Adams on Washington‟s birthday, during a ceremony 
commemorating the laying of the cornerstone of the Washington Monument, 
Winthrop urged that there had been no time “more important than at this moment 
where the two great leading principles of his policy should be remembered and 
cherished.”  First, was “the most complete, cordial, and indissoluble Union of the 
States; and, second, the most entire separation and disentanglement of our own 
country from all other countries.  Perfect union among ourselves, perfect 
neutrality towards others, and peace, peace, domestic peace and foreign peace, as 
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the result; this was the chosen and consummate policy of the Father of his 
Country.”84 
 As these passages demonstrate, public celebrations of Washington 
continued to place a high priority on the importance of his Farewell Address to 
America‟s future, but other contemporary sources reveal that there was less 
familiarity with or allegiance to Washington‟s maxims.  Given the progress of the 
United States and its foreign policy, the priorities of the nation‟s leaders, and the 
impact of decades of interpretation of the Farewell Address constricted by the 
Jeffersonian reconceptualization, it should come as little surprise that not all 
Americans saw the nation‟s destiny as being tied to Washington‟s principles.  
Writing to John C. Calhoun at the end of 1843, Secretary of State Abel Upshur 
argued that “a dictum of Washington‟s suited to our infant condition had induced 
our people to believe that we have no interest in progress of other nations.  But we 
should remember that the infant of that day has grown into a powerful 
commercial nation, whose interest[s] are diffused over every quarter of the globe, 
and that the purpose for which the federal Government was constituted was to 
protect those interests.”85  Upshur had clearly taken “entangling alliances with 
none” to its extreme.  Several years later President James K. Polk confided to his 
diary that “In my late message I was careful not to adopt or endorse all the 
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opinions of President Washington in his message in 1796, because I did not 
approve them.”86  Given his use of the Monroe Doctrine, this was no surprise. 
 In 1849, William Henry Trescot authored a pamphlet titled A Few 
Thoughts On the Foreign Policy of the United States, in which he argued that the 
United States had outgrown Washington and his Farewell Address.  As he put it, 
“It is true that at the commencement of our existence, with the caution of a nation 
at once wise and weak, we resolved to stand apart from the entanglements of 
European politics.  It is true that while every other vestige of his policy, has been 
trodden out by the press of new circumstances and strong necessities, the warning 
of Washington against foreign policy has been stereotyped into a political 
proverb.”  Fifty years later, the country was fundamentally changed, with evolved 
interests and capabilities.  Given that the United States “stands in such intimate 
relation to the colonial empires of the world, has it not a direct interest in their 
relation to each other; . . . has it not a right to be heard in all matters touching their 
mutual power?  Is it not time, that by some distinct and unequivocal 
manifestation, it should declare its intention to participate in the counsels of the 
world?  There is but one principle upon which American intervention in the 
international relations of Europe can be justified, but that so wide as to cover 
almost any interference; and it is this, that wherever the changes among European 
powers are such as to modify the respective weight of its colonial empires, we are 
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directly interested in the resulting balance of power.”87  This conception of the 
role the United States could and/or should play in the world was at the heart of the 
Yucatan debate and would continue at the heart of the struggle between those who 
desired to hold on to America‟s traditional principles and those who wanted to 
move in a bold new direction. 
 By 1850, Washington‟s Farewell Address occupied a somewhat different 
place in the larger American consciousness; it was still publicly celebrated but it 
had lost its universal meaning.  This was not only true with regards to foreign 
policy, but also, as was foreshadowed in the debate over Washington‟s remains, 
as it pertained to its Unionist sentiments.  A clash over the Farewell Address as a 
symbol of the Union took place in Congress in 1850 when Henry Clay introduced 
a resolution in the Senate to purchase the original manuscript of the Address, 
which was being put up for auction by the heirs of David C. Claypoole.
88
  As Clay 
put it when he addressed the Senate, “To say nothing of the nature and character 
of that address, who is there, sir, amidst the discordant and ungrateful sounds of 
disunion and discord which assail our ears in every part of this country, and in 
both halls of Congress – who is there that would not find refreshment and delight 
behind the Farewell Address of Washington to the people of this country?”89  
Many, including Daniel Webster, concurred in Clay‟s sentiments, but others 
questioned the necessity of the purchase.  James A. Pearce of Maryland, in 
                                                 
87
 William Henry Trescot, A Few Thoughts On the Foreign Policy of the United States 
(Charleston, [SC]: John Russell, 1849), 4, 14. 
88
 23 January 1850, in Cong. Globe, 31
st
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 220. 
89
 Henry Clay, 24 January 1850, in Ibid., 226.  
  
303 
 
remarks lasting less than a minute, expressed the idea four separate times that 
manuscripts of this sort were “valuable merely as relics.”90  Jefferson Davis of 
Mississippi questioned, “what is there so scared in the manuscripts of this 
Address?  It is known to have been the joint production of Washington and one, at 
least, of his Cabinet – not the emanation of his mind alone.  I feel no such respect 
as has been here expressed for it, and cannot perceive how this manuscript is to 
effect such happy results.”91  Solon Borland of Arkansas took offence that “the 
main object to be accomplished by the passage of this resolution is to reiterate 
what I have seen session after session, and what I think is disgraceful to many 
citizens of this country; that is, the disposition to speculate upon the patriotism of 
the country.”92   
 In the House of Representatives, Samuel W. Inge of Alabama struck a 
desolate tone, suggesting that “The glorious sentiments embodied by General 
Washington in his Farewell Address, had faded away.  These sentiments, which 
were so wisely, so patriotically expressed in that important paper had passed 
away, and were now lost sight of.  Does public opinion respond to the sentiments 
contained in that Address?  No.  There is no such response.  Instead of responding 
to the exhortations contained in that paper, our country throughout her whole 
extent is at this moment torn by dissensions, which threaten, in their progress and 
their termination, to tear down the existing fabric of our Government, and to 
destroy the most precious relic which has heretofore been preserved in the ark of 
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the Constitution.”93  Joseph R. Chandler of Pennsylvania disagreed with Inge‟s 
sentiment “that the spirit of this Address had departed among us.  He thought it 
was not dead, but sleeping, and he agreed . . . that the influence of this paper 
would reanimate it.”  He further “sincerely hoped . . . that we might all go 
together to the perusal of this Address, and emphatically dwell on that part which 
treats on the importance of preserving the Union, and the dangers which must 
result from its dissolution.”94  This debate over the physical Farewell Address and 
not its abstract principles encapsulated the ambiguous position it had come to 
occupy by mid-century.  For many it was still an enduring statement of American 
ideals, but for a vocal minority it was little more than a relic of the past. 
 The measure ultimately comfortably passed both houses of Congress, but 
by the time all political maneuvering had ceased it was too late.  On 12 February 
1850, Rev. Henry A. Boardman, a pastor from Philadelphia, acting on behalf of 
James Lenox of New York, purchased the manuscript for the sum of $2,300.
95
  
The loss of the Address because of petty and partisan disputes in Congress must 
surely have been seen as a bad omen by those who praised it as a symbol of the 
Union.  Over the previous quarter-century the Farewell Address had been held up 
as inviolable, its principles had been wisely expanded to give it lasting efficacy 
but also dismissed as being too narrow to meet America‟s new challenges and 
broadening interests.  As those expanded principles were perverted and turned 
into something unrecognizable, the Address was rendered little more than a tool 
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for the celebration of Washington.  Even as an important symbol of the Union, it 
was largely disregarded by many in the increasingly divided nation.  This moment 
that could have been seen as the nadir of the Farewell Address was relatively 
short-lived, though, as the arrival of Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth in 
the United States less than two years later stepped off the most widespread 
reconsideration of the Farewell and the place its principles of foreign policy 
should continue to hold to take place in the nation‟s history. 
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Six: “Washington or Kossuth?”: The Farewell Address in the American Mind 
after Fifty Years 
 
 Speaking in New York City on 11 December 1851 at the Corporation 
Dinner being held in his honor, Hungarian revolutionary leader Louis Kossuth 
presented his arguments for why America‟s long-standing principles of foreign 
policy were antiquated and preventing the United States from assuming its 
rightful place in the world.  He declared that “there can be scarcely any thing 
more dangerous to the progressive development, of whatever nation, than to take 
for a basis that which is none; to take for a principle that which is but the 
convenience of the passing situation; to take for substantial that which is but 
accidental, or take for a constitutional doctrine that which was but the momentary 
exigency of administrative policy.”  He was, of course, talking about George 
Washington‟s Farewell Address.1 
 Kossuth had come to the United States to generate support for the recently 
quashed Hungarian revolution against Austria.  He was specifically looking for a 
declaration by the U.S. government that it would go to war to prevent Russia, or 
any other European power, from intervening to put Hungary down, as Russia had 
in Hungary‟s original defeat in 1849.  He believed that every nation had a 
sovereign right to determine its own fate without outside interference, and that 
this principle of non-intervention should be part of international law, and he 
toured the United States for seven months advocating this principle of 
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intervention to defend non-intervention.  Kossuth‟s tour, while somewhat 
overlooked today, was in many ways a watershed moment for the United States.  
His arrival stepped off a spirited debate in Congress over the fundamental nature 
of U.S. foreign policy, but it was not contained to the legislative halls of the 
nation‟s capital; Americans of all classes and political persuasions were drawn to 
Kossuth and the power of his oratory and the cause he represented.  Kossuth‟s 
visit was a cultural phenomenon as people traveled hundreds of miles just to see 
him in person and hear him speak.  Most importantly, people throughout the 
nation engaged Kossuth on the level he engaged them and openly debated the 
merits of his arguments, and the meaning and significance of Washington‟s 
Farewell Address to America‟s past as well as its future.  This chapter will briefly 
consider the growing interventionist sentiment in the United States before 
Kossuth‟s arrival, but will primarily focus on the Hungarian‟s tour of the country, 
examining his central arguments, Americans‟ responses to them, and the larger 
cultural impact he had in the United States by highlighting key events in New 
York, Washington, D.C., and Boston.  This investigation reveals a great deal 
about the place the Farewell Address occupied in the American mind fifty years 
after Washington‟s death, and it provides insight into the broader popular 
conceptions of America‟s principles of foreign policy and the role the United 
States should play in the world.  While Kossuth was ultimately unable to convince 
the United States to endorse the principle of intervention for non-intervention, he 
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did succeed in producing the most significant reevaluation of Washington‟s 
Farewell Address to take place in the nation‟s history. 
 
A More Interventionist Foreign Policy? 
 After the victory over Mexico in 1848 a growing number of Americans 
began to urge the adoption of a more activist and interventionist foreign policy.  
This impulse was put on display, for example, in some of the arguments made to 
justify intervention in Yucatan in 1848.  Such arguments were among the earliest 
strains of thought in the Young America movement.  The basic premise of Young 
America was that the development of the United States by mid-century, in terms 
of territorial and population growth, the maturation of political institutions, and 
the recently demonstrated strength of the nation‟s military, represented a 
transition for the country from proverbial infancy and adolescence to manhood.  
Proponents of Young America, primarily members of the Democratic party, 
believed that the United States had not just the ability, but the duty to act 
internationally in defense of republicanism and liberal principles.  The Yucatan 
debate in Congress is not typically discussed in relation to the development of 
Young America, at least in part because liberal principles were not at stake, but 
the arguments, and more importantly the leading proponents, were consistent, 
making it a revealing look into the early formation of the movement.  The fullest 
expression of these ideas would not come until 1851-52 and the tour of Louis 
Kossuth throughout the United States, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Suffice it to say that Kossuth‟s calls for the United States to move past its old 
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modes of foreign policy thought and towards greater engagements with 
international movements were warmly received by those subscribing to Young 
America.
2
 
 Of greater notoriety in the years preceding Kossuth‟s arrival were 
American filibustering expeditions into the Caribbean and Latin America.  Some 
U.S. citizens, discontented with the unwillingness of the federal government to 
take a more activist approach to international and especially hemispheric affairs, 
chose to take matters into their own hands by outfitting private expeditions to 
invade neighboring islands and nations, most notably Cuba and Nicaragua.  These 
filibustering expeditions were often motivated as much by economic gain as by 
political ideals for those involved, but many Americans saw them within the 
context of the larger struggle over the proper aims and direction of U.S. foreign 
policy after Mexico.  Private interventions in Cuba in 1851 generated so much 
national attention that President Millard Fillmore issued a proclamation 
disapproving of them and prominent Whig newspapers vigorously condemned 
them.
3
  The Daily National Intelligencer of Washington, D.C., for example, 
repeatedly editorialized against filibustering in Cuba, and on 26 August 1851 
argued that these expeditions were a violation of existing treaties with Spain, and 
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that “This Government, were it not otherwise solemnly pledged, . . .  would be 
bound by a regard to its own honor and professions, to compel its citizens to 
respect the authority of Spain so far as to abstain from all enterprises against its 
territories.  Non-intervention in the internal administration of other Governments 
is the established policy of the United States, and universally recognised as such 
by every Administration of this Government.”4  The personal foreign policies of 
intervention threatened long-standing national principles as well as the reputation 
of the United States around the world.
5
 
 The desire of the government to remain uninvolved in international 
questions that did not pertain to its own direct interests was not universally 
adhered to in this period, as was witnessed in February and March 1851 when 
Congress approved the use of a U.S. naval ship to see Hungarian revolutionary 
leader Louis Kossuth transported from his captivity in Turkey to a new home in 
the United States.  American interest in Kossuth stretched back to 1848 when the 
outbreak of revolution throughout much of Europe captured the national 
imagination in the United States.  These revolutionary movements in the name of 
liberal reform on a continent historically dominated by aristocracy and monarchy 
were hailed in the United States as the dawning of a new era of republican and 
popular government.  Americans paid special attention to events in Hungary, 
which was fighting for an autonomous existence from Austria, and which fought 
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on long after many of the other revolutions had been quashed.  At the center of 
Hungary‟s struggle was Governor Louis Kossuth, who most Americans believed 
epitomized all that was right and praiseworthy about the revolutionary movements 
on the continent.  Kossuth was widely labeled a “genius” and deemed to be the 
George Washington of Hungary.
6
  The Austrian government, realizing it alone 
could not put down the Hungarian resistance, called upon the Russian military to 
assist, and the tide soon began to turn in Austria‟s favor.  On 11 August 1849, 
Kossuth abdicated in favor of Hungary‟s leading general, and fled to Turkey; two 
days later the revolution ended in surrender and defeat due largely to Russia‟s 
intervention.  Kossuth was soon after taken into custody in Turkey, and, to 
appease the Austrians, he was held under house arrest until 1851. 
 After his capture Kossuth was out of public view but he remained in the 
public‟s interest, especially in the United States, where people continued to 
sympathize with the plight of his nascent country and his own personal 
imprisonment.  The best demonstration of the strength of this sympathy was seen 
in February and March 1851 when Congress passed a resolution “to authorize the 
employment of some one of the public vessels . . . to receive and convey to the 
United States the said Louis Kossuth and his associates in captivity.”  Those who 
supported the resolution believed that it was “the wish” of Kossuth and his fellow 
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exiles “to emigrate to the United States.”7  That Congress was authorizing the use 
of a government vessel to carry out this transport was unprecedented, and some 
observers, both in the United States and in Europe, believed that it represented an 
act of intervention in European affairs, but Congress saw it as facilitating the 
emigration of a group of exiles to the United States upon their release from 
Turkey; as providing transport for Louis Kossuth, émigré, and not Louis Kossuth, 
revolutionary leader.  Unbeknownst to Congress was that Kossuth did not 
consider himself a mere exile, and had reassumed responsibility for the 
continuation of his country‟s revolution, going so far as to reappropriate the title 
of Governor of Hungary to himself.
8
 
 Turkey released Kossuth to the custody of the United States on 10 
September 1851, when he boarded the U.S.S. Mississippi bound for New York 
City.
9
  Captain John C. Long of the Mississippi was under strict orders to “„Avoid 
the expression of any opinion . . . inclined towards any particular party or nation.  
It is the determination of the government to preserve our neutrality strictly. . . .  
[A]ny deviation from the foregoing order . . . will hardly, under any 
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circumstances, admit of an excuse.‟”10  If Kossuth truly planned on settling in the 
United States to a life of quiet peace, such orders should have been easy to follow, 
but his behavior onboard the Mississippi made it immediately clear that quiet 
peace was not the future he had chosen.  Instead, at every port he courted the 
crowds that cheered both him and the United States for taking the side of 
European freedom, and in doing so he jeopardized the appearance of American 
neutrality.  With the situation growing increasingly untenable, Kossuth was 
allowed to leave the Mississippi to travel to Britain, from whence he would 
proceed to the United States several weeks later on a private vessel.
11
  The 
proceedings on the Mississippi, frustrating for both American authorities and for 
Kossuth, should have signaled to both sides that there would be difficult times 
ahead. 
 Kossuth docked at Southampton, England on 23 October for four weeks of 
public speeches and private meetings.  Kossuth felt that his time in England was 
vital for organizing a renewed revolutionary movement throughout Europe, and 
especially in Hungary.  His efforts at organization were largely unsuccessful; 
however, the trip to Britain still proved to be quite important, both for the effect it 
had in the United States and for the impact it had on Kossuth‟s expectations for 
that he could achieve when he got there.  While news of Kossuth‟s clashes with 
Captain Long was initially greeted with disdain by some Americans, most quickly 
forgot once transcripts of his British speeches reached the United States.  
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Speaking before immense crowds numbering in the tens of thousands (some 
newspaper accounts of one London speech reported a crowd of up to 100,000 
people), Kossuth spoke out in defense of the liberal principles that had garnered 
him international acclaim in the first place.  He also revealed for the first time 
that, far from looking to settle down to a life of peace and quiet, he was going to 
the United States to garner support for the Hungarian cause.  At a speech in 
Manchester, Kossuth declared his hope that he would be able to enlist the United 
States in an alliance with Great Britain in defense of the principles of non-
intervention and human liberty.  He saw U.S. efforts to see him released from 
Turkey as evidence of that nation‟s desire to stand up for his principles and his 
nation‟s right to an independent future; non-intervention was the key to both.  As 
Kossuth explained to his cheering audience, non-intervention meant that no nation 
had the “right to interfere with the domestic affairs of another country.”  The 
refusal to act when that principle was violated and in the face of humanity‟s 
suffering was not non-intervention, but “an encouragement even to despotism, to 
carry their victory of absolutism, which has gone so much too far already.”12  The 
implication, soon to be confirmed, was that Kossuth expected the United States to 
change its traditional foreign policy. 
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 Kossuth had not settled on such a bold course on his own.  Just days after 
he arrived in England, at a dinner in his honor, former U.S. senator and treasury 
secretary Robert J. Walker, a Democrat from Mississippi, declared what Kossuth 
assumed to be U.S. principles.  Walker stated that “The people of the United 
States had always maintained . . . the doctrine of non-intervention.  It is but a few 
years since they were an infant State; they were now probably approaching 
manhood, and they still held sacred the doctrine that no Government had any right 
to interfere in the domestic affairs of another county. . . .  They were in favor, 
then, of the doctrine of non-intervention.”  Walker continued that he “desired now 
to endorse the sentiment . . . and the people of America would be ready to endorse 
it too – that whilst they were opposed to any intervention in the concerns of other 
countries, the time might come when, if despots should combine to overthrow the 
liberties of any nation, the people of the United States would be prepared to unite 
with their ancestors [the British]” to defend the principles of liberty.13  These 
remarks, by a prominent American, an American said by some to be running for 
president, struck Kossuth deeply.  He believed that Walker spoke for all 
Americans, and that his sentiments not only suggested that the United States 
would forcibly defend the principle of non-intervention, but would also accede to 
an Anglo-American alliance to do it.  Thus Kossuth departed for the United States 
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on 20 November with a declared agenda and an expectation of success in 
achieving it. 
 
Louis Kossuth in the United States 
 The level of popular enthusiasm and rejoicing that greeted Kossuth upon 
his arrival in New York City likely surpassed his expectations, but trouble loomed 
at the highest levels of government.  On 2 December, President Millard Fillmore 
delivered his annual address to Congress, declaring that Kossuth “has expressed 
his grateful acknowledgments for the interposition of this Government in behalf 
of himself and his associates. This country has been justly regarded as a safe 
asylum for those whom political events have exiled from their own homes in 
Europe, and it is recommended to Congress to consider in what manner Governor 
Kossuth and his companions, brought hither by its authority, shall be received and 
treated.”14  Fillmore clearly expected to welcome Kossuth as a political exile and 
not as a foreign revolutionary.  More revealing, though, was the reaction of 
Congress to a resolution introduced by Democratic Senator Henry S. Foote of 
Mississippi for Kossuth‟s reception.  The resolution requested a “joint committee 
of the two Houses of Congress . . . be appointed . . . to make suitable 
arrangements for the reception of Louis Kossuth, Governor of Hungary, on his 
arrival in the United States, and to communicate to him assurances of the 
profound respect entertained for him by the people of the United States; and to 
tender to him, on the part of Congress, and in the name of the people of the 
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United States, the hospitalities of the Metropolis of the Union.”15  Foote hoped 
that this resolution of welcome could be passed immediately, as its terms were 
“exceedingly guarded, and can do no harm any way,” but he encountered a great 
deal of resistance and was forced to withdraw his resolution two days later.  New 
York Whig William H. Seward introduced a substitute that simply stated “That 
the Congress of the United States, in the name and behalf of the people of the 
United States, give Louis Kossuth a cordial welcome to the capital and to the 
country.”16  Even this resolution was subjected to a strenuous debate and was not 
passed by both houses of Congress until 15 December. 
 Most of the debate over the welcoming resolutions focused on Kossuth‟s 
principle of intervention for non-intervention and what an official Congressional 
welcome would mean for U.S. foreign policy and for the perception of the United 
States in the rest of the world.  In the earliest part of the debate, Joseph 
Underwood, a Whig from Kentucky, expressed the concern that “if we commence 
the system of complimenting foreigners for distinguished services in their own 
country in behalf of human liberty, there is no end; there is no limit to the exercise 
of this power, from this time forth forever. . . .  How long is it, after you bring 
your aid and assistance by words, before you must carry it out by deeds?”  He was 
“not for making idle declarations which we are not to carry out.  If we do 
intervene by word, I am for intervening by action also.  But I am not for 
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intervening in any way.  I think the soundest policy for any man, family, or 
nation, is to mind its own business and let the business of other people alone.”17 
 John Macpherson Berrien, a Whig from Georgia, lamented that Kossuth 
“comes here for the purpose of propagating a political principle,” and worried that 
knowing “the object for which he has come,” the rest of the world would be 
“much more authorized than they were . . . to conclude that the welcome to 
Governor Kossuth implies a pledge that we will interpose, if necessary, and in the 
manner he desires, for the protection of the Hungarian nation.”  He feared that 
“Such a pledge once given would be irrevocable.”  As was made clear during the 
Panama debate, international pledges were precarious.  To counteract this 
perception, Berrien proposed an amendment to the welcoming resolution 
clarifying “that it is not the purpose of Congress to depart from the settled policy 
of this Government which forbids all interference with the domestic concerns of 
other nations.”18  Whig Jacob Miller was likewise unwilling “to go to war on the 
Continent of Europe, by money, men, and political influence, for the cause of 
human liberty there,” or to “put an end to that wise policy which we have 
practised [sic] from the days of Washington to this hour.”  Miller was one of 
several senators to put the United States forward as an example for the world, as a 
demonstration of the success of liberal, republican principles.  He urged his 
brethren that “The altar of our liberty has its own temple.  It is here.  Here let the 
oppressed of every land come to worship. . . .  Let them come; but let us not take 
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away that altar from our own temple and carry it off into the wilderness of 
European Revolution, there to be taken by the Philistines, or its fires to be 
quenched forever beneath an ocean of blood.  No, sir; it is here that our duty is to 
be performed.”  The United States had an important role to play, but it was at 
home and not on foreign soil.
19
 
 Charles Sumner, a freshman senator from Massachusetts, delivered his 
first speech in the Senate in an attempt to focus attention away from Kossuth‟s 
principles and on the man himself.  Sumner argued that “It has been attempted to 
involve [this resolution] with the critical question of intervention by our country 
in European affairs; and recent speeches [by Kossuth] in England and New York 
have been adduced to show that such intervention is sought by our guest.  It is 
sufficient to say, in reply to this suggestion, . . . that no such intervention is 
promised or implied by the resolution.  It does not appear on the face of the 
resolution; it cannot, in any way, be inferred from the resolution.  It can be found 
only in the imagination, in the anxieties, or in the fears of Senators.  It is a mere 
ghost, and not a reality.  As such we may dismiss it.”  Sumner, a member of the 
Free Soil party and avowed opponent of slavery, was eager to welcome a shining 
tribute to the cause of human liberty to American shores, and wholeheartedly 
supported the resolution, but since intervention was the talk of the day, he 
emphasized that in dismissing interventionist concerns in this debate he was in no 
way “encouraging any idea of armed intervention in European affairs. . . .  In the 
wisdom of Washington we may find perpetual counsel.”  Could he address 
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Kossuth directly, he would say to him “with the respectful frankness of a friend: „. 
. . respect our ideas, as we respect yours.  Do not seek to reverse our traditional, 
established policy of Peace.  Do not, under the too plausible sophism of upholding 
non-intervention, provoke American intervention on distant European soil.  Leave 
us to tread where Washington points the way.‟”20  Sumner was arguing for the 
continued centrality of Washington‟s Farewell Address. 
 Advancing the other dominant strain of post-Mexico thought on the 
Farewell, Democrat Robert Stockton revealed that he was “not one of those who 
think that no change will ever be made in the principles of national policy which 
govern our foreign relations; on the contrary, I feel assured that the wonderful 
growth and development of the United States . . . will demand a modification of 
our national policy, in various respects different from that which prevailed in the 
infancy of the country.”  He argued that “the rigid neutrality of the Washington 
administration, wise and just as it then was, would not now (if a similar 
belligerent State of the world existed) be possible.”  Whereas in the 1790s the 
United States had had to accept insults and injustices from abroad in order to 
preserve peace, in 1851 “No American statesman can now contemplate any 
condition of the world, or any principle of public policy which would for a 
moment permit the United States to submit to any indignity from any power on 
earth.  We acknowledge no superiors.”  The point of Stockton‟s speech was not to 
suggest a rugged intervention on Hungary‟s behalf, but simply that a full-throated 
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endorsement of Washington‟s Farewell Address was not always going to be the 
appropriate response to foreign policy questions.
21
 
 Fellow-Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, without necessarily intending to, 
issued the strongest defense of the original meanings of the Farewell Address.  He 
stated that he would “not say, as most Senators have said, that in no event will I 
be for interference by this Government.  I will judge of the case when it arises.”  
As he saw it, “To say in advance that the United States will not interfere in 
vindication of the laws of nations, is to give our consent that Russia may interfere, 
in violation of the international code, to destroy the liberties of an independent 
nation. . . .  I will make no such declaration.  I will grant no such license to the 
absolute governments of Europe.”  Being opposed to a declaration of non-
intervention did not mean that he would support a declaration in favor of 
intervention either, as “Such a declaration might be looked upon as a blustering, 
empty threat.  I would make no declaration upon the subject either way until the 
proper occasion shall arise.  I would have this Republic retain within herself the 
control over her own action, so that we may be in condition to do whatever our 
interests and duty may require when the time for action comes.”  Douglas had 
keyed in on one of the most important, but by then largely forgotten aspects of the 
Farewell Address – a casualty of “entangling alliances with none” – that 
Washington‟s warning against permanent alliances was not so much a statement 
against involvement in foreign affairs as it was a reminder that the United States 
always needed to maintain the freedom to act in its own best interests.  Alliances, 
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like blanket declarations, bound the nation to courses of action that might not 
ultimately be in its best interests.  In 1851, and in the future, non-intervention and 
a strict adherence to the mid-century view of Washington‟s principles would 
likely still be the best decision for the country, especially as it pertained to 
revolutions in Europe, but it was not the only choice and would not always be the 
right choice.  Douglas concluded by declaring that “The peculiar position of our 
country requires that we should have an American policy in our foreign relations, 
based upon the principles of our own Government, and adopted to the spirit of the 
age.”  Neither George Washington nor John Quincy Adams could not have put it 
better.
22
 
 In the end, the debate over the resolutions of welcome consumed two 
weeks, but ultimately produced the result everyone expected.  Berrien‟s non-
intervention amendment was rejected and Seward‟s original resolution, despite 
the spirited opposition to it, was very easily passed; three days later the House 
approved it with almost no debate.
23
  The problem, of course, was that by the time 
this official Congressional welcome was approved, Kossuth had already been in 
the country for almost two weeks.  While an extended debate over his merits and 
the principles he hoped to spread was not the governmental welcome he had been 
expecting, Kossuth‟s popular reception in New York City was fervent, to say the 
least.  His transport from Britain landed on Staten Island late on 4 December, but 
was still greeted by city officials eager to welcome him and hear him speak.  
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From the moment Kossuth landed on American soil, he did not utter a useless 
word, always working to educate Americans about the plight of his country, 
discussing what he hoped to accomplish in America, and, most importantly, 
laying out how he hoped to do it.  One thing that he learned in Britain was that 
everything he said was going to be widely reported in the press, so every speech 
he made was an opportunity to address not just the gathered masses but also a 
much larger national audience. 
 In his first speech on American soil, before a very small gathering on 
Staten Island, Kossuth made two important statements through which he sought to 
shape American and global perspectives on his time in the United States.  First, he 
declared his desire to “see respected the right of every nation to dispose its own 
domestic concerns.”  This respect meant that while he was in the United States, he 
would not “intermeddle” with America‟s “internal concerns.  You are the 
sovereign masters of your fate.”24  This was a somewhat awkward statement for 
Kossuth to make because he was, in fact, planning on intermeddling, as he was 
looking to change the basic principles and behaviors of U.S. foreign policy.  It 
was a necessary statement, though, because he needed to assuage the concerns of 
those who believed that he was seeking to influence the upcoming presidential 
election, as well as the concerns of a great many more that his speeches about 
liberty, self-determination, and intervention were going to be redirected at the 
American South and slavery.  Kossuth keenly understood that regardless of what 
he personally felt about slavery, he could not afford to alienate the pro- or anti-
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slavery factions if he hoped to succeed in the United States, thus he hoped that a 
declaration that he would not intermeddle in internal concerns would put the 
slavery issue to rest without ever actually having to acknowledge it directly.
25
   
 Kossuth also thanked the people of the United States for giving to him the 
title of Governor of Hungary in various addresses and invitations.  He claimed 
that it was “not out of ambition that I thank you for the work you have assigned to 
me in naming me Governor of Hungary, – but I thank you for it, because the 
acknowledgment, on the part of the people of the United States . . . is an 
acknowledgment of the rightful existence of the Declaration of Independence of 
Hungary.”  While this statement elicited cheers from the assembled crowd, the 
use of the title governor in addressing Kossuth hardly represented such a grand 
statement.  Americans had a habit of using old titles when addressing individuals 
as a sign of respect for past accomplishments; plus Kossuth had reappropriated 
the title for himself, so to address him as anything else would likely have been 
interpreted as disrespect.  More revealing of Kossuth‟s objectives was that he 
presented the use of the title governor as an acknowledgement by all Americans 
of the legitimate existence of the Hungarian declaration of independence, which 
was certainly a stretch in logic.
26
 
 Two days later Kossuth was brought to New York City for an extravagant 
welcome.  He was greeted at Castle Garden by upwards of 200,000 people, and 
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when he spoke he could barely be heard over the roaring crowd.  The speech gave 
further insight into his objectives while in the United States.  He once again took 
to ascribing motives and beliefs to the American people based on statements and 
actions that did not realistically signify what he claimed they did.  The important 
example of this was his statement that he was pleased “to know that the United 
States of America, conscious of their glorious calling,” had demonstrated through 
the “generous act of my liberation” that it was “resolved not to allow the despots 
of the world to trample upon oppressed humanity.”  As the debate about to take 
place in the United States Senate clearly revealed, the offer to transport Kossuth 
to the United States, even in the minds of his supporters, did not signify any grand 
declaration of American or humanitarian principles.  Nor did it suggest that the 
United States was ready to “become the protectors of human rights,” but this did 
not stop him from presenting it as such, and the raucous cheers of an audience 
swept up in the enthusiasm of finally seeing the legendary Kossuth only seemed 
to confirm him.  The Castle Garden speech was also the first time that he 
definitively stated his intention to “use every honest exertion to gain your 
operative sympathy, and your financial, material and political aid for my 
country‟s freedom and independence.”27  Anyone who still thought of Kossuth as 
an exile would have had their expectations corrected at Castle Garden.  Once he 
concluded his speech he was swept up in a grand procession through the streets of 
New York.  Later, from city hall, he looked on as much of the state‟s militia, the 
city‟s mayor, the state‟s governor, New York‟s entire congressional delegation, 
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and virtually every other major and minor official in or from the city and state 
proudly passed in review for the honored guest to behold.  As one report 
described it, the “entire route of the procession was . . . one continued scene of 
ovation.”28 
 Kossuth remained in New York until 23 December, throughout that time 
receiving small delegations from a variety of states, cities, and organizations, and 
delivering several major addresses before the city authorities, the state bar 
association, the militia, the press, and the ladies of the state, at Tammany Hall, 
and in Henry Ward Beecher‟s Plymouth Church in Brooklyn.  Kossuth 
demonstrated with all of these impromptu remarks and formal speeches an 
amazing ability to continually come up with new material specifically tailored to 
engage the interests and earn the respect of whatever audience he was addressing, 
while simultaneously bolstering the different facets of his own argument.  No 
opportunity to enlist a single person or raise a single dollar was missed.  Kossuth 
toured the United States for seven months, delivering hundreds of speeches, 
speaking to large crowds and small, for minutes or for hours, always hitting upon 
his central themes, but never delivering the same speech twice.  At each stop and 
to each crowd he – and the rather large retinue that accompanied him on his 
travels – specifically crafted his remarks to reflect an interest in his audiences‟ 
local histories.  At the press banquet in New York he discussed at length the 
importance of a free press to a free society, in St. Louis he reflected on American 
expansion and the gateway to the west, and in Boston he remarked on the lessons 
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he drew from the birthplace of the American Revolution.  At his core, Kossuth 
was a highly skilled propagandist, engaging his listeners‟ attention and appealing 
to their sympathies while also laying out a convincing case for supporting the 
Hungarian cause.
29
 
 Perhaps the best demonstration of the force of Kossuth‟s personal appeal 
was the outpouring of monetary support he received throughout his travels.  
Whether it was prominent individuals donating large sums of money, or, more 
frequently, average Americans donating just a dollar or two, most Kossuth events 
turned into successful fundraisers.  To facilitate this fundraising, New York‟s 
Central Hungarian Committee devised the Hungarian bond.  Available in sums 
ranging from $1 to $100, every dollar invested in a bond went directly to the 
Hungarian cause, and the bonds were repayable once Hungary had an independent 
treasury.
30
  These bonds were also seen as great collectible items, as each one 
featured Kossuth‟s likeness and a replica Kossuth signature.  By the time Kossuth 
left the United States in July 1852, he had raised over $80,000, and while many, 
including Kossuth himself, saw this sum as a disappointment, the total was still 
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impressive given that most of it came in small denominations.
31
  Much to 
Kossuth‟s chagrin, purchasing Hungarian bonds was not the only way Americans 
could monetarily demonstrate their support for Hungary.  Enterprising merchants 
began making and selling hats styled after Kossuth‟s, which they called the 
Kossuth Hat.  One report suggested that Americans spent as much as $500,000 on 
these hats.
32
  Supporters could also purchase Kossuth coats, which closely 
resembled the Hungarian leader‟s, and Kossuth oysters, which were distinctive in 
no way from regular oysters besides the fact that they sold much better.
33
 
 Few segments of the economy were left untouched by Kossuth-mania.  
Virtually every newspaper in the country was dominated by Kossuth stories; even 
those papers opposed to the Hungarian and his cause begrudgingly printed 
extensive accounts of his speeches and travels so as to not lose readers to other 
papers offering better coverage.
34
  For those who wanted to read still more, 
countless books and pamphlets detailing Kossuth‟s life and speeches, as well as 
                                                 
31
 Different historical accounts vary on the total amount of money raised, claiming as little as 
$80,000 by July 1852, or as much as $180,000 through the middle of February.  The most 
complete discussion of it, in English, can be found in Komlos, Kossuth in America, 157-58.  
Komlos presented the $80,000 figure; the claim of $180,000 was relayed in Arthur James May, 
“Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1927), 108. 
32
 The Pittsfield Sun (Pittsfield, MA), 11 March 1852. 
33
 Donald S. Spencer, Kossuth and Young America, 58. 
34
 Two newspapers demonstrate the extreme approaches taken to Kossuth.  The first was the New 
York Times, which had been founded in September 1851.  According to Elmer Davis, author of a 
1921 history of the Times, the paper, which had worked hard to establish a “reputation for 
balance,” asserted itself as Kossuth‟s “principal champion in America.”  Kossuth‟s arrival was the 
“first big local news story” since the Times‟s founding and was seen by the paper‟s editors as the 
perfect opportunity “to show New York what the new paper could do.”  On the other end of the 
spectrum, the avowedly anti-Kossuth Boston Pilot, emphasized that it did not report on Kossuth 
“for his sake,” but in deference to “our readers, particularly such of them as take no other paper” 
and would “like to know what is going on.”  Elmer Davis, History of the New York Times, 1851-
1921 (New York: The New York Times, 1921), 27-28; “The Pilot on Intervention,” Boston Pilot, 
27 December 1851. 
  
329 
 
the prominent speeches made both for and against Kossuth in Congress and 
elsewhere, were published and widely distributed.  People could also purchase 
poems, portraits, sheet music, and all variety of knick-knacks memorializing 
Kossuth‟s visit.35  At the same time, several cities and towns had difficulty 
figuring out how they were going to pay for the lavish receptions, banquets, and 
accommodations they had provided for Kossuth.  The influx of cash to Kossuth 
merchants also left some businesses that were not making a profit on him in 
trouble.  For example, the American Art-Union, a subscription art distributor, 
found itself at the beginning of 1852 unable to pay its contracted engagements 
due to the fact that December “was extremely cold and inclement, an 
extraordinary scarcity of money prevailed throughout the country, and Kossuth 
excitements and festivals engrossed the thoughts of all, and drew upon the purses 
of many thousands.”36  For better and for worse, people were eager to spend their 
money on Kossuth. 
 
Kossuth and Washington’s Farewell Address 
 In part due to the enthusiasm manifested for him, Kossuth overestimated 
the nature of American sympathy and support for the Hungarian cause.  More 
importantly, he vastly underestimated the popular attachment to George 
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Washington and the principles he espoused in his Farewell Address.  In order to 
enlist the military and political might of the United States on Hungary‟s behalf, 
Kossuth needed to convince the American people and government that it was time 
to abandon the Farewell Address in favor of a more internationalist (and 
interventionist) foreign policy.  He had given hints to this effect in some of his 
earliest remarks, but it was in his 11 December Corporation Dinner speech that 
Kossuth revealed the full extent of his expectations for the United States and his 
complete and explicit critique of Washington‟s Farewell Address.  Kossuth began 
by admitting that his “confident hopes” for success in the United States were 
“checked by that idea of non-interference in foreign, chiefly European, affairs, 
which . . . we are told to be one of the ruling and lasting principles of the policy of 
the United States.”  He understood Americans‟ “religious attachment to the 
doctrines” of the founding fathers, and the “instinctive fear” people had “to touch, 
even with improving hands, the dear legacy of those great men.”  But, he asked 
his audience, “is the dress which well suited the child, still convenient to the full-
grown man; nay, to a giant, which you are?  Would it not be ridiculous to lay the 
giant in the child‟s cradle, and to sing him to sleep by a lullaby?”  The Farewell 
Address had been declared when the United States was in its infancy, but now 
that the nation had reached its maturity, did it make sense to follow those old 
ideas?  Kossuth thought not, and argued that the United States had “entered into 
the second stadium of political existence, the destination of which is, not only to 
exist for yourself exclusively, but to exist as a member of the great human family 
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of nations.”  This meant that “the glorious republic of the United States must feel 
resolved to be a power on earth – a power among the nations,” and had to 
“unhesitatingly accept all the natural consequences of this situation.”37  This was 
the central argument of the Young America movement, and why many of its 
supporters backed Kossuth. 
 In order to convince the American people that the adoption of intervention 
for non-intervention was a necessary consequence of their new station, he needed 
to define for them what the Farewell Address did and did not mean.  He believed 
that it was “entirely an unfounded supposition, that the doctrine of non-
interference in foreign matters had been, . . . bequeathed to be a constitutional 
principle to you” by Washington, and that he had never “recommended non-
interference, or indifference, to the fate of other nations, to you.  He has only 
recommended neutrality.  And there is a mighty difference between these two 
ideas.”  Neutrality referred to “a state of war between two belligerent powers” and 
was what Washington contemplated when he advised Americans “not to enter 
into entangling alliances.  Let quarreling powers, – let quarreling nations war; you 
consider your own concerns, and let foreign powers quarrel about ambitious 
topics, or scanty, particular interests.”  Neutrality was “a matter of convenience, 
not of principle.”  Non-interference, on the other hand, referred to “the sovereign 
right of nations to dispose of their own domestic concerns.”  Neutrality and non-
intervention were “two entirely different ideas, having reference to two entirely 
different matters.”  Kossuth was adamant that Washington had “recommended 
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neutrality in the case of foreign wars, but he never recommended indifference to 
the violation of the common laws of humanity, by interference of foreign powers 
with the sovereign right of nations to dispose of themselves.”  Even neutrality, by 
Washington‟s own words, had only been intended as “a matter of temporary 
policy . . . as a temporary convenience,” and not as “a lasting regulation for all 
time.”  He reminded the audience that “policy is not the science of principles, but 
of exigencies; and that principles, are, of course, by a free and powerful nation, 
never to be sacrificed to exigencies.”  Kossuth may have been placing too much 
emphasis on single words, on the distinction between policy and principle in 
Washington‟s writing, but his larger point that much of the Farewell Address was 
only temporary in nature was a valid one.  In many ways what he was actually 
arguing against was the permanency and rigidity of the Jeffersonian 
reconceptualization and “entangling alliances with none.”38 
 Kossuth proceeded to investigate “how your policy has been developed, in 
the course of time, with respect to the principle of non-intervention in foreign 
concerns.”  Quite logically he looked to the Monroe Doctrine.  He argued that the 
Doctrine had been a declaration that “the interference of foreign powers in the 
contest for independence of the Spanish colonies, was . . . sufficient motive for 
the United States to protect the natural right of those nations to dispose of 
themselves.”  He also raised the instructions given to the U.S. delegates to the 
Congress of Panama, which “clearly stated, that the United States would have 
opposed, with their whole force, the interference of Continental powers with that 
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struggle for independence.”  While the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine 
was, at least nominally, to stave off European intervention, as we have seen, the 
United States quickly backed away from its warnings and emphasized its quite 
limited nature.  As for the Congress of Panama, the delegates were instructed to 
reinforce the notion of a limited Monroe Doctrine, and not, as Kossuth claimed, to 
highlight America‟s willingness to go to war to defend Latin American 
independence.  The salient point Kossuth forgot to mention when discussing both 
the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Congress was that the United States had 
been primarily motivated by its own security and interests, and not by the 
idealistic principles he was advocating.
39
 
 Kossuth felt that he had shown “how Washington‟s doctrine of perfect 
neutrality in your foreign relations, has, by-and-by, changed into the declaration 
to oppose, with all your forces, absolutistical Europe, interfering with the 
independence or republican institutions of Central and Southern America.”  By 
1851 the only reason this “manly resolution” had not been extended to Europe 
was due to its distance from American shores, but with the advent of the steam 
engine distance had become an antiquated notion.  “Distance,” Kossuth 
contended, “is no more calculated by miles, but by hours.  And, in being so, 
Europe is, of course, less distant from you than the greater part of the American 
continent . . . even nearer than perhaps some parts of your own territory.”  In the 
“present condition” of the world, Americans were “at least, as much interested in 
the fate of Europe, as your fathers, twenty-eight years ago, declared themselves 
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interested in the fate of Central and Southern America.”  When these facts were 
combined with America‟s recent “general interference with the Turkish captivity 
of the Governor of Hungary,” it became clear that “the natural, logical, 
unavoidable, practical consequences of your own freely-chosen government 
policy, which you have avowed to the whole world,” were that the United States, 
by its own principles and interests, was ready to intervene in Europe to defend 
non-intervention.
40
 
 Having demonstrated America‟s new policy, Kossuth laid out his three 
requests to the government of the United States.  First, he wanted it to enter into 
an alliance with Great Britain to ensure the international enforcement of 
intervention for non-intervention.  In case anyone still questioned the legitimacy 
of non-intervention, as he defined it, Kossuth quoted a letter written by 
Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette, in which he argued that “„every nation 
has a right to establish that form of government under which it conceives it can 
live most happy, and that no governments ought to interfere with the internal 
concerns of another.‟”  Kossuth was taking his ground “upon a principle of 
Washington – a principle, and no doctrine of temporary policy calculated for the 
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first twenty years of your infancy.”41  Second, he asked the United States to 
maintain its commercial intercourse with all European nations, even if they were 
in a state of revolution; he was concerned that Hungary have access to supplies 
and external revenue.  Finally, he urged the government to officially recognize the 
independence of Hungary “at the earliest possible time.”  Beyond these requests, 
Kossuth also encouraged people throughout the country to “form committees,” 
pass resolutions, and offer “financial aid,” all in support of the Hungarian cause.42 
 Throughout the Corporation Dinner speech Kossuth was interrupted by 
applause and cheers, but this did not translate into many new converts to his 
principles.  There were certainly those people and politicians, most notably the 
proponents of Young America, who had already been moving in Kossuth‟s 
direction even before he arrived in New York, who believed that it was time for 
the United States, in the words of historian Donald S. Spencer, to pursue a more 
“evangelical foreign policy.”43  It was these people and groups who had been 
most enthusiastic about welcoming Kossuth.  But he interpreted their strenuous 
support and the enthusiasm of the crowds he addressed as representative of a 
larger movement in his direction.  He was mistaken.  Those who had supported 
intervention for non-intervention would continue to do so, but most Americans – 
while still willing to sympathize with his cause, to attend and cheer his speeches, 
and to give monetary aid – were not willing to abandon Washington‟s principles 
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in order to ensure that Hungary get a fair fight the next time it sought 
independence.  This split in public opinion was reflected in the partisan popular 
press of the day.  Newspapers like the New York Evangelist and magazines such 
as The American Whig Review came out in defense of Kossuth after his 
Corporation Dinner speech.  The Evangelist felt that Kossuth had moved the 
debate away from questions of “whether we shall preserve a strict neutrality” or 
“enter into „entangling alliances‟” in favor of the more important question of 
whether the United States was “prepared to contemplate a violation of the law of 
nations with indifference, such as was perpetrated . . . upon Hungary, and was 
threatened against the Spanish Colonies of South America in their struggle for 
liberty?  We say – NO: we protest against it on the ground of both duty and 
interest.”44  The American Whig Review argued that Kossuth‟s “coming to us 
begins an epoch, and throws a new light upon our own future and that of the 
world.  Hitherto we have thought only of ourselves and our internal relations; the 
time has arrived when we must take our position before the world as one of the 
brotherhood of nations, and employ our powerful influence for the establishment 
of a law of nations congenial to our own institutions.”45   
 A much larger number of periodicals came out in favor of America‟s 
traditional principles in the wake of Kossuth‟s Corporation Dinner speech.  The 
Advocate of Peace believed that a departure “from the advice and example of 
Washington . . . would prove fatal to ourselves, and dangerous to the cause of 
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freedom throughout the world,” and described intervention for non-intervention as 
a “suicidal and interminable absurdity.”46  The Mercersburg Review feared that 
Kossuth could “change our whole policy hitherto, and entangle us in a general 
European war.”47  The Boston Herald described him as possessing “a very 
incorrect idea of the nature as [sic] our government and the tendencies of our 
people,” and declared that “interference would be entirely against the 
Washingtonian policy of non-intervention.”48  Several newspapers expanded on 
the idea that the United States should stand as an example to the rest of the world.  
One of the more interesting editorials in this vein appeared in the National Era, 
which argued that “The first duty, then, of the American Union is to preserve its 
own Republicanism, to keep it fires ever burning, like the sacred fire of the vestal 
virgins – to do nothing that can touch its vitality or purity.  This duty it owes not 
only to its own People, but to mankind.”49  Echoing the Washingtonian sentiments 
Stephen A. Douglas expressed in the Senate, several newspapers took a wait-and-
see approach to the question of intervention.  The New York Observer and 
Chronicle, while being opposed to an immediate endorsement of Kossuth‟s 
principles, argued that the United States needed to consider each potential case for 
intervention on its own merits, as “a nation may be so far off, or oppressed by 
such a formidable power that we could not render efficient aid if we should 
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interfere. . . .  In all cases we are to ask, What good can we do?  If we are in 
danger of merely getting harm to ourselves, and doing nothing to help others, the 
better part of valor would be discretion.”50  The Christian Observer took perhaps 
the best approach to these issues in praising Kossuth for raising “questions and 
principles which have never before been discussed in the popular assemblies of 
our country. . . .  The strong excitement of the popular mind in defence of great 
principles of right, is not to be deprecated as an evil.  It is healthful and salutary.  
It inspires thought – and leads many not accustomed to intellectual efforts of the 
kind, to think as they never thought before.”51 
 The debate over the place Washington should hold in determining the 
ongoing principles of U.S. foreign policy extended beyond the editorial pages, as 
speeches were made and pamphlets were published throughout the country 
dealing with Kossuth and his arguments.  In A Few Thoughts on Intervention, 
William B. Reed lamented the “exotic and Anti-Republican doctrine” Kossuth 
had introduced and that threatened “to launch the fortunes and destiny of this 
Republic on the whirlpool of European politics.”  He described the arguments 
made by Kossuth in his Corporation Dinner speech as being “absurdly 
overstrained,” and he took umbrage with the fact that “a foreigner comes amongst 
us to set to rights our notions and traditional opinions; to tell us, after the study of 
a week, what Washington‟s Farewell Address really means, and to reverse the 
                                                 
50
 Emphasis in original.  “The Right and Wrong of Intervention,” New York Observer and 
Chronicle, 25 December 1851. 
51
 Emphasis in original.  “Excitement on Great Principles,” Christian Observer (Louisville, KY), 
20 December 1851. 
  
339 
 
elementary principles of our foreign policy.”  The Monroe Doctrine had already 
been “stretched” by American politicians, but even so it still fell “far short . . . of 
sanctioning our involving ourselves directly in the sharp and ragged net-work of 
European politics.”  Reed likewise argued that far from supporting Kossuth‟s 
argument, the example of the Panama Congress proved the opposite, as “every 
leading member of the Democratic party . . . took open and decided ground 
against the mission, on this very ground of its contravention of the Washington 
and Jefferson doctrine of rigid neutrality.”  Reed even questioned on what 
grounds Kossuth had to come to the United States to plead for the cause of 
Hungary and for the “immediate recognition of the Hungarian Republic as an 
existing institution – a de facto Government,” given that “no de facto sign remains 
but M. Kossuth‟s title by courtesy, of Governor.”52  Reed believed that Kossuth 
was dramatically off-base in his discussion of American principles and American 
history.
53
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 Henry A. Boardman, in a speech titled The New Doctrine of Intervention, 
Tried by the Teachings of Washington, contended that the United States owed its 
“present position” more to George Washington than to “any other individual,” and 
had to repel “all attempts to pervert his principles and to seduce our government 
from the wise policy he prescribed to it.”  He did not object to American 
sympathy for liberal revolutions, but feared that intervention for non-intervention 
“would be most disastrous to the cause of liberty and enlightened progress both at 
home and abroad,” as it would “throw the influence of this nation, hitherto the 
beneficent guardian of peace and happiness among the nations, into the scale of 
merciless and insatiable war.”  This did not mean that intervention would never 
happen, but “Cases must be disposed of as they arise, each on its own merits.”  
Endorsing an all-encompassing principle would prevent the United States from 
exercising such circumspection in deciding upon its foreign policy.  Like Reed, 
Boardman invested a great deal of time discussing Kossuth‟s Corporation Dinner 
speech, which he described as Kossuth‟s “ingenious argument to explain away the 
principles of the Farewell Address.”  He questioned “Whether it became 
[Kossuth], an exile, invited to our shores by the generous hospitality of our 
Government, to set himself up, almost before the spray of the ocean was dry upon 
                                                                                                                                     
the intervening power enters against the wish of the government into whose territory it marches.  
Austria, assuredly, was not opposed to the entrance of the Russian soldiers.”  Kossuth‟s 
fundamental premise was that Hungary‟s rights as a nation had been violated, but, as these 
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his clothes, as the expositor of that immortal instrument, and to undertake to 
instruct the American people in the true import of sentences which are among 
their household words, and written upon their heart of hearts.”  He did not 
understand the behavior of Kossuth and “his American coadjutors, who in one 
breath laud our present position to the skies, and in the next exhort us to quit the 
broad thoroughfare which has conducted us to it, for intricate and tangled by-
paths which no nation ever yet attempted without being seriously damaged, if not 
ruined.”  If the United States was going to “sacrifice all our national traditions, 
and embark on the stormy sea of European politics,” then the proponents of 
Kossuth‟s principles needed to “show some solid reasons for it.”  The alternative 
had seemingly become “KOSSUTH or WASHINGTON,” but no one had 
adequately demonstrated why the answer should be anything but an emphatic 
Washington.
54
 
 As these editorials, pamphlets, and speeches demonstrate, the people were 
engaging the issues Kossuth raised in a substantive way.  Kossuth was making 
complex and convincing arguments in support of intervention for non-
intervention, but rather than blindly endorsing or unthinkingly dismissing them, 
people were confronting them in a very sophisticated manner.  This was 
epitomized by those who responded to Kossuth‟s impassioned pleadings by 
arguing that with no crisis afoot, there was no reason to make a permanent 
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declaration of future policy; by those who reasoned that circumstances and not 
rhetoric should dictate future action.  While defending contemporary 
understandings of the Farewell Address, they were also upholding Washington‟s 
original ideal that the wisest foreign policy was that which maintained America‟s 
freedom to act in its own best interests.  History indicated that the United States 
possessed sound principles and that the Farewell Address would continue to be a 
wise guide, but history could not predict future circumstances and future interests. 
 This national debate was still taking shape when Kossuth left New York 
for Washington, D.C. just before Christmas, but already his brief time in the 
United States had been both highly successful and greatly disappointing.  He had 
presented his case to hundreds of thousands of cheering Americans, had been 
celebrated at multiple extravagant galas given by highly important and influential 
people, had been daily courted by visitors from around the country, and had raised 
thousands of dollars for the Hungarian cause.  At the same time, he could only 
look on while the United States Senate criticized his principles before issuing a 
tepid resolution welcoming him to the country – two weeks after he arrived.  Plus, 
despite his best efforts to stay out of the slavery controversy, he had already been 
condemned by the Abolitionists for his refusal to come out against slavery.  He 
had likewise been abandoned by most Southerners, both because they feared the 
domestic implications of his rhetoric on liberty and intervention, and because he 
had been vocally supported by prominent anti-slavery men like Charles Sumner.
55
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Kossuth had thus encountered a great deal more resistance than he had originally 
anticipated, but he made his way to the nation‟s capital confident in himself and 
still hopeful that his enthusiastic popular support would carry the day. 
 
In the Nation’s Capital: Kossuth, Webster, and Clay 
 This hope came in the form of Secretary of State Daniel Webster and 
President Millard Fillmore.  Webster, a prominent figure in the history of U.S. 
foreign relations dating back to the 1820s, and the first person to hold the position 
of Secretary of State twice, was perhaps best known, especially in Europe, for his 
1824 speech in the House of Representatives defending the cause of Greek 
liberty.  In Kossuth‟s mind, if any of the influential men in Washington would be 
for Hungary, it would be Webster.  The problem was that Webster, as has been 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, was an unwavering defender of 
Washington‟s principles.  Even looking to the Greek speech, Webster had only 
proposed American recognition of Greek independence, not military intervention 
to help establish it.
56
  Kossuth‟s hope for Fillmore was somewhat slipperier, as it 
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rested on an out-of-context passage from his most recent annual message to 
Congress.  Kossuth frequently referenced Fillmore‟s statement that “The deep 
interest which we feel in the spread of liberal principles and the establishment of 
free governments and the sympathy with which we witness every struggle against 
oppression forbid that we should be indifferent to a case which the strong arm of a 
foreign power is invoked to stifle public sentiment and repress the spirit of 
freedom in any country.”  On its own this passage seemed to bolster Kossuth‟s 
arguments on America‟s new foreign policy; however, it was preceded in the 
address by Fillmore‟s reminder that the United States had proclaimed and 
continued to adhere to “the doctrine of neutrality and nonintervention. . . .  
„Friendly relations with all, but entangling alliances with none,‟ has long been a 
maxim with us.  Our true mission is not to propagate our opinions or impose upon 
other countries our form of government by artifice or force, but to teach by 
example and show by our success, moderation, and justice the blessings of self-
government and the advantages of free institutions.”57  Taken as a whole, the 
passage made clear that Fillmore believed that the United States should 
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sympathize with liberal revolutions around the world, but that its role was as 
exemplar and not as vindicator.  Kossuth‟s hopes in both Webster and Fillmore 
were dashed almost as soon as he reached the nation‟s capital. 
 On the eve of Kossuth‟s appearance in Washington, Webster complained 
that his arrival in the United States had given “great strength and vivacity” to the 
already existing “zeal . . . for intervention in the affairs of other states.”58  
Webster later remarked that he would “treat [Kossuth] with all personal and 
individual respect, but if he should speak to me of the policy of „intervention,‟ I 
shall „have ears more deaf than adders.‟”59  Webster‟s approach to Kossuth 
seemed to be a common one in Washington, as seen in the experience of Charles 
Sumner, Lewis Cass, and James Shields, who were delegated as the official 
welcoming committee from the United States Senate.  Sumner, in describing their 
initial encounter with him, noted that when he shook Kossuth‟s hand and greeted 
him “„Governor, how do you do‟?”, Kossuth‟s immediately reply was “„Let me 
rather ask you a question.  What will you do?‟  Thus at once, on the threshold, he 
opened his cause.”  When Cass was greeted similarly, he “turned the conversation 
from Hungary to the ease with which [Kossuth] spoke our language!  In this way 
he will be met at every turn.”60  These men in Washington wanted to welcome the 
man but not his principles. 
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 On New Year‟s Eve Webster formally introduced Kossuth to the 
president, in what would be one of the defining moments of the Hungarian‟s time 
in the United States.
61
  In a very brief speech, especially by Kossuth‟s standards, 
he praised the United States for its inspiring history, for restoring him to “life” 
and to “freedom,” and for raising him “in the eyes of the many oppressed nations 
to the standing of a harbinger of hope, because the star-spangled banner was seen 
cast in protection around me, avowing to the world that there is a nation, alike 
powerful as free, ready to protect the laws of nations, even in distant parts of the 
earth and in the person of a poor exile.”  He presented himself to the president as 
a “living protestation against the violence of foreign interference oppressing the 
sovereign right of nations to regulate their own concerns,” and thanked Fillmore 
for his declarations in behalf of his principles in his recent address to Congress.  
Fillmore, later described by one witness as looking as “rigid as a midshipman on a 
quarterdeck,” began by welcoming “Governor Kossuth” to “this land of freedom.”  
He acknowledged that, “As an individual, I sympathized deeply with you in your 
brave struggle for the independence and freedom of your native land.  The 
American people can never be indifferent to such a contest.”  He stated very 
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plainly, though, that “our policy as a nation . . . has been uniform, from the 
commencement of our Government; and my own views, as Chief Executive 
Magistrate of this nation, are fully and freely expressed in my recent message to 
Congress, to which you have been pleased to allude.”  Without explicitly rebuking 
Kossuth, he was making clear that he had never endorsed intervention for non-
intervention and he was not about to now.
62
 
 Fillmore was not treated kindly by Kossuth‟s supporters in the days 
following their encounter.  Shields wrote that Kossuth had been treated “shabbily” 
and that Fillmore‟s remarks were “worse spoken than it read.”63  The National 
Era described Kossuth‟s speech as “admirable in sentiment and devotion,” and 
the president‟s reply as “cold and unimpressive.”64  The Democrat‟s Review took 
the most negative view of the administration in complaining of its “churlish 
inhospitality” and its “Cossack civility.”65  For Kossuth, the meeting with the 
president made clear that the United States would not be abandoning its 
traditional principles of foreign policy or turning away from Washington‟s 
Farewell Address.  Just days after the meeting, Sumner wrote to a relative that 
Kossuth “confesses that his mission has failed.”  While many would later argue 
that Kossuth‟s failure was due to Americans‟ devout attachment to Washington, 
Sumner believed that it stemmed “from his asking too much.  Had he been 
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content with stating his case, without directly proposing any change in our 
national policy, he would have secured the hearts of the people, & would have 
prepared them for all that is practicable when the great exigency arrives.  But it is 
a rank absurdity to suppose that our Govt. – at this nether extreme from Russia – 
can pledge itself to be the executive power to enforce a new reading of the Law of 
Nations against that distant empire.”66  Sumner‟s was an astute analysis of what 
had transpired to that point; given the already widespread sympathy for Kossuth, 
it is likely that he could have accomplished more in the long term by looking for 
less in the short term. 
 While his mission as originally conceived had failed, Kossuth felt that he 
still had work to do in Washington and beyond.  On 5 and 7 January, he was 
formally received in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, 
respectively, and on the evening of the 7
th
, he attended a Congressional banquet in 
his honor.  Attended by three hundred guests, including prominent members of all 
three branches of government, Kossuth once again gave a forceful speech; he may 
not have convinced these men to support him, but he was not going to change his 
message.
67
  Despite these positive events, Kossuth‟s time in Washington ended as 
inauspiciously as it began, with an interview with another venerable statesman of 
old, and long-standing defender of national self-determination, Henry Clay.  Just 
as Webster was famous for his defense of the Greeks, Clay was known for the 
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years he devoted in the 1810s and 1820s to seeing the United States recognize the 
independence of the new Spanish American nations.  Also like Webster, and at 
least partially because of his experience as John Quincy Adams‟s secretary of 
state, Clay had become an ardent proponent of America‟s traditional foreign 
policy. 
 Clay, being in a poor state of health and in his waning days, issued what 
was likely the most pointed critique of Kossuth‟s views and the strongest defense 
of American principles the Hungarian endured while he was in the United States.  
Clay apologized for not having met Kossuth sooner, adding that his “wonderful 
and fascinating eloquence had mesmerized so large a potion of our people . . . that 
I feared to come under its influence, lest you might shake my faith in some 
principles in regard to the foreign policy of this government, which I have long 
and constantly cherished.”  Clay entertained the “liveliest sympathies” for 
Hungary, but was greatly concerned that war would “be the issue of the course 
you propose to us,” and questioned if, in that event, the United States would be 
able to “effect any thing for you, ourselves, or the cause of liberty?”  The past 
experience of the world had demonstrated that there was little likelihood; the cost 
of carrying out a war halfway around the world was too high, and the might of the 
Russian army was too great.  Thus, “after effecting nothing in such a war, after 
abandoning our ancient policy of amity and non-intervention in the affairs of 
other nations, and thus justifying [the despots of France] in abandoning the terms 
of forbearance and non-interference which they have hitherto preserved toward 
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us; after the downfall, perhaps, of the friends of liberal institutions in Europe, her 
despots, imitating, and provoked by our fatal example, may turn upon us in the 
hour of our weakness and exhaustion.”  These despots could rightfully say to 
America, “„You have set us the example.  You have quit your own to stand on 
foreign ground; you have abandoned the policy you professed in the day of your 
weakness, to interfere in the affairs of the people upon this continent.‟”  Clay was 
less concerned with the fate of Hungary than he was with the ramifications for the 
United States of a failed intervention in Europe.
68
 
 The recent widespread failure of liberal revolution in Europe had given the 
United States “an impressive warning not to rely upon others for the vindication 
of our principles, but to look to ourselves, and to cherish with more care than ever 
the security of our institutions and the preservation of our policy and principles.”  
Clay was an advocate of the idea that America‟s example could do “more for the 
cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect.”  He concluded by asking 
Kossuth, “if we should involve ourselves in the tangled web of European politics, 
in a war in which we could effect nothing, and if in that struggle Hungary should 
go down, and we should go down with her, where, then, would be the last hope of 
the friends of freedom throughout the world?”  Clay believed that it was “Far 
better . . . for ourselves, for Hungary, and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to 
our wise, pacific system, and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep 
our lamp burning brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations, than to 
hazard its utter extinction amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in 
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Europe.”69  In their parting words, Clay reiterated the great respect he had for 
Kossuth, but it mattered little, for he had done what no one else had: tell Kossuth 
explicitly that his principles were not America‟s principles. 
 Kossuth‟s failure in Washington meant that he had to drastically change 
his plans, and rather than triumphantly returning to England as he had originally 
intended, he set out to tour the rest of the United States.  He likely hoped that an 
outpouring of sympathy from across the country would put pressure on the 
president and Congress to take decisive action in his favor, or that he could 
somehow impact the presidential election taking place that fall to bring in a more 
friendly administration; at the very least he expected to generate positive press 
and raise monetary aid along the way.  Kossuth was thus incensed by lingering 
negative press associated with the Clay interview.  Some newspapers had tried to 
put a positive spin on the meeting when reports leaked of what had transpired, but 
it was clear that there had been nothing encouraging for Kossuth to take from the 
encounter.  To make matters worse, word also spread that he had made remarks 
critical of Clay.  Kossuth always maintained that he had made no disparaging 
comments, that he had the utmost respect for Clay, and that he was only upset that 
their private meeting had been publicly reported, but the original negative story 
was impossible to put down, and it hampered his efforts throughout the West and 
South.
70
 
 
Kossuth’s Tour 
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 Kossuth set out from Washington, and after a brief stop in Maryland, spent 
the rest of January making his way across Pennsylvania.  The highlight of his time 
in the state was his address before the legislature in Harrisburg, when a crowd of 
people, so excited to hear him speak, overran the chambers and refused to let the 
legislators have their seats.
71
  Kossuth spent all of February in Ohio, including 
more than two weeks in Cincinnati, which boasted one of the largest German 
immigrant populations in the country.  Through the end of February his tour was 
largely successful, as he was celebrated everywhere he went, although he did not 
raise as much money as he had hoped – he fell as much as $20,000 short of 
expectations in Cincinnati.  This success began to wane after he left Ohio.  Unlike 
most of his stops in the North, and with the notable exception of New Orleans, 
Kossuth was not invited to most of the places he visited in the South.  His time in 
Louisville, Kentucky was indicative of his reception throughout much of the 
South.  His formal speeches were still reasonably well-attended, with at least a 
few hundred listeners, but virtually all of the enthusiasm was gone; there were no 
longer cheering crowds or ostentatious displays welcoming him to each new city, 
he was not courted on a daily basis by eager supporters, and the sale of Hungarian 
bonds slowed considerably.  Just as problematic was the diminishing national 
newspaper coverage that resulted from his poor reception.  Even in those places 
most energized by Kossuth, papers stopped carrying daily reports of his travels or 
transcripts of his speeches.  For most Americans, the Kossuth moment had 
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passed.  From Louisville he moved on to spend a slightly more successful week in 
St. Louis, that was followed by five days in New Orleans that were among the 
worst he spent in the country.  Despite having been invited to come, he was 
greeted with icy and at times hostile treatment by the city‟s residents.  Once he 
left New Orleans at the end of March, he largely abandoned his Southern tour, 
taking only ten days to race through multiple stops in Alabama, Georgia, and the 
Carolinas, before returning to Washington, D.C.
72
 
 It was becoming increasingly clear that Kossuth was desperately in search 
of positive press coverage to keep him in the public eye.  Some newspapers had 
criticized him for not visiting Mount Vernon on his first trip to Washington, so he 
made a special trip the second time around, accompanied by several newspaper 
correspondents.
73
  Positive press was crucial for Kossuth if he had any chance of 
success.  This was especially true in a place like Washington, where, once 
Kossuth left, attention turned away from the man and towards his principles.  Just 
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days after Kossuth first departed the nation‟s capital, James Conger, a Michigan 
Whig, introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives declaring 
American support for intervention for non-intervention.  It was objected to for 
procedural reasons and was seemingly never introduced again.
74
  Several days 
later a resolution was introduced by another Whig in the Senate, John Clarke of 
Rhode Island, that sought to reaffirm America‟s attachment to its traditional 
principles of foreign policy.  The resolution proclaimed “That this Government 
has solemnly adopted, and will preservingly adhere to, as a principle of 
international action, the advice given by Washington in his Farewell Address.”75  
Echoing Douglas‟s comments of the prior month, the resolution stressed “That 
although we adhere to these essential principles of non-intervention as forming 
the true and lasting foundation of our prosperity and happiness, yet whenever a 
prudent foresight shall warn us that our own liberties and institutions are 
threatened, then a just regard to our own safety will require us to advance to the 
conflict rather than await the approach of the foes of constitutional freedom and 
of human liberty.”76  The United States would adhere to its traditional principles 
until it had a compelling interest to pursue a different course.  Over the ensuing 
months, many speeches were made on both sides of the issue, but the decreased 
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national attention being paid to Kossuth removed all urgency and the resolution 
was forgotten by the end of the congressional session. 
 The defenders of the Farewell Address in Congress also latched onto 
Washington‟s birthday as an ideal occasion to hold a banquet in his honor to 
demonstrate the nation‟s continuing faith in his wisdom.  The organizers of the 
event were quite open in their private correspondence that it was “an anti-Kossuth 
affair, or at least . . . a demonstration in favor of the neutral policy of 
Washington.”77  The New York Observer and Chronicle later described it as “the 
strongest demonstration against Kossuth yet made.”78  Those speaking at the 
banquet, including many congressmen, Supreme Court Justice James Wayne, and 
General Winfield Scott, never mentioned Kossuth by name, but the contents of 
their speeches and toasts made it abundantly clear that they were explicitly 
refuting the Hungarian.  Justice Wayne offered a toast to “The Congressional 
Banquet of 1852, in celebration of the Birthday of Washington – It will aid to 
make in the hearts of the American people, a sanctuary and a fortress for his 
virtues, from which native and naturalized citizens may combat for his principles, 
against the sophism of „Intervention for Non-Intervention.‟”  Another toast was 
given to “Intervention – We are not to be deceived by artful definitions.  Our true 
policy is, „Friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.‟”  The final 
regular toast of the evening was offered to “The Memory of Washington – May it 
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„moderate the fury of party spirit, and guard against the mischief of foreign 
intrigue.‟”79   
 Kossuth spent a week in Washington, during which time little notice was 
taken of him, making him especially eager to get to Massachusetts, which was 
virtually the only place left in the country excited to have him.  The state‟s 
residents had taken a keen interest in him from the moment he gained 
international attention in 1848-49.  When word arrived that Kossuth had landed at 
Staten Island, four hundred Bostonians traveled to New York City to see his 
reception, only to arrive a day too late.
80
  Richard Henry Dana, a prominent writer 
from Cambridge, Massachusetts, likewise traveled to New York to see Kossuth, 
making a “hurried visit . . . of one day” to hear “the wonderful Kossuth . . . at the 
bar reception.”  Dana described him as “a hero & a miracle,” but felt that he was 
“doomed to disappointment here.  I do not believe our country will interfere in the 
affairs of Europe.”81  Tracy Patch Cheever, a lawyer from Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, similarly remarked in his journal in the weeks before Kossuth was 
set to arrive in Boston that “I feel yet a strong sympathy for him even if his 
intervention notions are untenable, for in a case of such dire extremity to his 
country, in a case so noble and patriotic, he is surely somewhat excusable for 
arguing doctrines which may be unsound. . . .  If he is right in the grand object, he 
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should be encouraged even though his view of one of the means to be employed, 
be erroneous.”82  Dana and Cheever epitomized the perspective of many in 
Massachusetts and the rest of the nation: excited to see Kossuth, but neither 
hoping for his success nor enthusiastic about his principles. 
 One man who came out early and boldly in Kossuth‟s favor was the 
Democratic governor of Massachusetts, George S. Boutwell.  In his annual 
message to the state legislature, he declared that if Austria and Russia “shall assert 
the right of interference in the domestic affairs of European nations, . . . it would 
seem proper for our government to give them notice that we assert, on our part, an 
equal right to interfere in favor of republican or constitutional governments.”  The 
governor was careful to add that the nation needed to reserve for itself “the power 
to judge the circumstances and the necessity of interference, as events 
transpire.”83  He generally endorsed Kossuth‟s principles, but was not willing to 
guarantee American action if they should be violated.  Boutwell had been very 
pleased when the legislature nearly unanimously resolved to invite Kossuth to the 
state, and was even more so when Kossuth appreciatively accepted the invitation 
a few weeks later.  Members of the state legislature traveled to New York to await 
Kossuth‟s arrival from Washington, and on 23 April a special train left Newark, 
New Jersey to bring Kossuth to New England.  At several stops in Connecticut he 
was joyously greeted and cheered, and in Springfield, Massachusetts, he was met 
by a crowd of over five thousand and delivered a very enthusiastically received 
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speech the following morning.  Two days later in Worcester, state legislator 
Anson Burlingame gave the most Kossuth-ian speech the Hungarian had likely 
heard since his departure from Ohio.  Burlingame, a member of the Free Soil 
party who would later achieve acclaim throughout the North for his spirited 
condemnation of Preston Brooks‟s caning of Charles Sumner in 1856, reminded 
the crowd that Washington‟s policies were “for the exigency of those early times.  
Why, a nation can have no such thing as a fixed policy.  It must have fixed 
principles.  The eloquent speaker [Kossuth] has told us that policy is one thing, 
and principle quite another thing.  One takes its hue and form from the passing 
hour; the other is eternal, and may not be departed from with safety. . . .  Let us 
not wrong our fathers by believing they intended to chain this nation to the cradle 
of its infancy.  Washington himself has told us that his was a temporary policy, 
suited to the requirements of the time, but not intended to stand as our guide 
through all eternity.”84  As Kossuth had in his Corporation Dinner speech, 
Burlingame was calling for a more progressive view of Washington‟s Farewell 
Address. 
 The following day Kossuth made his triumphant entrance into Boston.  
When he arrived on the Boston neck, he was met by thirty-four companies of the 
military, which formed into a long procession to escort Kossuth to the State 
House.  Along the route, people lined the streets and watched from the windows 
to see the great spectacle.  The procession lasted two-and-a-half hours and 
culminated in speeches and a formal review of the military from the State House 
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steps.
85
  As one observer put it, reflecting on Kossuth‟s review of the military, 
“The lines were drawn as usual at the foot of the Common, and the surrounding 
hills were covered with the assembled thousands, like vast swarms of human 
bees.”86  While Kossuth reflected back on that day‟s proceedings thirty years later 
and was grateful to the “hundreds of thousands of people who had gathered for 
the occasion,” a more likely estimate suggested that closer to fifty thousand 
citizens had assembled to see Kossuth and watch the parade of the sixteen-
hundred-person volunteer militia.
87
 
 The most anticipated event for most Bostonians was Kossuth‟s evening 
address in Faneuil Hall on 29 April.  According to one report, by the time the 
doors were opened at six o‟clock, “it had become so densely packed in the streets 
before the hall that there was no moving through it, and some ladies fainted 
before the pressure was relieved by admission.”  An hour later the hall was so 
filled that “the pressure at the centre was uncomfortably severe.”88  The 
proceedings began at eight with a speech by Boutwell in which he praised 
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American principles and decried the Russian intervention in Hungary.  He 
suggested that the United States had obligations to defend liberal principles 
abroad, but once again would not unconditionally endorse intervention for non-
intervention.
89
  Kossuth then took the stage and spoke on the same themes and 
with the same passion he had since he first arrived in New York five months 
earlier.  Tracy Patch Cheever wrote about the speech in his journal the following 
day after reading it in the newspaper and reflected that, “I find some striking 
thoughts indeed, but not that impressiveness which has of course grown old by 
reason of the great number of addresses which have been made by its Author.”90  
Kossuth‟s soaring oratory had become routine.   
 The most interesting remarks made by Kossuth that evening were those 
that were a departure from his normal themes in which he attempted to explain his 
mission‟s failure.  He pointed to two factors in particular, both of which were 
beyond his control.  First, he had arrived in the United States “on the eve of an 
animated contest for the presidency.”  The domestic political situation and 
machinations had greatly problematized a fair consideration of his principles and 
requests.  Second, he claimed that “Many a man has told me that, if I had only not 
fallen into the hands of the abolitionists and free-soilers, he would have supported 
me; and, had I landed somewhere in the south, instead of New York, I would have 
met quite different things from that quarter. . . .  [T]hus being charged from one 
side with being in the hands of abolitionists, and from the other side with being in 
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the hands of the slaveholders, I indeed am at a loss what course to take.”  The 
only silver lining to these “contradictory charges” was that they gave him the 
“satisfaction to feel that I stand just where it is my duty to stand, on a truly 
American ground.”91  Boutwell later argued that when it came to the presidential 
election, Kossuth had “attributed too much importance to that circumstance, there 
can be no doubt,” as his failure could be traced to “Other, deeper-seated and more 
adverse causes.”  He specifically pointed to the fact that “The advice and 
instructions of Washington as to the danger of entangling foreign alliances were 
accepted as authority by man, and as binding tradition by all.  Consequently, there 
was no, and could not have been, any time in the century when his appeal would 
have been answered by an aggressive step, or even by an official declaration in 
behalf of his cause.”  As for his other claim, Boutwell believed that even had 
Kossuth been “spurned by the Abolitionists and the Free-soilers, he would not 
have been accepted by the South; for there was not a quadrennium from 1832 to 
1860 when that section would have contributed to the election of Thomas 
Jefferson to the Presidency with the weight of the Declaration of Independence 
upon his shoulders.”92  This assessment from one of Kossuth‟s strongest 
supporters in Massachusetts. 
 The day after his first speech at Faneuil Hall, Kossuth again appeared 
there for a Legislative banquet.  The demand for tickets was so great that they 
were sold and resold by enterprising Bostonians for much more than their original 
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$2 price in an example of mid-nineteenth century ticket scalping.
93
  Over the 
ensuing two weeks Kossuth moved on to the suburbs, visiting the Bunker Hill 
monument in Charlestown, Harvard University in Cambridge, the Revolutionary 
battlegrounds at Lexington and Concord, Plymouth Rock, and a host of other 
cities and towns in the eastern part of the state.  At each location he spoke 
eloquently about the historic events to take place there and how they related to 
Hungary‟s historic struggle.94  He continued to draw large and cheering crowds, 
but as his time in Massachusetts drew to a close, some of the enthusiasm had 
clearly faded away.  Kossuth returned to Boston for a farewell address of his own 
on 14 May, and while Faneuil Hall was once again “densely filled,” those who 
were admitted faced “much less inconvenience” securing a ticket and navigating 
the crowds.
95
  People were still excited to hear Kossuth, but for many the novelty 
of his visit had faded.  As much as most Americans genuinely sympathized with 
him for his nation‟s plight, and while there were those who strongly believed in 
his principle of intervention for non-intervention, for the vast majority Kossuth 
was more of a celebrity than a serious shaper of public opinion.  Once people had 
made contact with him, had heard his soaring oratory for themselves, had donated 
their small sum of money or purchased their memorabilia, many no longer felt the 
need to give up their time or treasure to him.  After attending Kossuth‟s address to 
an audience of fifteen thousand at the Bunker Hill monument, Cheever 
commented in his journal, “I rejoice in the privilege of having heard one of the 
                                                 
93
 Kossuth in New England, 97. 
94
 See Kossuth in New England, 97-259. 
95
 Ibid., 260. 
  
363 
 
greatest orators and Patriots . . . of modern days,” and then never mentioned him 
again.
96
  The mayor of Charlestown, Richard Frothingham, who introduced 
Kossuth on that day, kept a scrapbook of newspaper clippings detailing Kossuth‟s 
visit to Massachusetts.
97
  It was the same phenomenon as the Kossuth hats and 
books and Hungarian bonds featuring Kossuth‟s face; people wanted a piece of 
Kossuth, wanted a story to tell their children, not an American crusade halfway 
around the world. 
 Kossuth left Massachusetts a few days after his final Faneuil Hall address 
and took up a less hectic schedule in visiting the far reaches of New York.  By the 
time he made his final return to New York City in mid-June, the Kossuth 
excitement had thoroughly passed everywhere in the country.  The most revealing 
evidence of the state of Kossuth‟s popularity and influence was that when he 
departed the country on 14 July 1852, he did so with no fanfare and under a false 
name.
98
  He was not making the triumphant return to England he had originally 
expected, the American government and people had not endorsed intervention for 
non-intervention, there was little remaining enthusiasm for his cause, and there 
was almost no money left to show for the sale of Hungarian bonds.
99
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Kossuth and America 
 Kossuth‟s most significant failure was, as the old saying goes, that he did 
not quit while he was ahead.  Despite his self-confidence, his oratorical skills, and 
the truly sympathetic nature of his story, Kossuth was never going to succeed in 
the United States; there were simply too many interests – many of them having 
nothing to do with his actual mission – arrayed against him.  His decision to 
invest six months in touring the nation once he was assured of his mission‟s 
failure after his meeting with Fillmore was understandable, but it was a mistake, 
because he ultimately worked to cement his own legacy of failure in the minds of 
most Americans.  Had he left the United States after being welcomed in front of 
both houses of Congress and being celebrated at the Congressional banquet, had 
he left near the height of his popularity, his story would have been different.  The 
American desire to see and hear him would not have been sated, the press would 
not have begun circulating stories about poor receptions and diminishing interest 
before it stopped circulating stories at all, and the opposition to him might not 
have grown so pitched.  Once the president had rejected him, there was 
realistically nothing Kossuth could have done that would have led to the United 
States committing to intervene on Hungary‟s behalf, but an early departure could 
have at least maintained American interest in him and could have prolonged the 
discussion of intervention for non-intervention in useful ways.  Instead, Kossuth‟s 
lengthy tour ensured that the enthusiasm his visit generated dissipated entirely; he 
was still there but Americans stopped caring.
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Conclusion 
 
 The timing of his departure aside, the biggest reason for Kossuth‟s failure 
was his attack on Washington‟s Farewell Address.  The American people 
understood that intervention for non-intervention flew in the face of Washington‟s 
wisdom, but as several pamphlets and speeches demonstrated, this did not mean 
that they saw no value in the principle.  Even those who still believed that the 
United States needed to maintain Washington‟s Farewell Address understood that 
there could come a time in the future when it would be necessary to move past it 
(or at least to move past the Jeffersonian reconceptualization).  As Charles 
Sumner pointed out, though, Kossuth asked for too much.  Had he promoted 
intervention for non-intervention without asking the government for an official 
declaration in support of it, without asserting that the people needed to give up 
their attachment to Washington to believe in it, his principle would have been left 
to percolate in American minds so that when Hungary did seek independence 
again, Americans would have been keenly attuned to questions of intervention, 
and would not have previously ruled against it.  Instead, Kossuth gave the 
American people a specific reason to disagree with him and his opponents a 
persuasive argument to use against him. 
 The main result of Kossuth‟s attempt to convince Americans to abandon 
the Farewell Address was to reinvigorate popular consideration of and allegiance 
to it.  This renewed interest in the place that the Address and its principles should 
hold in determining U.S. foreign policy also helped to frame the collective 
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American memory of Kossuth‟s time in the United States and the reasons for his 
failure.  As early as the summer of 1852 this framing process had begun.  In 
speaking before the alumni of Harvard University in late July, Robert C. 
Winthrop, a former congressman and senator from Massachusetts, reflected that 
because of Kossuth, “The great name, the greater principles, of Washington are 
suffered to be drawn into dispute, and even to be derided as temporary.”  
Fortunately for all Americans, “The sober second thought has come apace.  The 
danger is over.”1  In a book review appearing in the North American Review later 
in the year, the author lauded the fact that the result of Kossuth‟s “endeavors to 
set aside the authority of Washington, and to give a new interpretation to the 
Farewell Address” had been “not to weaken the influence of Washington‟s great 
name and divine wisdom, but to freshen, in the minds of the people, a knowledge 
of his doctrines, and to exalt their reverence for his character.”2  The passing of 
years only served to further confirm this view of Kossuth‟s visit.  An 1856 
biography of Millard Fillmore reflected that “The deep, wide-spread sympathy 
manifested for [Kossuth] wherever he went, was unparalleled; but he 
misconstrued it, and was much chagrined when forced to discriminate between 
sympathy and policy.  To unsettle the national policy of a country consolidated on 
the maxims of Washington and Jefferson, was a task he could not accomplish.”3  
Kossuth had attempted to place the blame for his mission‟s failure on the 
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presidential election and slavery, and, at least to a certain extent, it would have 
been reasonable for Americans to have remembered it that way.  Instead they 
universally remembered Kossuth‟s mission for his attempts to overturn 
Washington‟s Farewell Address, and they remembered his failure because they 
were unwilling to see him accomplish that. 
 As the Kossuth episode demonstrated, the majority of Americans still 
drew wisdom from Washington‟s Farewell Address and believed that continued 
adherence to its maxims was of great importance to America‟s present and future 
growth and happiness.  It also made clear that American understandings of the 
Farewell Address had evolved over time.  Washington had intended the Address 
as a warning to all Americans to always be guided by the nation‟s best interests 
when constructing foreign policy, as he recognized that those interests would 
change over time as the nation grew and matured.  With the Jeffersonian 
reconceptualization, though, most Americans began to view the Address with a 
more isolationist conception of what those best interests were.  In many ways this 
process culminated in the all-or-nothing approach taken in the debate over the 
Congress of Panama.  Whereas John Quincy Adams asserted that the United 
States had more interests in common with the new nations of Latin America than 
it did with Europe, and thus should pursue a different relationship with each 
region of the world, his opponents in Congress in 1826 argued that “entangling 
alliances with none” prohibited any such closer relationship.  In the twenty-five 
years after this debate, more Americans began to recognize (largely unknowingly) 
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the validity of Adams‟s original arguments, extending the United States‟ sphere of 
interests to cover places like Hawaii, Texas, and ultimately all of North America 
as being free from European interference.  By 1852, then, the debate over the 
Farewell Address centered not on the question of whether or not the United States 
had common interests with other nations, or should take an interest in European 
actions in other countries, but on how broadly those common interests should be 
defined and how far they were willing to extend a blanket of protection (or at least 
how far they were willing to declare that blanket to exist).  Proponents of Young 
America and others who had moved far beyond the Farewell Address in their 
conception of the proper relationship of the United States with the rest of the 
world favored the broadest possible sphere of American interests; however, most 
Americans had a stricter definition of American interests more in line with their 
understanding of Washington‟s original intentions. 
 Of course, for America‟s future, it was Tyler and Polk‟s more aggressive 
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine rather than an expanded view of the 
Farewell Address that would increasingly influence U.S. policymakers.  By 
manipulating long-standing national principles to achieve goals reflective of 
short-term and largely regional interests (slavery), they not only undermined the 
sanctity of the principles of the Farewell Address but set a dangerous precedent 
for the future.  Polk‟s attempt to see the United States intervene in Yucatan in 
1848 was only the first time this altered vision of the Doctrine would be used to 
justify foreign policies otherwise questionable in light of American principles.  
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Looking back to 1812 and James Madison‟s judgment to go to war against Great 
Britain, it had been interpreted with some legitimacy by many opponents of the 
war as a violation of the Farewell Address, but there were truly national objects at 
stake in the decision.  Economically, prosecution of the war had the greatest 
negative impact on the North, but the freedom of commerce it sought to protect 
would be in the North‟s best interests in the long term.  For Tyler and Polk in the 
1840s, no such universal objects were at stake, and rather than accomplishing a 
long-term good at the expense of short-term disquietude from one region of the 
country, the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico deepened an already 
dangerous divide and likely hastened the onset of the Civil War less than two 
decades later. 
 Kossuth‟s tour of the United States also reaffirmed the widespread popular 
interest taken in foreign revolutions and revolutionary leaders.  Seen in support 
expressed (and carried out) for the French Revolution in the 1790s, that of 
Spanish America in the 1810s, Spain and especially Greece in the 1820s, Texas in 
the 1830s, the European revolutions of the 1840s, and in the individual 
personages of Lafayette, Bolivar, and Kossuth, Americans were always impressed 
with revolutionary movements and individuals they saw as having taken after the 
American example.  More often than not they were left disappointed or 
disillusioned by the results, but the existence of republican revolution abroad only 
served to confirm their own conceptions about the importance of the United States 
as a guide to the rest of the world as to what was possible as an alternative to 
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monarchy and despotism.  This mindset was fostered by the Farewell Address, as 
American presidents encouraged sympathy but nothing else for foreign 
revolutionary movements because Washington‟s maxims called for non-
involvement.  This non-interference brought on by the Address not only allowed 
the United States the time at peace necessary to grow and prosper, but it 
reinforced in most Americans‟ minds how persuasive of an example the United 
States truly was. 
 The most important revelation highlighted by the American reaction to 
Kossuth was the great significance still attached to the Farewell Address more 
than fifty years after it was first published.  It did not rise to the level of sacred 
text until after Washington‟s death, and Americans may have maintained largely 
false interpretations of it at the hands of the Jeffersonian reconceptualization, but 
it remained the single most important document in shaping Americans‟ 
conceptions of their foreign policy principles and the relationship of their nation 
with the rest of the world.  From the Washington Benevolent Societies to the 
Panama debate to Centennial celebrations to the reception of Kossuth, the 
Farewell Address remained a key component of American popular political 
culture.  Even in the face of the increasingly tense ordeal of the Union of the 
1840s, and especially after the Compromise of 1850 as slavery came to dominate 
the American political landscape, Kossuth‟s suggestion that the United States had 
somehow outgrown the Farewell Address or that it never meant what they thought 
that it did only served to reaffirm and reinforce its status as a fundamental 
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statement of American principles.  Understanding the cultural, political, and 
diplomatic significance attached to Washington‟s Farewell Address not only 
illuminates the history of the Address itself, but also the development of the 
American nation in the first half of the nineteenth century.
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Appendix A: The Foreign Policy Portion of Washington‟s Farewell Address 
 . . . Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and 
harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And can it be that 
good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, 
and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and 
too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and 
benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of 
such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by 
a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the 
permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is 
recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it 
rendered impossible by its vices? 
 In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that 
permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate 
attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and 
amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges 
toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a 
slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient 
to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against 
another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight 
causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling 
occasions of dispute occur. 
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 Hence frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The 
nation prompted by ill will and resentment sometimes impels to war the 
government contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government 
sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion 
what reason would reject. At other times it makes the animosity of the nation 
subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister 
and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of 
nations has been the victim. 
 So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a 
variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an 
imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and 
infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation 
in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. 
It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others, 
which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily 
parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, 
and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are 
withheld; and it gives to ambitions, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote 
themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of 
their own country without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with 
the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for 
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public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good the base or foolish compliances 
of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. 
 As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments 
are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How 
many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice 
the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public 
councils! Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful 
nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious 
wiles of foreign influence ( I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the 
jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and 
experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of 
republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it 
becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense 
against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of 
another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve 
to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots who may 
resist the intrigues of the favorite are liable to become suspected and odious, 
while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to 
surrender their interests. 
 The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in 
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection 
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as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled 
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
 Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very 
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes 
of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be 
unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of 
her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or 
enmities. 
 Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a 
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the 
period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; 
when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time 
resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the 
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us 
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, 
shall counsel. 
 Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own 
to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any 
part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European 
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? 
 It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion 
of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me 
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not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I 
hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is 
always. the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be unwise to 
extend them. 
 Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a 
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for 
extraordinary emergencies. 
 Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, 
humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and 
impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; 
consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means 
the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so 
disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our 
merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of 
intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, 
but temporary and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as 
experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is 
folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay 
with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that 
character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having 
given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude 
for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon 
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real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, 
which a just pride ought to discard. 
 In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and 
affectionate friend I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting 
impression I could wish--that they will control the usual current of the passions or 
prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny 
of nations. But if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some 
partial benefit, some occasional good--that they may now and then recur to 
moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, 
to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism-- this hope will be a full 
recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have been dictated. 
 How far in the discharge of my official duties I have been guided by the 
principles which have been delineated the public records and other evidences of 
my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my 
own conscience is that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them. 
 In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe my proclamation of the 22d 
of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice and 
by that of your representatives in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that 
measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or 
divert me from it. 
 After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, 
I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a 
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right to take, and was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position. 
Having taken it, I determined as far as should depend upon me to maintain it with 
moderation, perseverance, and firmness. 
 The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct it is not 
necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my 
understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the 
belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all. 
 The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything 
more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in 
cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and 
amity toward other nations. 
 The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be 
referred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant motive 
has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent 
institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and 
consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its 
own fortunes. . . .
1
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Appendix B: The Monroe Doctrine 
 
 . . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through 
the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been 
transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by 
amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the 
North West coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His 
Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been 
acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this 
friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably 
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best 
understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has 
given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has 
been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of 
the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not 
to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . 
 . . . It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great 
effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the 
people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary 
moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very 
different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, 
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with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we 
have always been anxious and interested spectators. 
 The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in 
favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. 
In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have 
never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. 
 It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent 
injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this 
hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes 
which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. 
 The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this 
respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in 
their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been 
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom 
of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled 
felicity, this whole nation is devoted. 
 We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing 
between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider 
any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies 
of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, but with the 
Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose 
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independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, 
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in 
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States. 
 In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our 
neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall 
continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the 
competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on 
the part of the United States indispensable to their security. 
 The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. 
Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied 
powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, 
to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such 
interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all 
independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even 
those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. 
 Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the 
wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains 
the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to 
consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate 
friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and 
  
382 
 
manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting 
to injuries from none. 
 But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and 
conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their 
political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace 
and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to 
themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, 
that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look 
to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, 
and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue 
them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to 
themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .
1
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